

ALBANIA'S COURSE TOWARD STATEHOOD

A CASE OF INTERACTION BETWEEN GREAT POWER' POLICIES,
THE OTTOMAN AND BALKAN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
AND ALBANIAN CULTURAL AND BIOLOGICAL NATIONALISM

A REVIEW ARTICLE

The Albanian National Awakening 1878-1912, by Stavro Skendi,
Princeton N. J., Princeton University Press, 1967, 498 pp.

This book deals essentially with the emergence of the Albanians' awareness of their ethnic character in the multinational Ottoman empire during the thirty-four years that preceded the establishment of Albania as an independent and sovereign nation-state in 1912. Thus, within the broader historical context, this bulky and laborious volume constitutes a small though far from uninteresting chapter in the long story of the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman empire and, more specifically of the breakup of its European territories into several nation-states, with Albania being the last to achieve that status, in the face of increasingly strenuous Ottoman efforts since the nineteenth century to fight the centrifugal tendencies becoming manifest in its territories elsewhere too, in Egypt, for example.

Although lacking in many respects in internal continuity, in spite of its broad chronological outline, partly perhaps because some of its chapters are based on separate articles Mr. Skendi published between 1953 and 1960; revealing, too, a certain weakness in organization because of the seeming absence of any unifying esthetic form or of an underlying conceptual framework; although lacking a map that would show the territorial extent of the Albanians' habitat and of their territorial aspirations as compared to the territorial extent of Albania as an independent state; and, finally, suffering from rather poor editing, several typographical errors, and imperfect indexing, ultimate responsibility for which lies mainly with the publishers, this study, nevertheless, is an important contribution to Balkan history, making use of unpublished documents from Austrian, French, British, and Italian state archives, though

not of the files of the American Board of Missions which are likely to have yielded interesting insights into the role of American protestant mission^s as transmitters of nationalist ideas among the Albanians.¹ This study, moreover, paradoxically enough, exactly because it lacks any clear political theoretical framework, provides quite a wealth of fascinating materials to students of the growth of nationalism among a particular human population group and of the processes through which a new nation-state emerges in the society of nations.

But, before making further comments on the substance of this 498 page book, the reading of which is tough going with the result that often one has difficulties in seeing the forest because of the trees, a careful summary of its contents seems appropriate.

The introduction, in its latter parts, and Chapters I, II, and III, entitled, respectively, "The Albanian League and the Congress of Berlin," "Resistance to the Decisions of the Berlin Congress," and "Struggle for Administrative Autonomy," describe how, from the very outset of the Tanzimat period, the Muslim Albanian feudal families, joined by the "broader layers of the town population" (p. 24), attempted to oppose the centralization policies of the Ottoman government in order to preserve the traditional autonomy and ancient privileges they earlier enjoyed within the Ottoman empire. These chapters describe, too, how the Ottoman government, although purposely keeping the Albanians administratively divided into separate, ethnically non-homogeneous vilayets, in order to prevent any unification and national development, nonetheless, at the time of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, sought to encourage the hostility of the Albanians against plans or decisions of the Treaty of San Stefano and the Berlin Congress, under which territories the Albanians regarded as their own were to be awarded to Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece; and how the Albanians, first in the south, where education was more widespread than in the tribal, more visceral north, sought in turn to exploit the difficulties in which the Ottoman government found itself, in order to press for self-government (administrative autonomy) within a single, predominantly Albanian vilayet, with Albanian-language schools, and to ensure their territorial integrity threatened from outside. The result was that, once the Ottoman government was obliged to implement the territorial decisions of the Berlin Congress, it had to face, when Dulcigno, in the north, was ceded to Montenegro in late 1880, several rebellious Albanian acts (e. g. the seizure of the districts of Prishtinë and Usküb) and to

1. *Yearbook* (1966) of the American Philosophical Society, p. 410.

resort to strong-arm measures to suppress these acts, occupying Prizren in April 1881 (the headquarters of the Albanian League) and dissolving this "milet" (nation), as the League was called.

These first three chapters, finally, touch on great power attitudes and policies toward Albania and the Albanians, though this theme is developed in detail in Chapters X, XI, and XII. In a secret convention of January 15, 1877, Austria-Hungary and Russia agreed on the desirability of an independent Albania, in case of Ottoman territorial changes or of the Ottoman empire's disintegration while at the Berlin Congress, the first of these powers, whose support the Albanian notables tried to get in their drive for self-government, sought to keep at a minimum the cession of Albanian territories to the southern Slavs, since it considered northern Albania, with its Roman Catholic mountaineers (the Mirdite), as an important counterpoise to Slavism in the Balkans. Italy, likewise interested in Albania, considered its security in the Adriatic adequate as long as Albania remained under Ottoman rule. Sir Charles Dilke's, Francesco Crispi's, and Bismarck's ideas that the Albanians should get together with the Greeks, as natural allies against the Slavs and the Turks, Mr. Skendi observes, overlooked the fact that the majority of Albanians was Muslim and therefore stood greatly to lose should they join Greece and, it might be added, being Muslims, were less desirous than non-Muslim peoples of the Ottoman empire, to break away from it altogether in order to set themselves up in a state of independence.

In chapters IV and V, entitled, respectively, "Cultural Affirmation" and "Problems in National Education," Mr. Skendi recounts how Albanian leaders, motivated by a desire to stimulate a sense of unity among their religiously, regionally, administratively, and socially divided countrymen, sought to promote literacy among them, namely the knowledge of how to write and read the Albanian language—a shared social communications link, not a divisive factor as was religion especially, which, as elsewhere in the Balkans and the Middle East, was inextricably fused with that - in Group feeling termed "ethnocentrism" by the American sociologist William Graham Sumner. This struggle for Albanian literacy involved efforts to instil a sense of pride in the group that spoke the mother tongue and in that tongue itself, the antiquity of which had been discovered mainly by Western historians or philologists from the late eighteenth century on, as witness the works of J. Thunman, J. Xyländer, and J. C. von Hahn (the "father of modern Albanology") and the more profound studies of the last quarter of the nineteenth century which established that Albanian was not "Pelagic," i. e. pre-Hellenic, as originally believed, but a dialect of Illyrian.

