

The misdeciphered or misdecoded or misread and unchecked dispatch from the Greek border authorities which elicited both the qualified Greek ultimatum to Bulgaria and the order to occupy Bulgarian territory evidently until the ultimatum's orders were fulfilled, proved to be quite costly to the Greek taxpayer. The special commission of the League of Nations under Sir Horace Rumbold which investigated the whole affair after the hostilities had ceased and the troops had been withdrawn, decided that Greece should pay to Bulgaria an indemnity of thirty thousand leva (about £ 45.000)—twenty million leva for material damage done on Bulgarian territory by the invading Greek troops and ten million leva for moral damages.

From the viewpoint of the League of Nations, which provided the corporate veil behind which the governments of the Great Powers concerned acted in response to Bulgaria's recourse to the League Council, the whole settlement was hailed as a tremendous success and as an omen of the League's effectiveness in dealing with the unauthorized use of governmental force in international politics and in implementing Articles 10 of the League Covenant, under which members states undertook to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of states. In retrospect, however, as Mr. Barros underlines in his conclusions, this success merely demonstrated that the preconditions for League (or UN) effectiveness in controlling and managing the use of organized violence by governments in the multistate system are Great Power unanimity and fights between lesser states. In the 1930's this became abundantly clear with Japan's invasion of Manchuria and Italy's invasion of Ethiopia.

Hunter College, C.U.N.Y.
New York, N.Y.

STEPHEN G. XYDIS

Evangelos Kofos, *Ἡ Ἐπανάσταση τῆς Μακεδονίας κατὰ τὸ 1878* (*The Macedonian Revolution of 1878*). Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1969, XII. 344pp. (Introduction pp. 1-10, Brief Historical Survey pp. 11-47, documents pp. 51-344), Indices, photographs, photocopies of documents, map.

Evangelos Kofos makes another contribution, with this work, to

1. There are also some documents of 1877.

the history of Macedonia. He has searched and published the archives of the Greek Consulates of Salonika and Monastir, and of the Vice-Consulates of Serrae and Kavalla, of the year 1878,¹ deposited in the Historical Archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry in Athens. From this source, he has thrown some light on the hitherto unknown rising of the Greeks of the then Ottoman-occupied Macedonia.

Everyone, who has searched the Archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry will realize the difficulties encountered by Kofos and will justly appreciate his remarks on pp. 5-6 of the "Introduction." His "Brief Historical Survey" (pp. 11-47), which was greatly needed in a work of such a nature, has some unfortunate short-comings, especially regarding the policy of the Great Powers during the period. The rising of Macedonian Hellenism in the year 1878 is a minor element in the general conflagration of the Balkan peninsula during 1875-1878. It cannot be put in its true historical perspective, if it is not considered in the light of the incidents in the Balkan peninsula during these years. Moreover, the policy of the Powers, especially that of Austria-Hungary, Russia and Britain could have been presented to the reader in a more detailed way and not incidentally, as it is done in the "Brief Historical Survey." Before leaving this Survey and at the risk of being considered pedantic and even polemic, we venture to make two more remarks of lesser importance, on this otherwise scholarly work. We would have felt happier if the book and letters of Leonidas Boulgares had been treated with more scepticism. The author tells us, of course, (Footnote 2 of p. 17 of the "Brief Historical Survey") that Boulgares's contentions, used in the work, are corroborated by documents found in the Archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry. We do not know to what extent they are corroborated. But, then, would it not have been more scholarly to have used the primary source rather than secondary sources, and in a case where the probability of bias is indeed very strong? Further, the reader would have been helped, if, in addition to the enumeration in Arabic numerals of the documents cited, the pages, on which these documents are found in the publication, had been given. (pp. 51-73, "Table of Published Documents"). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that this section of the work ("Table of Published Documents") is written with great care and the summary of the documents given is of great help. Another quality of this work (from the point of view of form) is the uniform method of presentation of the documents cited. The rules followed by the author are given on pp. 7-8 of the "Introduction."

— Reading the documents published, we are confronted with the gigantic

picture of the Greek Consul in unredeemed territories of Hellenism. Batikiotes and his colleagues of Monastir, Kavalla and Serrae were no exception to the rule. No one can give them lessons in patriotism. But I wonder if, sometime, they did not represent their wishes as facts. For example, were the Turks, living in Batikiotes's district, really so sympathetic to the interests of Hellenism, as the reports of Batikiotes to Deligiannes of 18th and 25th January, 1878 (pp. 88 and 91) suggest? The Bulgarian danger is another point constantly re-iterated in the documents. How to save Hellenism from a possible Bulgarian domination, favoured by Russia? The Greeks of Macedonia waited anxiously for "the Greek army to enter Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia" to help the revolution and they were ready for "any sacrifice" if Greece were willing to fight the Turks. Because their national pride was hurt "by the progress of the Slavs and the liberation of the Bulgars." That is how Batikiotes was urging his government to cross the Rubicon.² Hellenism must fight the Turk. After all, this was not a monopoly of the Slavs, who wanted to arrive at a solution of the Eastern Question, according to their own interests. But could the idealism of "the Great Idea" be reconciled with the reality?

