

national problem in contemporary Yugoslavia. But perhaps the major thrust of this volume will interest its readers since it is intended to depict that nation's critical unemployment, high population growth, inadequate agricultural production, and youthful unrest. Nevertheless, the contributors are apparently convinced Yugoslavia has a very promising future. But they fail to consider Moscow's envy!

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Stephen Fischer-Galati. *Twentieth Century Rumania*. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970. Pp. x + 248 + 1 map.

*Twentieth Century Rumania* is Fischer-Galati's third volume in four years on modern Rumania. As such, it leaves the impression of having been written more for the purpose of filling out an Eastern European series than as a new contribution to contemporary scholarship. Even though this volume, unlike the author's *The New Rumania* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967) and *The Socialist Republic of Rumania* (Baltimore, 1969), discusses Rumania before World War II as well as the post-war republic, the history encompassed throughout relies heavily on standard texts. The author refers frequently to the works of Henry Robers, Ghita Ionescu, J. M. Montias, and to his own *New Rumania*—all of them in English.

Furthermore, although it may be argued that this history can be useful as a reference work to trace the intricacies of government changes in the Rumanian kingdom after World War I and the Byzantine confrontations between Moscow and Bucharest after World War II, in this respect it is not superior for the former to Henry L. Robert's *Rumania*, the definitiveness of which Fischer-Galati readily recognizes, and for the latter to the author's own *The New Rumania* which has essentially the same, although a more rigorous, treatment of the material covered in the sections for the two decades after 1945. In general Fischer-Galati's style in *Twentieth Century Rumania* suffers from his attempt to present a kaleidoscopic, all-inclusive survey of the country's history which leaves the reader somewhat baffled.

Nevertheless, if the major fault of the work is its redundancy, it still has the merit of presenting the author's always astute analyses of modern

Rumanian history. A good philosopher is one who can abstract essence from complex material and relate it simply to his colleagues. Professor Fischer-Galati here as in the past has clearly demonstrated the essential lesson of Modern Rumania. Despite all the western cold war rhetoric of Soviet domination, imposed regimes, and foreign occupation, Rumanian society today is, as it was in the thirties, an evolutionary product of its history—both its actual historical development and its historical myth. Fischer-Galati carefully distinguishes between these two, judiciously rejecting “the theory that the moving force in Rumanian history has been the quest for national self-determination, the almost universal desire for national unification,” (p. 8) while, however, conceding the impact that the national myth has had on the country’s modern history. Moreover, the successful demonstration of the author’s most important hypothesis—that the rulers of the Rumanian state in the fifties and sixties were following a national course just as were the rulers of the twenties and thirties dispels the contention that the leaders of “Communist” Rumania are less Rumanian than those of the bourgeois state.

The author views the coming to power of the Rumanian Communist Party in 1945 not as an unexpected development, but as the only realistic outcome given both the domestic and international situation. Vote fraud, Communist harassment of rivals, and the Red Army in Rumania were not the only reasons Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej came to power. The old parties had been discredited; viable alternatives in the communist dominated coalition could not be found. Although it is true that the Communists depended upon the Soviet Union for support, their rivals hoped to be guaranteed in power by the West. Fischer-Galati does believe that Stalin wished to establish an exclusively Communist government immediately after the war under persons from the “Muscovite” faction in the party, but he contends that international politics forced him to back the moderate course suggested by Gheorghiu-Dej (pp. 88-90).

Fischer-Galati devotes most of his work to the post-World War II period—the era in which his personal contributions in the past have been most significant. Moreover, since in this later volume he can examine further the conclusions of his earlier studies he is able to give a more in-depth analysis of the government of Nicholae Ceausescu. In 1966 the author thought that “the Rumanian contemporary course ... [was] less spectacular than in Gheorghiu-Dej’s day.” It represented “a stage of consolidation of the gains achieved under Gheorghiu-Dej’s leadership.” Now he concedes that Ceausescu has gone further toward declaring Buch-

arest's independence from the Kremlin, publicly leading the country on a national path in economics and foreign policy despite increased tension with the countries of the Warsaw bloc.

At his conclusion, Fischer-Galati pronounces the regime of the Rumanian Communist Party successful. Under the leadership of Gheorghiu-Dej and more so under Ceausescu the government has succeeded in gaining the loyalty of the population. Not only has the leaders' independent stand vis-à-vis Moscow accomplished this, but the progress over the last quarter century which has made Rumania an economic power in Europe has also gained the support of citizenry. The author sums up this performance somewhat humorously, but still seriously, with the statement that the old "derogatory evaluation that 'Rumanian is not a nationality but a profession'—is no longer relevant to the country's achievements" (p. 215).

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Vladimir Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost. Memoirs of Yugoslavia, 1948-1953*. New York: Viking Press, 1971. Pp. 341.

Among the many turning points of the postwar era few contained the drama and lasting impact of Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Soviet bloc in 1948. By exposing the self-serving nature of Moscow's policies toward the "People's Republics" and without officially abandoning the tenets of communism, Tito's regime succeeded in discrediting Stalinist methods more effectively than the western world could ever hope to do. Thus any account of the Stalin-Tito feud, but especially one by an "insider," continues to attract much attention even though the basic facts of the story are by now essentially established. A book on this subject by Vladimir Dedijer, author of the much-quoted *Tito Speaks* (1953), friend of the maverick Djilas, and an intellectual of recognized integrity and depth is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the communist world.

Dedijer's own role in the events he describes (he served as director of the government's information office and as delegate to the United Nations) was minor, and he was not privy to the decision-making pro-