But, concurrently, this struggle also focused on the practical question of the appropriate symbols for recording — and teaching — the mother tongue that was learned in the bosom of the family and in this way was transmitted from generation to generation. In this connection, however, the Albanians, unlike certain other language groups in the Balkans or elsewhere which had no written symbols for their mother tongue and therefore had to invent such symbols or borrow them elsewhere, suffered from an embarrassment of alphabetical riches that was to plague them until the time they achieved independence in 1912. For recording their language they used more than one alphabet — the Latin and Greek ones at least as early as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (these being preferred by the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Albanians, respectively), with the Arabic script of their Muslim and Ottoman overlords emerging in the eighteenth century as a competitor of the two earlier, Christian alphabets.

A few years before the creation of the League of Prizren, Mr. Skendi writes, Albanian leaders belonging to the three religious faiths had conferred over the question of a single, common alphabet but had been unable to reach agreement as to which of the three scripts should be preferred — with advocates of the Latin script, such as Ismail Kemal Vlora, a Muslim, arguing that Latin letters were easily available for printing — or whether an entirely new alphabet should be devised. Then, around the time of the Albanian League, another Muslim leader, Sami Frashëri, produced a somewhat hybrid alphabet based mainly on the Latin, but also including Greek characters, and this, after its adoption by the Istanbul Society for the Printing of Albanian writings (a sort of cultural branch of the Albanian League set up in 1879), became very popular especially among the Muslim Albanians. Among the Catholic Albanians of the north, on the other hand, the Latin alphabet continued to be used, and when one of their leaders, in 1899, devised the Latin-based *Bashkimi* alphabet, and another one, in 1901, devised *Agimi*, a likewise Latin-based alphabet, chaos, as Mr. Skendi notes, ensued.

The struggle for Albanian literacy finally had to face two hard facts: First, the Ottoman government, though allowing the establishment of schools sponsored by Austria-Hungary and Italy for Catholic Albanians, prohibited the opening of Albanian-language schools for the Muslim Albanians or the Albanian-minded Eastern Orthodox, in order to prevent the growth of an Albanian national consciousness among them, while allowing them only Turkish-language schools. Second, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, with Ottoman consent, promoted the establishment of Greek-language schools among Eastern Orthodox Albanians and opposed an Albanian edu-

cation for them. Thus, up to the Young Turk revolution in 1908, only two short-lived Albanian schools were opened, both in Korcë — one in 1885, for boys, under the auspices of the Albanian community of Bucharest; the other, for girls, in 1891, with the support of the American and English religious missions.

In Chapter VI, entitled "The Role of Societies and Press Abroad," which should be read together with Chapter IX ("Contribution of the Italo-Albanians to the National Movement"), Mr. Skendi recounts in detail how mainly Eastern Orthodox Albanians, living in Romania, Egypt, Bulgaria, and the United States, who lived beyond the reach of the restraining and repressive policies of the Ottoman government or of the hellenizing efforts of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, tried, through organized politico-cultural activities, to promote the growth of national consciousness and pride among their countrymen and produced various publications in the Albanian language of a nonperiodical or periodical character. If, as Mr. Skendi notes in Chapter IV (pp. 114-116), Italo-Albanian intellectuals since the mid-nineteenth century played a pioneering role in arousing Albanian cultural nationalism through mimesis of the Italian liberation and unification movement, it was an Eastern Orthodox Albanian, Fan S. Noli, living in the United States, who, with the support of the Russian Orthodox Church, achieved, in 1908, the founding of a national Albanian church that was independent from the Patriarchate of Constantinople!

The later pages of Chapter VI, with their information on the activities of Faik Konitza and Noli in the Albanian communities abroad ("colonies," in Mr. Skendi's somewhat infelicitous terminology) belong really to Chapter VII which not only provides additional material about Konitza (the publisher of the monthly Review *Albania*, who like Koraes with regard to the Greeks, ascribed priority to the cultural development of his countrymen to any immediate descent of theirs into the arena of armed action) but gets down to facts (not sufficiently, in this reviewer's opinion) about the various leaders of all three faiths, whose names, together with some of their activities, the author mentions in several of the earlier chapters, and whose actions and interactions in a social and economic environment that showed few signs of bourgeois development, he often notes in the book's subsequent chapters. In this chapter, entitled "Political Thinking," one gathers, for instance, materials about the political aims of territorial preservation and self-government of the three Bektashi Muslim Frasheri brothers; about Albanian Catholics, such as Vasa Pasha (an anticlerical author of a poem entitled "Oh, Albania" in which he proclaimed that the faith of the Albanians should be "Albanian-

dom"); or Prenk Doci, the author of the *Bashkimi* alphabet and champion of the concept of an Albanian confederation; about Eastern Orthodox Albanians, such as Thimi Mitko and Spiro Dino, who lived abroad and, unlike many of their correlative countrymen at home, promoted fervently the cause of Albanian nationalism, not of *enosis* with Greece; about Ismail Kemal, a Muslim feudal nobleman, who studied at a Greek school in Janina, cooperated with Midhat Pasha in the Ottoman constitutional experiment of 1875, and was to play an important role both in the Young Turk movement as a liberal and in the whole course of affairs that led to Albanian independence in 1912; or about Shadin Kolonja, likewise a Muslim, who introduced the social-economic aspect into the realm of Albanian political thinking.

Chapter VIII, entitled "Diffuse Revolutionary Activity," deals, on the one hand, with certain local and sporadic uprisings in northern Albania (of 1884 and 1897) that were directed against the Ottoman government's fiscal efforts, and, on the other, with Albanian activities in the south from 1905 on, which had as their target Greek unconventional and ostensibly nongovernmental warfare aimed at promoting the cause of Hellenism in the Epirus region of the Ottoman empire which Albanians considered as part of their territory. The southern Albanians, in their activities, received support from the Bektashi and the Porte, and occasionally cooperated with the Bulgarian komitadjis. Evidently in mimesis of Bulgarian and Greek methods during the struggle for Macedonia, the Albanians, in 1906, set up their first national guerrilla band. Summing up, Mr. Skendi observes that the Albanian insurrections during the first twenty-five years after the dissolution of the League of Prizren remained local in character and coordination. Their aim continued to be the preservation of ancient privileges the Porte's centralization policies sought to abolish. However, they did not lack in national character, because the rebels often asked also for Albanian schools, the use of the Albanian language, the withdrawal of Ottoman officials from Albania, and self-government.

"Contribution of the Italo-Albanians to the National Movement" is the title of Chapter IX. This provides a bridge to the three chapters that follow — which deal mainly with non-Albanian exogenous factors that contributed directly or indirectly, by the stimulus of support or of opposition, to the emergence of Albanian nationalism and, eventually, to Albanian statehood. This chapter primarily reveals the extent to which the Italo-Albanians, unlike the Albanian communities of Romania, Egypt, Bulgaria, or the United States, not only contributed to the awakening of Albanian cultural nationalism, as noted in Chapter IV, but also tended to become instruments of

the foreign policy of the host state — of Italy, in this case, especially from the 1880's when Crispi, an Italo-Albanian himself, became premier.

