

Ristić's account is based not only on his own personal experience of the troubled Yugoslav politics on the eve of World War II, but also on his privileged access to his leader's personal papers. Yet in the process the author, unfortunately, fails to utilize other available documentary materials and accounts of this event.

The primary cause of the coup was the conspirators' resentment of Yugoslavia's collaboration with the Axis and their concern for the implications of such collaboration for Europe, the Balkans, and Yugoslavia's "honor." The signing of the Tripartite Pact by the Regency government triggered the officers' action, and is considered by the author as a crucial point for both Germany and Yugoslavia. For the former it may have marked the day World War II was lost, mostly because Yugoslavia's subsequent conquest by Germany contributed to Hitler's overconfidence in the Eastern front. For Yugoslavia, in contrast to the signers of the Pact, Ristić argues that although the coup did not lead to the establishment of the communist regime, it did make possible Tito's survival in 1948.

This book, undoubtedly, is of interest because of the account it presents of the events leading to Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact and the mechanics of the coup against the Regency. To the reader interested also in Greek history, Ristić's book is of special interest in that it provides numerous references on Greece and her place on the war planning of the Axis.

Yet the selectivity of the sources utilized by Ristić, the vagueness of many of his conclusions, and his general treatment of internal Yugoslav politics both before and after the signing of the Pact, make this book something less than the most complete account of this crucial period in Yugoslavia's history.

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Norman E. Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean 1797-1807*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970.

If modern European history can be delineated by the advent of the French Revolution, one sign of this epochal change was the sudden appearance of Russian naval power in the Mediterranean. Two Russian

conditions precipitated this appearance, and these conditions were themselves a reflection of the future rather than a continuity with traditional Russian history. One was the unprecedented economic development of southern Russia which could be measured by the remarkable growth of Odessa as a commercial port between 1796 and 1806. The second was the radical reversal by Paul of the Petrine tradition of enmity towards Turkey which led to the Russo-Turkish Alliance of 1799. Through Catherine's Turkish wars Russia gained control of the northern shore of the Black Sea by 1792. But it was Paul who decided that this new commercial Black Sea trade required secure access through the Straits and protection from any powerful adversary such as Napoleon. This meant an alliance with the Ottoman Empire, even to the point of preserving it, and the possession of naval bases in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In 1799 Russia took the Ionian Islands from the French and before the Battle of Austerlitz brought this period to an end, Russia had extended her control into the Adriatic as far as Cattaro on the Dalmatian Coast. Operating primarily from her base at Corfu, Russia supported the Neapolitan and Sardinian Kingdoms with her Navy and Marines and prevented any one power, French, Austrian or British, from gaining control of Italy. Though Professor Saul does not use the metaphor, one can say that for a brief moment the Adriatic had become a Russian lake. Russia's defeat by Napoleon at Austerlitz weakened the Ottoman Porte's resistance to French diplomatic pressure. On December 27, 1806, the Porte declared war on Russia bringing an end to the conditions that had made possible Russia's dramatic incursion into the Mediterranean.

Professor Saul has written a valuable book which details the extent and process of Russia's first naval appearance in the Mediterranean. The author characterizes Russia's Mediterranean presence as cautious rather than aggressive. This cautiousness even leads Professor Saul to partly blame Russia for the failure of the Treaty of Amiens. By refusing to act as guarantor of the independence of Malta, Alexander forced the French and British to resume war. Professor Saul's book suggests that Paul deserves better treatment by historians. Twice as much space is given to Paul's period (pp. 23-154) as to Alexander's (pp. 155-222). This appears out of balance since much of the Paul section deals with the Emperor's attraction to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem (the Order of Malta) which, according to Professor Saul, drew Paul into the Mediterranean. Paul apparently was fascinated with the Order and hoped to reconstitute it in Russia as a means of regenerating his own nobility. In addition,

Paul saw the Order as a means of recreating a bond among the aristocracy of Europe which somehow could become the basis for defending and preserving the old order against the assault of the French Revolution. But Professor Saul does not go deeper than this and consequently the issue of the Order becomes digressive. The issue detracts from a more positive image of Paul responding to the modernizing forces developing in southern Russia. In fact, the author avoids connecting Paul to such a response while stressing the importance of this Black Sea trade (i. e., p. 225). This becomes a somewhat serious criticism since the author argues, and rightly, that there was a great degree of continuity between the Mediterranean policies of Paul and Alexander. In fact, the over-all organization of the book hangs on that continuity even though the author frequently points to vagaries of personality and court intrigue as highly influential factors. Another criticism is that the book's contents are too fragmented. The same events are sometimes described in separate passages but in a different context and without sufficient linkage. This leads to an excessive number of details which at times obscure the reader's view of the broader strategic contours.

On the other hand, one must compliment the author in tracing such a wide range of sources which include manuscript material at Corfu of the Ionian Republic, the State Archives at Naples of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, papers of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, Rome and published Russian primary and secondary sources. In general, this is an excellent book which brings together a great deal of information about a subject that has been insufficiently treated.

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Paul L. Horecky, Editor, *Southeastern Europe: A Guide to Basic Publications*. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. 755.

As every scholar knows only too well, the rapid accumulation of knowledge (or at least of publications written in the pursuit of knowledge), which is so much a feature of our times, is not without its drawbacks. Familiarizing oneself with the growing literature in virtually any field