

to its service, bringing useful information on conditions beyond the frontiers. All this was undoubtedly known as well as visible to a bureaucrat of Abdülkerim's rank. Hence the Christian world was no terra incognita to him, as Itzkowitz claims. While there is no evidence that Abdülkerim had been to Europe before his appointment as extraordinary ambassador to Russia, it did not require greater "courage and fortitude" of him to venture outside his country than it required of a Christian ambassador to journey to the Ottoman Empire!

In addition to an index the book has a map and a list of places on the travel routes of the two ambassadors, a biographical dictionary and a glossary of Turkish and Russian terms, and an extensive bibliography.

Brooklyn, New York

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Andrei Oțetea, *Tudor Vladimirescu și revoluția din 1821* (Tudor Vladimirescu and the Revolution of 1821). Bucharest: Editura Stiințifică, 1971.

The Revolution of 1821 in the Romanian Principalities has been one of the most crucial issues in Romanian historiography. For over a century Romanian historians of the "traditional school" had presented Tudor Vladimirescu's uprising as a spontaneous indigenous peasant movement, whose aims were different from those of the Greek revolt in the Romanian Principalities. While the goal of the *Philike Hetairia*, they contended, was the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire and the restoration of the Byzantine Empire of which the Romanian Principalities were to constitute an integral part, the prime objective of Vladimirescu's movement was the destruction of the Greek-Phanariote regime in the Principalities and the re-establishment of the native rulers, who were to remain under the suzerainty of the Porte.

With few exceptions, this interpretation has been firmly established in Romanian historiography. The challenge to the traditional school has come from Professor Andrei Oțetea. In his study of the 1821 revolution in the Principalities, which is based on an earlier work now considerably expanded and updated, the author departs drastically from the old theories and interprets the Romanian revolt as an integral part of the national liberation movements of the Balkan peoples against Ottoman

domination, thereby placing it within the framework of the Greek Hetairist insurrection in the Principalities. Vladimirescu, who was an agent, if not an actual member, of the *Hetairia*, was commissioned by the Hetairists to create an incursion in Little Wallachia (Oltenia) which would allow the army of Prince Alexander Ypsilantis to cross the Danube and proceed to liberate Greece. Oțetea considers the Romanian revolt not simply as an anti-Greek-Phanariote struggle on the part of Vladimirescu, but rather as a national and anti-Ottoman movement, integrated in the plans of the Greek insurrection in the Danubian Principalities.

Using a vast volume of archival sources (the first Romanian historian to make extensive use of British documents), and the recent mass of documents and memoirs published by the Romanian Academy, the author has succeeded in presenting a thorough analysis of the internal and external factors which contributed to the outbreak of the revolution of 1821, the role of the two protagonists —Ypsilantis and Vladimirescu—, the attitude of the Great Powers toward the insurrection in the Principalities, the death of Vladimirescu at the hands of the Greek Hetairists, the failure of the Hetairist movement and the subsequent re-establishment of the native rulers. Certain points, however, deserve more attention. The exact nature of Vladimirescu's relation to the Hetairist movement and Russia's attitude toward Ypsilantis and the Greek insurrection in the Principalities are two pivotal issues which need to be further clarified.

Professor Oțetea's competent treatment of Vladimirescu's revolt as part of the Hetairist movement does not solve all the questions resulting from such collaboration with the *Hetairia*. There is no doubt that Vladimirescu fomented the insurrection in Little Wallachia as a lieutenant of the *Hetairia* and fully aware of its objective, namely, to drive the Ottomans out of European Turkey. Yet, by placing the insurrection entirely within the Hetairist plans, the author often ignores the specific historical realities of the Romanian society which produced the stormy events of 1821. In contrast to the old school of historians who depicted Vladimirescu as the champion of the oppressed peasant and the proto-martyr of the Romanian cause, Oțetea sees him as a militant opportunist or as a trustworthy agent of the Hetairists. There is no doubt that he entered into a secret alliance with the Greek *Hetairia* and the author has convincingly proven this point. But far from being an obedient lieutenant on whose fidelity the Greeks could depend, Vladimirescu was,

above all, an ardent Romanian patriot for whom the Romanian cause outweighed any allegiance to the ambitions of the Hetairists.

As far as the attitude of Russia toward Ypsilantis and the Greek revolt in the Principalities is concerned, Oțetea contends that Ypsilantis embarked on his adventure with the consent and approval of Tsar Alexander I and John Capodistrias. This might suggest that the Greek insurrection in the Principalities was, more or less, another attempt on Russia's part to induce the Greeks to take up arms, as they had previously done. In support of his argument the author cites several sources from the Archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry. His conclusions, however, appear to have been read into the original sources and they are not the result of a careful analysis of the documentary materials. Nor is such evidence sufficient proof that Alexander I and Capodistrias were the real promoters and instigators of the Greek revolt in the Romanian Principalities. Although the Russian government was suspected of supporting the Greeks, there is no reason to believe that the overthrow of the legitimate government of the Sultan, which constituted the ultimate aim of the Greek Revolution, entered into Alexander I's scheme, particularly at a time when the Tsar was more interested in maintaining peace on the continent than in promoting revolutions which ran contrary to the conservative principles of the Holy Alliance. From their bitter experience with Russia the Greeks had learned that if they were to free themselves, they ought to rely on their own forces and not on the support of their co-religionists. Their long war of independence is perhaps the best evidence that this was indeed the case.

Despite certain ideological prejudices, ineluctable for a historian who basically interprets history according to the dictates of the official Marxist line, this study of Professor Oțetea is a significant contribution to the historiography of the revolution of 1821. He has succeeded in clarifying numerous questions and arguments which beset the traditionalists for so long. *Tudor Vladimirescu și revoluția din 1821* is by far the most comprehensive study undertaken by any Romanian historian in this important area of Romanian history.