In this chapter, Mr. Skendi refers to the three Italo-Albanian congresses — of 1895, 1897, and 1903, respectively — which sought to promote a unified alphabet, the publication of a dictionary and Albanian-language books and periodicals, and the unification of the vilayets that included Albanian-speaking elements in the Ottoman empire, and also set up the *Società Nazionale Albanese* as well as a political committee whose appeals to the Sultan and the great powers are dwelt on at some length. He also recounts the conflicts over means for reaching shared ends among Italo-Albanian leaders such as Giuseppe Schiro, the "hawk," whose "Battle Songs" remind us of Rhigas' or Koraes' similar bugle calls addressed to the Greeks under Ottoman rule; and Girolamo de Rada, the "dove," who advocated reforms and self-government and, together with Anselmo Lorecchio, considered the Greeks and the Slavs as the primary foes. Mr. Skendi finally deals with the reactions of Albanian leaders proper, such as Mehmet Frashëri, Kolonja, Konitza or Ismail Kemal, to the efforts of their hyphenated countrymen across the Adriatic to play a leading role in the Albanian national movement. These Albanian leaders proper, some of whom tended to side with Austria-Hungary rather than Italy in their pre-state foreign policy, proved unwilling to cooperate whenever the Italo-Albanians became too active in politics. And this unwillingness, in Mr. Skendi's view, was also due to the dichotomies of Muslim *versus* Christian and Eastern Orthodox *versus* Roman Catholic. The Italo-Albanian activities, he nevertheless concludes, were an incentive to the national movement and made the Albanian question better known in the world, by mobilizing Italian public opinion and causing concern to Austria-Hungary.

Chapters X, XI, and XII — "Albania's Importance to Austria-Hungary and Italy," "Rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Italy and Albanian Reaction," and "The Interest of Balkan Neighbors and the Great Powers" — deal mainly with the Albanians less as actors, subjects, than as objects, instruments of international politics. They deal, in other words, with the international political environment in which Albanian nationalism developed. Mr. Skendi describes here how, among the great powers, Austria-Hungary played the role of a protagonist in Albanian matters, entering into that arena earlier than the other powers, with Italy as an antagonist, and Russia and the other great powers playing tertiary roles. He also shows how most Albanian leaders in the pre-statehood foreign policy tended to align themselves primarily with the great-power protagonist rather than the antagonist, although this

not always consistently with shifts sometimes occurring from the one power to the other, for the purpose of exploiting to Albanian interest the conflicting politics of these two powers toward the Albanians and Albania.

For Austria-Hungary, Albania constituted a "bastion" against further Slavic expansion and influence in the Balkans. And, when Italy, from the 1880's on, started showing a vivid interest in that part of the European territories of the Ottoman empire, Albania constituted an area that should be preserved from any great power domination, because of its importance in the sphere of Austria-Hungary's Adriatic interests. Thus with Russia first (in 1877 as mentioned earlier, and also through the *Dreikaiserbund*) and then with Italy (through the Triple Alliance connection) Austria-Hungary could come into agreement over the desirability of maintaining the status quo in the Albanian sector or, in the case of any alteration of this status quo, over the need of setting up Albania as some sort of separate political entity, if not as an independent state.

Italian policy, on the other hand, was primarily a response to Austria-Hungary's. For Italy Albania was a sector of the Ottoman empire in which any Austro-Hungarian predominance should be prevented and was also connected with the idea of transforming the Adriatic into an Italian sea. Accordingly, Italy showed willingness to reach the Monza agreement with Austria-Hungary in 1897, under which, on the one hand, each party declared it had no thought of occupying Albania but was determined to allow no power to occupy it, and on the other, both agreed that if the Ottoman empire were to lose Macedonia, Albania should be set up as a privileged province within the framework of the Ottoman empire or raised to the status of an independent principality.

In spite of the Monza agreement, Mr. Skendi recounts, Austria-Hungary and Italy continued to be distrustful of each other's aims in Albania and competed in a policy of peaceful penetration there. Their instruments of policy were: the promotion of trade and navigation in Albania (for instance, the postal service in Albania and Epirus was an Austro-Hungarian monopoly); their consular officials who, especially on the Austro-Hungarian side were of high caliber and often engaged in "black" activities that today are normally performed by intelligence agencies such as the CIA; special missions of non-governmental personalities, for instance of the botanist Antonio Baldacci, for the Italians, whose reports hardly deal with Albanian flora; good will visits of naval vessels to Albanian ports, which was an instrument of influence the Italians highly favored; welfare institutions (hospitals, orphanages, ambulances); Albanian-language schools (from 1897 on), unified alphabets, the

publication of dictionaries — all this with the deliberate purpose of strengthening the national consciousness of the Albanians; and, finally, the Albanians themselves — with Austria-Hungary attaching particular importance to mobilizing members of the Albanian elite on its side, such as Doci or Konitza (both of whom saw Albania's interest closely bound to Austria Hungary's).

The interests of the Balkan states in Albania were tied up with their desire to incorporate chunks of European Turkey in their own territories, and thus aroused the specter of loss of territories the Albanians regarded as their own. The cession of Dulcigno to Montenegro in 1880 has already been mentioned as a turning point that adversely affected Albanian attitudes toward Montenegro — a Russian protégé that appeared both to Russia and Italy as an obstacle to Austro-Hungarian expansion into the Balkans. Enmity toward the Slavs existed among both Muslim and Catholic Albanians, likewise for territorial reasons, and led to antagonism toward both Serbia which was obsessed by the desire for an outlet to the Adriatic, and Bulgaria which during the Macedonian struggle sought to enlarge Macedonia so as to include in it territory considered by the Albanians as their own. The Albanians, moreover, also had to fight the policies of the Serbian Church and the Bulgarian Exarchate. Finally, the Greek territorial aspirations in Epirus which clashed with Italian interest there, likewise exerted a negative effect upon Albanian attitudes toward the Greeks who after 1881 sought either to neutralize Albanian armed opposition in case of a war with the Ottoman Empire or to draw the Albanians into the anti-Ottoman camp by inciting them to rebel and proposing Albania's participation in a federation of Balkan states. As Mr. Skendi sums up (p. 315): "The various conflicts of interests with neighbors and great powers, opposing or supporting them, . . . could not help but make the Albanian people more aware of their national identity and their national interests."

