

Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: the Case of Romania, 1944-1965*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. 317.

On the jacket of Professor Jowitt's book there are two comments by two authorities on communist affairs. Professor Montias, the Yale economist, characterizes the volume as "a dazzling display of political theory applied to the recent political history of a Communist state." Professor Zvi Gitelman, a political scientist from the University of Michigan, is even more effusive: "This book does two things superbly: it adduces factual evidence that is largely unknown and it treats it in an original, exciting, provocative way . . . It will be of great interest to students of comparative government and organization theory, communist area specialists, and specialists on Romania. The theoretical analysis is brilliant." Since this reviewer is more concerned with the political realities of what actually happened in Romania between 1944 and 1965 than with a theoretical analysis of the events of that period, no matter how dazzling or brilliant it may be, he feels compelled to express major reservations about the book.

Professor Jowitt's study is in his own words "an exercise in comparative analysis." That analysis encompasses a multitude of theories, the nature and scope of which is clearly stated in the four chapter headings (1) A comparative analysis of nationalist and Leninist ideologies and nation-building strategies; (2) Nation-building in Romania: Priorities and strategies, 1944-1955; (3) Emulation, mediation, and initiation: Romanian national development, 1955-1965; (4) A period of elaboration and synthesis, July, 1965-July, 1969. Subchapters devoted to "argument and areas of analysis," "organizational and situational factors," "the breaking-through process and party institutionalization," "a period of emulation," "'on' time and synthesis," and other similar topics further clarify the theoretical and comparative analysis as such and as pertaining to Romania.

The analysis is provocative and illustrations are drawn from the Romanian political experience to prove the validity of Professor Jowitt's work. But therein lies the fundamental weakness of his study in terms other than those of an exercise. Professor Jowitt's book is atonal. He uses chromatic scales which are alien to Gheorghiu-Dej's and Ceausescu's Romanian rhapsodies. It may be possible to provide a theoretical frame of reference for the actions and decisions of the Romanian communist

leaders since 1944 but the schematization developed by Professor Jowitt is so "mod," so unrelated to the *modus operandi* of Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceausescu, and other principals as to render "The Case of Romania" a cacophonic parody.

Colleagues from Eastern Europe have repeatedly expressed bewilderment over the jargon and methodology of "Kremlinologists" which they regard as completely alien to their own experiences as members of communist parties or as mere inhabitants of communist countries. Their views may very well be ascribed to methodological retardation and adherence to traditional, perhaps even rudimentary, historical concepts. But no matter how defective the historical method may be in terms of comparative analysis it does provide, at least for case studies of the historically-oriented countries of Eastern Europe, a more accurate basis for analysis of what "*wirklich ist gewesen*." The student of comparative political analysis will applaud Professor Jowitt's virtuosity; the student of Romanian affairs is likely to walk out "'on' time," at the end of the first movement of Jowitt's variations on a theme by Lenin and Gheorghiu-Dej.

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J. F. Brown, *Bulgaria Under Communist Rule*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. Pp. X + 339.

So little has been written about postwar Bulgaria in English that the scholar greets each new offering with great expectation and hope. It is unfortunate, therefore, that Brown's attempt to fill this void is marred by a collection of platitudes and biased anti-Soviet remnants of the "Cold War" days. In fact the author's acknowledgment that "many parts of . . . (the) book are based on Radio Free Europe analysis" should caution the reader that Mr. Brown is attempting to offer a polemic as sound scholarship. Actually, the author presents two major premises. First, he maintains that the Communist "takeover" in Bulgaria was almost identical to that elsewhere in Eastern Europe, i.e., as he intimates, directed by Moscow and without the aid of a strong native Communist movement. Secondly, he proposes that Bulgaria's wellbeing is (or would be) directly proportionally to its estrangement from the Soviet Union. In order to prove the latter he compares the country unfavorably to Yugoslavia and Rumania. Both of these premises are short-sighted, misleading, and in general mistaken.