The Olympus Rising of February-March 1878 which started at Litochoron made Batikiotes to report that it would become generalized and reach Verroea and Naousa.³

From Monastir consul Skotides reported that the Turks were taking measures to prevent the rising from spreading.⁴ Meanwhile, the revolutionaries constituted a Provisional Government. But the signature of the San Stefano Treaty (which liberated Ottoman troops) and British consular agents were important factors which helped to stifle the revolution. The Turks perpetrated their usual atrocities. Litochoron was burnt down. Other Greek-inhabited places followed. Batikiotes's report to Deligiannes of 15th March 1878 (item No. 41, pp. 121-124) is more than eloquent on the Turkish savagery. The Olympus rising was over. All that was left to the inhabitants of the areas of revolt was to send reports to the Sublime Porte, the Oecumenical Patriarchate and to the Powers, re-affirming their desire to be treated as part of the Hellenic nation.

But no one could really help them in their desperate position. The Ottoman authorities now became more tyrannical. The Macedonian

2. Batikiotes to Deligiannes, January 25, 1878, document No. 18, p. 91.

3. Batikiotes to Deligiannes, February 17, 1878, p. 96.

4. Report to Deligiannes of 26th February 1878, p. 196.

Greeks had to take their fate into their own hands. We are, thus, faced with the Greek rising of Western Macedonia. This rising was in the beginning (late spring to July 1878) receiving no material support from the Greek Government. It was only after the Congress of Berlin that official Greece actively supported the rising, which was at its height during the months of August and September 1878. But the Ottoman Empire sent her army to suppress the revolt. The Ottoman troops were commanded by the notorious Shevket Pasha. New martyrdom of the unredeemed Hellenes. The bashi-bazouks started their inhuman activity. In October, the revolutionaries suspended their activities. It was the severe winter, however, and not the Turks which forced them to do so. Circumstances, on the other hand, did not allow the resumption of the operations in 1879 and thus this chapter of the history of the unredeemed Hellenism of Macedonia was closed. We have to wait until the years 1904-1908, to see the Macedonian Hellenes in action against the Bulgarian penetration into their own country.

Reading the documents published in this work, we find ourselves confronted with the well-known "setting" of Hellenism under Turkish domination. Further, there are some elements pertaining only to foreign-occupied Macedonia. The roles of the Greek Consul and of the Greek Church in places, where unredeemed Hellenes live, need no comment. They are well known. Turkish inhumanity – "*il faut appeler les choses par leur nom*" as the French say—is sufficiently well known too.

Nevertheless, on every fresh occasion that I come across it, I involuntarily pause and meditate on it. I can never reconcile myself to the fact that our grandfathers, if not our fathers, lived in such a world. I think that our children of elementary-school age, must be enabled to read documents such as these published in the present work. Not in order to arouse national hatred. But in order that the children realize what their fore-fathers had to suffer and how more fortunate we are to-day. The agony of Hellenism is also depicted on other ways in Kofos's compilation, as we saw *supra*. The attempt to face the Slav danger. The great influence which the Great Powers have on the affairs of Greece. Finally, the tragedy of "the Great-Idea Hellenism": the abyss separating Greece's national aspirations and the poor material resources, which the State had at her disposal, to further such a policy. Since the establishment of the Modern Greek State in 1830, one of the constant factors in Greek history has been the military weakness of Greece. On the other hand, Greece's legitimate aspirations had to be supported by force of arms.

There are some isolated points, too, in these documents, which are of interest. One of these concerns Salonika. On 11th January, 1878, Batikiotes reported to Charilaos Trikoupes that the Turks and the Jews, of his district recognized that Salonika should fall into Greek hands.⁵ We found evidence in the Archives of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, that, during the First World War, the Jews of Salonika wanted this town to be placed under a Great Power.⁶

The index of the present publication is compiled with great care. Further, we are in a position to know the hard work behind the useful map found at the end of this publication. Kofos must take full credit for that. The presentation of the work answers to the high standards, which the publishers have set for their publications. But it is with a rather pessimistic note that I shall conclude this review. It is the photographs of Koumoundouros, Charilaos Trikoupes and Stephanos Dragoumes⁷ and the comments accompanying them, which have led me to this final remark. It is high time that Greek historians responded to the great challenge of filling the many gaps in the knowledge of Modern Greek history. Scholarly biographies of Greek public men of the 19th and 20th century—like Koumoundouros, Ch. Trikoupes and St. Dragoumes, not to mention Eleftherios K. Venizelos—are imperatively needed. The Greek and foreign primary sources are now available for the study of the lives of most of these men.

Cyprus

CHRISTOS A. THEODOULOU

5. Item No. 11, pp. 85-87.

6. This question is dealt with in a monograph which we shall publish during the course of the year.

7. Found in an appendix of the work under review.