Chapter XIII starts out with information of importance that might well have been included in Chapter VII ("Political Thinking") because it discusses the ideas of Abdul Frashëri and his brother Sami about the future regime of Albania. The former, in a memorandum of 1890 to Crispi, favored a monarchical regime for a territorially far more extensive Albania than the one that became independent in 1912; the latter, on the other hand, preferred a republican form of government for his country. Otherwise, this chapter, as its title indicates, deals with three pretenders to an imaginary throne of Albania, none of whom was great-power-backed. The two most eminent of these pretenders were the self-styled Prince Gjin Aladro Kastrioti (a Spaniard born Don Juan de Aladroy Perez de Velasco) and Prince Albert Ghika, from

Romania. Mr. Skendi, who views Ismail Kemal as the ideal leader in contrast to these pretenders, concludes that the reaction (mostly negative) of the Albanians to the nationalist propaganda of these pretenders, regardless of this propaganda's soundness, had a favorable effect on the national awakening, even though these aspirants to an imaginary throne were seeking merely to further their own personal interest.

Chapters XIV to XVIII, constituting the book's Part Three — "Toward Independence (1908-1912)" — describe the initial cooperation between the Albanians and the Young Turks (Chapter XIV); the struggle of the Albanians for a national alphabet and national schools (Chapter XV); the emergence and intensification of Albanian-Young Turk conflict (Chapter XVI); the revolts and demands of the Albanians and the intervention of Montenegro, Russia, Austria-Hungary and, to a lesser extent, of England, in the conflict (Chapter XVII); and, finally, the attainment of independence shortly after the outbreak of the First Balkan War (Chapter XVIII).

During this crucial four-year period, the Albanians, except for the reactionary Muslims of the north, started out by participating in, and supporting the Young Turk movement in its liberal aspect symbolized by restoration of the Midhat constitution and the introduction of a representative form of government to replace Hamidian despotism. However, their cultural and primarily autonomistic nationalism soon clashed with the forceful nationalism of the Young Turks, who sought to place the various peoples of the multinational Ottoman empire into the strait jacket of Ottomanization, after first creating the impression that they would respect their various cultures.

In these chapters, Mr. Skendi describes how the committees set up by the Young Turks in Albania soon started to operate as national Albanian organizations, with the appearance of certain inherent contradictions; and how various national Albanian clubs and societies were set up and the first Albanian press organs appeared in Albania proper. In the north, he observes, where the Albanians were backward, fanatic Muslims, the founding of such organizations was quite hard. When the Young Turks started to suspect the aims of these organizations and sought to practice surveillance over them, the Albanians, Mr. Skendi writes, went underground. They set up secret committees which, although favoring the consolidation of the national Ottoman state, nevertheless tried at the same time to promote the separation and self-government of Albania, and proclaimed the death penalty for any member found guilty of treason.

During the election campaign for the first Ottoman Parliament tension grew considerably between the Albanians and the Young Turks who at all

costs tried to secure a Turkish majority in the Parliament and decreed in their electoral law that candidates should present themselves as Ottomans, abandoning their nationality. Because the Albanian clubs supported nationally-minded candidates, clashes occurred with the candidates of the Young Turks. And in the Parliament itself most Albanian deputies together with a number of their colleagues — mostly Christian — joined the Liberals who favored a sort of decentralized Ottoman empire, with some autonomous rights for the religious minorities. As a result the relations between the Albanians and the Young Turks soon deteriorated, with reactionary Muslim Albanians, indignant at Abdul Hamid's deposition, rising in local revolts.

In Chapter XV, Mr. Skendi, as already mentioned, deals with the problems of a national alphabet and national education. The Young Turks, in contrast to the Sultan, decided to permit the writing of Albanian and its teaching in elementary and junior high schools. However, the problem of a single alphabet still remained to be solved. To deal with the problem as well as with that of education three congresses convened — two in Monastir, in November 1908, and in March 1910, respectively, and one in Elbasan, in September 1909. All three opted for Latin-based alphabets, even though no agreement was reached on a single alphabet, with the first Monastir congress resolving that the Istanbul and the new Latin-based alphabet it had devised would be the only ones to be used in Albanian schools.

The Muslims of north Albania, however, were opposed to the new script. So were the Young Turks who feared lest a Latin alphabet unite the Albanians and eventually contribute to their detachment from the Ottoman empire. Hence efforts at the Dibër Congress of July 1909 (convoked by the Young Turks) to foist upon the Albanians the Arabic script; hence, too, alphabet demonstrations and counter-demonstrations in various towns, with the Young Turks agitating more and more against the Latin alphabet and evoking strong protests. The Bektashi Muslims in the south, it should be noted, unlike their northern correligionaries, gave support to the Latin alphabet. The division, namely, was not on religious lines.

When, late in 1910, the Ottoman government, after stamping out Albanian revolts in the north, to be mentioned shortly, proceeded to abolish the Albanian clubs and societies, suppressed the Albanian-language newspapers, shut down the schools and printing houses, and eliminated Albanian from the curriculum of government schools (basing itself on the law on associations of November 1910), the Albanians registered a vibrant protest. As a result the Young Turk government had to relax its policy the following year and ordered the schools reopened, the opening of new schools, and even allowed

the use of the Latin alphabet. Only the Koran was to be taught in Arabic characters.

However, the Albanian-Young Turk rift could not be healed. It was not caused merely by disputes over alphabet or schools. It deepened because of the forceful nationalism of the Young Turks, who wanted to transform the Ottoman empire into a strongly centralized national state and therefore sought to impose a uniform taxation throughout — which meant such auxiliary measures as the registration of inhabitants and of their land — as well as to ensure for the state a monopoly over all means of coercion — which meant depriving the Albanians of their traditional right to bear arms and the introduction of compulsory military service. It was, naturally, the Muslims of Kosovo and Shkoder who were the staunchest opponents of these measures, with the Catholic tribes around Shkodër being willing to accept these, only if their Muslim countrymen likewise did.

In the south, Albanian opposition to Young Turk measures was less “reactionary” and more sophisticated. Here the Albanians opposed the government’s centralization policies not because the loss of ancient privileges was involved but because they desired a free development of their nationality. In November 1908, Kolonja wanted, for instance, the Albanian soldiers to serve only in their own vilayets — except in times of general mobilization — and the subaltern officers as well as those of the gendarmerie to be Albanians. In the civil service, too, Albanians should be preferred. Mayors should be elected by open vote, and the revenues from taxation assigned to public works should be placed at the disposal of the local administration. All in all, as Mr. Skendi concludes in Chapter XVI, in spite of religious divisions and cultural differences between north and south, the unarmed or armed conflict of northerners and southerners with the Young Turks, albeit for different motives and aims, served to stimulate the assertion of ethnocentric feelings among the Albanians.

In Autumn of 1909, when a popular flare-up occurred in the north against the collection of tithes, the Young Turks responded by promulgating the “law on the bands” which provided for severe penalties against who carried or kept arms as well as for collective (family) punishments. The following year, likewise in the north at Kosovo, another revolt occurred, as Mr. Skendi recounts in Chapter XVII. This revolt was directed against the imposition of dues on goods brought from Prishtinë. Battles ensued with Turkish troops — at Kacanik and Crnoleva, in April and May, respectively. The Turks, victorious, attempted to disarm and subdue the rebellious

population and implement the "law on bands." These efforts only served to fan further the hostility of the local population.

Soon after, the northern Catholics, too, rebelled. A number of them, pursued by Ottoman troops, took refuge in Montenegro, thus triggering the diplomatic intervention of the King of that small kingdom with the Porte. The refugee Albanians demanded the return of their weapons; dispensation from newly ordered taxes; and the construction of new roads and schools. After initial reluctance, the Ottoman government accepted these demands, with a few changes in detail.

Peace, however, did not come with the return of the Albanian refugees from Montenegro. Armed demonstrations occurred in the mountains of Dibër with appeals not for the maintenance of ancient privileges but for schools, the free circulation of Albanian publications, amnesty for those sentenced for their political activities, government employees of Albanian nationality, roads, tax-spending in Albania. Then, in February 1911 a new revolt — of Catholics mainly — occurred in the mountains of Shkodër, with Ismail Kemal predicting backstage new such outbreaks. On April 27, an Italo-Albanian lawyer, Dr. Terenc Toci, hoisted the Albanian flag at Kimez in Mirdite, where a short-lived "Provisional Government of Albania" was proclaimed.

The Young Turks, naturally, responded with a new expedition against the rebels. And a new wave of refugees swept into Montenegro, triggering various Russian and Austro-Hungarian demarches with the Porte, that led to the proclamation of an amnesty for the rebels on June 18.

On their side the rebels responded on June 23 with the Gerchë Memorandum which Ismail Kemal had drafted. Largely a synthesis of demands of both northerners and southerners and applying to the whole of Albania, this memorandum was a landmark in the whole story of the Albanian national awakening. It assailed the Young Turk regime as tyrannical and set forth the Albanian claims — the opening of national schools; the use of the Albanian language; guarantees against anticonstitutional actions and abuses; respect for customs and traditions; recognition of the national existence of Albania; full liberty in choosing one's own deputies; the organization of all vilayets on decentralized lines; the most capable valis and high officials; government employees selected from Albanians; the appointment for a given period of a representative of the Sultan as Inspector-General; obligatory peacetime military service in Albania only; the establishment of a special military organization for regions bordering on the Balkan states, with Albanians having the right to serve there for the surveillance and the

defense of the frontiers; taxes to be spent for the needs of Albania; restitution of confiscated weapons, with their possessors to comply with the regulations.

Earlier, in the south, on May 15, it should be noted, a Central Revolutionary Committee had been set up in Vlorë, calling for a general revolution and formulating claims even more extreme than those contained in the Gerchë memorandum. Although not demanding full independence, this committee called for the union of the four vilayets into a single pashalik to be governed by Albanians, with a separate Parliament and army; and an all-Albanian civil service. To back these demands, it set up guerrilla bands, composed of men from various social strata and faiths.

It is not necessary here to describe the concessions the Young Turks were forced to make in response to these demands nor the Albanian response to these concessions. Suffice is to mention that after the Italo-Turkish war was declared on September 11, 1911, and the Young Turks dissolved the Parliament on January 18, 1912, the election campaign that ensued for a new Parliament led to a deterioration of Albanian relations with the Young Turks who resorted to money, fraud, and terror to prevent their opponents from being elected. As a result, when the new Parliament met on April 18, 1912, with the Young Turks gaining 215 out of the total of 222 seats, the Albanian Central Committee decided to go ahead with the revolution it had planned since December of the previous year, on Ismail Kemal's initiative, beginning from Kosovo. On May 20 the insurgents' leaders agreed to wage war on the Young Turks and ask for autonomy within a single vilayet; Albanian instruction with the Latin, national alphabet, in schools built with taxes levied in Albania; an Albanian civil service; the use of Albanian in the law courts; and peacetime military service in Albania. Shortly after, the Kosovars successfully revolted in Ipek and Gjakovë, calling for the dissolution of the new Parliament.

The Ottoman government responded to these demands by sending troops to suppress the insurrection. However, on July 23, it was forced to resign, and one of the most urgent tasks of the new government was to make peace with the Albanians. That same day, the chiefs of south Albania sent in a twelve-point memorandum with demands similar to those formulated in the Gerchë document. Five days later, the Albanian Central Committee of Istanbul sent in a memorandum of its own in order to dissipate any Young-Turk doubts about Albanian willingness to live within the framework of the Ottoman empire. According to this memorandum the boundaries of a self-governing Albania should include: (1) the whole vilayet of Janina; (2) the

whole vilayet of Shkodër; (3) the sanjaks of Prizren, Novi Pazar, Prishtinë, and the kaza of Kalkandelen from the vilayet of Kosovo; (4) the sanjaks of Korçë, Elbasan, and Dibër from the vilayet of Monastir.

On August 5, the Ottoman government was obliged to dissolve Parliament as the Kosovars had demanded. The central and southern Albanian leaders, however, continued to insist on the implementation of the Gerchë memorandum. And, Mr. Skendi notes, a certain organization between north and south, which had been lacking until then, was now developing, which demonstrated that the national consciousness of the Albanians had now grown, to include the whole of the country. Thus, acting on behalf of the four vilayets, the northern Albanian leaders, on August 9, conveyed to the Sultan the so called "fourteen points of Hasan Prishtina." Representing a compromise between the aims of the conservatives and Hamidists, on the one hand, and the enlightened intellectuals, on the other, these points were far less extreme and nationalist than those formulated either at Gerchë or by the southern leaders. They included demands for a special system of administration and justice; a capable and honest civil service with knowledge of the Albanian language and customs; military service in Albania, except in wartime; Albanian-language schools of every grade, and *lycées* in vilayets and sanjaks of more than 30,000; protection of the habits and customs of Islam and the establishment of *medreses* (religious instruction schools); absolute freedom to open private schools; the organization of *nahiyes* (communes); the construction of roads.

On August 14, when the whole of south and central Albania was in rebel hands and the Sultan notified the insurgents of his acceptance of most of their demands, the way for Albanian autonomy seemed now open. Events other than the Albanian revolt, however, were in the making that were to lead the Albanians to something more than autonomy.

The secret Serbian-Bulgarian and Greek-Bulgarian treaties of March 13 and May 29, respectively, had prepared the ground for the war against Turkey in Europe that was to begin on October 8, when Montenegro opened hostilities against the Ottoman Empire. The speedy victories of the Balkan allies soon started fulfilling the conditions the Albanian leaders as well as Austria-Hungary and Italy had recognized as necessary for setting up Albania as an independent state.

During these hectic weeks, Ismail Kemal emerged as the dominant Albanian personality. This former deputy for Berat in the first Young Turk Parliament and leader of the twenty-six Albanians elected to that Parliament became Albanian's chief spokesman at home as well as abroad. As

already mentioned, in June 1911 he had drafted the famous Gerchë memorandum, and in December of that same year he had initiated the decision for launching a general Albanian uprising. Now, at the outbreak of the first Balkan war he became Albania's chief diplomat, carrying out probes, indulging in exchanges, conducting negotiations. Already in spring 1910, in conversation with the Austro-Hungarian diplomat Pallavicini, he had raised the question of an unified and integral Albania, in case of Turkey's collapse. The following year, when the Italo-Turkish war broke out, he had emphasized, in conversation with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Paris, the urgent need of recognizing the Albanian people as an "ethnographic entity." He thought that, in case of the Ottoman empire's dissolution the Albanians would oppose union with Italy but would favor an Austro-Hungarian protectorate for their country. On neither occasion, however, had he found Vienna prepared to discuss the future. Austria-Hungary still sought to restrict itself to supporting the Albanians' claims for the preservation of their ancient privileges and for equal rights for their language.

The outbreak of the first Balkan war placed Albania in a very difficult situation. Hostility to Young Turk domination was tempered by fear lest the Balkan allies proceed to a partition of Albanian territory. As in 1877 and 1897, they sided, Mr. Skendi writes, altering his earlier view that they had remained neutral, with the Ottoman empire, because by doing so they felt they could best safeguard their territory. And they made approaches to Austria-Hungary on the premise that the Ottoman empire would lose the war.

Likewise deeply concerned, but with a slight time lag, was Austria-Hungary. At one of several ministerial conferences held in Vienna (between October 25 and 30), Austro-Hungarian foreign policy makers decided that Albania's preservation was in Austria-Hungary's vital interests even if it became necessary to resort to the *ultima ratio* — war. Any state should be prevented from setting foot on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, particularly in the Ionian sea. When it became clear that the *status quo* could not be maintained, Vienna proposed to Rome, on November 17, an exchange of views on the delimitation of the borders and the internal organization of Albania. Four days later Rome informed Vienna that it was in agreement with the Austro-Hungarian program for Albania, according to which districts exclusively or preponderantly Albanian should be assigned to Albania, but the results of the war should be taken into account for the benefit of the Balkan allies.

Ismail Kemal, meanwhile, whose movements and contacts at certain points have not been clarified by Mr. Skendi's study of the Austrian archives (this

lack of clarity being compounded by the confusion Mr. Skendi or a misprint creates in his account of them, especially on p. 459, if one confronts the chronological order given in the text with the documentary dates given in the relevant footnotes) had apparently left (from where?) for Bucharest at the end of September, in order to consult with the patriots of the Albanian community there "Before his departure . . . [he] told an Italian journalist that he saw no solution to the Albanian problem except through Austrian intervention"⁶⁸ (Note 68 refers here to a letter of Dervish Hima to Rappaport, Constantinople, 5 November 1912, *HHSStA*, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6). "There is ground to believe," Mr. Skendi continues, "that he had been in touch with Pallavicini, for on November 12 the Austro-Hungarian ambassador informed his Ministry that Ismail Kemal had already left for Vienna."⁶⁹ (Note 69 reads: "Pallavicini to Berchtold" Pera, 2 November 1912, No. 369, Ref. I, in *ibid.*" (Was the Austrian a clairvoyant?) "On November 5," Mr. Skendi goes on, to write, "a meeting was held in Bucharest, where it was decided, (by whom?) that 'a directing committee should be created which would undertake the government of the country'; . . . ". (Note 70 refers to *Histori e Shqipërisë*. [1900-1909], p. 61, namely *History of Albania*, 1900-1919, [Tirana] 1961) The gathering of Bucharest, Mr. Skendi then recounts, could not make up its mind whether Albania was to be autonomous or independent, since that depended "on future developments and the attitude of the great powers."

We then read that from Bucharest Ismail Kemal went to Vienna (when?) whence, on November 9, he sent his momentous telegram to his son in Vlorë: "*Avenir Albanie assuré*," and asked him to wire the good news everywhere in Albania. This reviewer wonders on what grounds Ismail Kemal could have based his reassuring telegram when it was eight days later, on November 17, as mentioned earlier, that the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Berchtold proposed to Rome an exchange of views on the delimitation of the borders and the internal organization of Albania (p. 456).

The mystery grows when we read on p. 460, that when Ismail Kemal visited on November 12 the Ballplatz and sounded out Austrian officials there as to Austro-Hungarian intentions with regard to Albania's future, these officials limited themselves to generalities, repeating to him semi-official press statements to the effect that Austrian sympathies for the Albanians and their development were profound and that Austria-Hungary wished to support Albania's national integrity in order to secure peace in the Balkans. Quite correctly, Mr. Skendi, in the next paragraph goes on to write that "Ismail Kemal's conversation with Berchtold in Budapest must have been more encouraging" (basing himself on Ismail Kemal's memoirs), How-

ever, it seems to me that he might have drawn the reader's attention to the gap of information from primary sources in the *Haus-Hof-und-Staatsarchiv* in Vienna or the *Archivio Centrale dello Stato* in Rome that hinders full clarification of the course of Ismail Kemal's soundings, exchanges, and negotiations at this turning point in the story of Albania's emergence as an independent state. In this connection, too, Mr. Skendi might have summed up the findings of other historians, L. Salvatorelli in this specific instance, about great power exchanges on the future of Albania, instead of merely referring the reader, in note 61, to this Italian writer's work, *La Triplice Alleanza, Storia Diplomatica, 1877-1912*, Milan, 1939, pp. 450-452.

The concluding part of this story is, of course, far less shrouded in mystery. While the Greek armies were not far from Vlorë (Valona) and the Serbian armies were close to Durrës (Durazzo), Ismail Kemal disembarked at the latter port and arrived at Vlorë on November 26. Two days later an extraordinary national assembly convened, composed of 83 delegates — Muslim and Christian — from all parts of Albania. Ismail Kemal, who presided, proposed the proclamation of Albania's independence, the establishment of a provisional government, the election of a senate to control and assist the government, and the creation of a commission to be sent abroad to defend Albania's rights. The assembly approved his proposals and entrusted him with the formation of the provisional government. The Albanian flag was then raised and the great powers notified of the proclamation of Albania's independence. As Mr. Skendi concludes (p. 463): "Thus the independence of Albania was achieved under precarious circumstances, after more than three decades of efforts in developing national consciousness."

Mr. Skendi's conclusions seem to serve as a covert apologia — unnecessary in this reviewer's opinion — for Albania's relative lateness in acquiring a nationalist consciousness as compared to its Balkan neighbors. Thus, he enumerates various "obstacles to national affirmation" greater than those of these neighbors and emphasizes that some of these obstacles were at times unique. This reviewer discerns six such obstacles enumerated in Mr. Skendi's text and presents them below but not in the order of their textual appearance;

- (1) First, there was the divisive factor of three different religions, with the Muslim Albanian majority enjoying a privileged position in the likewise Muslim Ottoman empire, in contrast to the Roman Catholic Albanians of the north and the Eastern Orthodox Albanians and Greeks of the south. Some of the latter, Mr. Skendi might have added, favored not self-government or independence but union with Greece.

According to the view of a Greek diplomat who served at Gjirokastër in 1929-1930 in vice-consular capacity, at least up to 1880 all Eastern Orthodox Albanians, regardless of the language they spoke, regarded themselves as Greeks, i.e. were, to use Mr. Skendi's term, "Grecomanes" (which should be better spelled as "Grecomanes" like "balletomanes," if "γραικομανής" is the term's etymological origin). Austrian propaganda, however, according to this same source, had persuaded some of these to pose as Albanian patriots. When their children became aware that they would play a greater role in a small Albania than in the larger Greece in which they would be incorporated, they became fanatically attached to Albanianism and gradually attracted others to this view.²

- (2) Second, the feudal Muslim Albanian nobility of landowning pashas and beys, although opposed to the loss of privileges which the Ottoman government's centralization policies entailed, had, nonetheless, a vested interest in the Ottoman empire and, it might be added, a sense of solidarity with that empire's ruling class.
- (3) Third, the majority of Albanian political leaders did not strive for the usual goal of a nationalist movement, namely the achievement of statehood, but desired only self-government as a single unit within the framework of the Ottoman empire.
- (4) Fourth, regional social differences existed. In the north were the mountaineers in a backward and tribal state. In the south, on the other hand, Albanian society, though still patriarchal, was more progressive.
- (5) Fifth, many alphabets, instead of a single one, existed side by side, hindering social communication.
- (6) Sixth, "enlightenment" — the diffusion, namely of western influences, among which the "ideology" of nationalism — was difficult because the majority of the Albanians, being Muslims, were "East-oriented" and therefore less open to the adoption of western ideas than their Christian countrymen, whether these were Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox.

Joining this game, this reviewer would add to the above six "obstacles to national affirmation" a seventh one: the lack of any pre-Ottoman Albanian political background seriously comparable to that of the pre-Ottoman Serbs, Bulgars or Greeks — Skenderbeg notwithstanding.

Because of the somewhat apologetic character of these conclusions, Mr.

2. M. C. Melas, *Memoirs of an Ambassador* (in Greek) (Athens, 1967), pp. 40-41.

Skendi dwells somewhat less systematically on the factors that were favorable to "national affirmation" than on those that were unfavorable. This reviewer, from his reading of these conclusions as and the entire book, notes the existence of the following ten favorable factors of the Albanian national awakening:

- (1) First, the feeling of common "blood," which, in Mr. Skendi's view, existed in the tribal society that existed in the mountains of the north and in regions where conversion to Islam had been of a recent date.
- (2) Second, a common spoken language, with variations of dialect only (Geg and Tosk), as compared, for instance, to the Swiss, the Belgians, the Indians, or the South Slavs. Also a written language, albeit with various alphabets.
- (3) Third, common folkways, in spite of religious and regional differences.
- (4) Fourth, an Ottoman policy that occasionally fanned Albanian ethnocentrism for Ottoman purposes and for a brief period had liberal characteristics.
- (5) Fifth, the existence of Albanians in diaspora who became bearers of Western ideas and imitators of Westborn nationalism.
- (6) Sixth, the presence in a neighboring Western country (Italy) of a great number of hyphenated countrymen free to promote nationalist ideas, and encouraged by their government to do so.
- (7) Seventh, the Ottoman government's recognition of Austria-Hungary's *Kulturprotektorat* and its acquiescence in the establishment of Italian schools and in Protestant mission activities.
- (8) Eighth, the example of the national awakening of neighboring Balkan peoples (especially Greece) and of their acquisition of the status of a nation-state.
- (9) Ninth, the existence of an international environment that was extremely favorable to the awakening of the national consciousness and to the promotion of Albanian ethnocentrism, as witness the attitudes and policies of Austria-Hungary and Italy of cultivating this consciousness.
- (10) Tenth, great power policies which, under certain conditions (changes in the status quo unfavorable to the Ottoman empire's European territories) envisaged the establishment of an independent state in Albania.

It was largely this last factor, as Mr. Skendi acknowledges, that was of outstanding importance for the emergence of Albania as a new nation-state in 1912. For when the Balkan states that year upset the Ottoman status quo in Europe the great powers primarily concerned with Albania saw to it that

some at least of the territories which the Albanians regarded as theirs should serve as the basis of a new state. "Historical events," as Mr. Skendi puts it, imposed independence upon Albania.

Mr. Skendi further believes that the Albanians were not yet culturally prepared, in contrast to neighboring Balkan nations, for achieving this status. "One hesitates to say," he writes (p. 472), "that the Albanians were ready for independence." "The other Balkan nations" he goes on to say "had a long period of cultural preparation before attaining it," i. e. independence. "The Albanians who needed it most had the least preparation." While this may be true as far as "cultural" preparation is concerned (although this reviewer, judging from the contents of this book, is not fully convinced of this either), the matter, again in this reviewer's opinion, is really irrelevant. During the three years or so before 1912, as Mr. Skendi's facts abundantly demonstrate, the Albanians by their lively response to threats against their territory emanating from outside as well as struggle against the territorial partition which the Ottoman administration had imposed on them, for purposes of rule, of control, clearly expressed a very visceral attachment to their land that is one of the outstanding features of a biological nation,³ namely of a certain type of group attitudes and behavior that is not just a characteristic of *homo sapiens*.

But this remark leads to others that are concerned less with Mr. Skendi's book as history than with its character as a case study of nationalism and international relations and politics.

1. The earlier deplored lack of any map in Mr. Skendi's book does not help reveal the full extent of the Albanians' territorial aspirations, which can be summed up in the words "Greater Albania," and has its Balkan equivalents in the Serbians' "Greater Serbia" (which became Yugoslavia); the Bulgarians' "Greater Bulgaria" (based on the Treaty of San Stefano); and the Greeks' "Greater Greece" (deriving its inspiration from the "Megali Idea"). At times extending south as far as the Ambracian gulf, namely including more than Camëria (Tzamouria) in post-1913 Greece, and east and north-

3. R. Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative* (New York: Atheneum Press, 1966), p. 191, introduces the term "biological nation" and defines it as "a social group containing at least two mature males which holds as an exclusive possession a continuous area of space, which isolates itself from others of its kind through outward antagonism, and which through joint defense of its social territory achieves leadership, cooperation, and a capacity for concerted action." Because of cultural reasons, the Albanians, as Mr. Skendi's study indicates, had some difficulties in achieving leadership, cooperation, and a capacity for concerted action.

east to Usküb (Skopje) and to the Kosovo-Metohija region, both in Yugoslavia, these Albanian territorial aspirations engendered territorial antagonism both toward Serbia and its successor and toward Greece, ever since Albania's territorial extent was decided upon in 1913. For instance, Albanian irredentism in the Kosovo-Metohija region which has an extremely high ratio of Albanians in its population was to serve, as an important factor, among several others, in aligning Albania with Stalin's USSR during the Tito-Stalin dispute of 1948, and then against the Khrushchevian and post-Khrushchevian USSR — the result being today that Albania is aligned with Mao's China. With regard to Greece, Albanian aspirations to Camëria came to the surface in 1938-1943 when Fascist Italy made Albania part of the *impero* and promoted these aspirations that were directed against Greece's territorial integrity.

But Greece's relations with Albania were adversely affected mainly by the question of Northern Epirus or Southern Albania. This involves a dispute over the matter of the ethnic consciousness and aspirations of a number of Eastern Orthodox Greeks living in the southern part of Albania — the Grecomans, as Mr. Skendi calls them — and over the propriety of including territories inhabited by Greeks within the boundaries of the Albanian state.

Although these are problems lying outside the scope of Mr. Skendi's book the author might well have made a few concluding remarks about the genesis of these frontier problems, which institutionalized, as it were, through boundary delimitation certain factor of antagonism over territory that had contributed to the awakening of the Albanian nationalism. Whether this was accidental or the deliberate result of Austro-Hungarian and or Italian policy could be the subject of another study. Further research in the available archives might provide an answer to this question.

2. This study tends to refute one of the author's implied hypotheses that is evidently based on his knowledge of the nationalist processes that occurred in other Balkan nations, about the emergence of nationalism among an aggregate of people living in a particular territory, namely that a period of intense cultural efforts *normally* precedes political efforts to achieve independence or, in other words, that an awakened consciousness of belonging to a nationality in that particular group is an antecedent of efforts to achieve nationhood and statehood. For it reveals that cultural efforts, such as the adoption of a single alphabet, are instruments of leaders striving to achieve political ends: the setting up of some sort of territorial political unit, monad, organization, usually a state.

3. This study also reveals the complex political process that underlies

the whole problem of recognition of a new state in terms of International Law. For it clearly demonstrates how external political efforts converge with internal political strivings — not always in the same proportions, with external factors occasionally playing a preponderant role (Cyprus is a most recent example)—for the achievement of the desired political end: usually the creation of a new state, member of the society of nations.

4. This study, though short in economic and social analysis and including no summary of the attempts of Marxist-Leninist historians to interpret the Albanian national awakening in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory, implicitly serves to demonstrate the fallacy of Marxist-Leninist thinking about nationalism as a social phenomenon supposedly connected with the rise of the bourgeois class and therefore destined to wither away with the withering away of the state.

5. The fact that this study reveals that Albanian leaders did not regard attainment of the status of a nation-state as a maximum, ultimate political goal, with self-government (autonomy) as a second-best solution, but primarily strove for self-government, with full independence merely contingent upon the breakdown of the Ottoman empire, raises the questions of whether these leaders were truly nationalists on the basis of definitions of nationalism, such as Hans Kohn's, in which nationalism "recognizes the nation-state as the ideal form of social organization . . ." ⁴ or whether this definition is too restrictive, therefore inadequate. The present reviewer is inclined to believe that the latter may be the case, having also in mind the concept of the biological nation mentioned in an earlier paragraph. In other words, he believes, that the process Mr. Skendi discusses in his book correctly belongs to the category of nationalist phenomena.

6. As the "reactionary" and often rebellious response of the "backward" conservative Muslim Albanians of the north to the westernizing, secular efforts of the Young Turks or even of the Sultan during the Tanzimat period reveals, the creation of a new nation-state, which is usually regarded as evidence of the diffusion of West-born nationalism, may be the partial result of the affirmation of non-Western values. In his book, Mr. Skendi tends to underestimate this factor, basing himself primarily on the ink-stain rather than on the blood-stain record.

7. In a functional definition of nationality, it has been said that "membership in a people essentially consists in a wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively,

4. H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1961), pp 16-17. This book was first published in 1944.

and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders.”⁵ This definition, which elegantly covers the cases of multi-language nationalities such as the Swiss or (with De Gaulle’s permission) the Canadians, successfully withstands the test of Mr. Skendi’s study, which in terms of communications media could be called “The Albanian Struggle for a National Alphabet.” For this book draws attention to the enormous importance of the written as against merely the spoken language in the social communications that help create a sense of nationality. In a yet unpublished article, this reviewer distinguishes several types of ethnocentrism based on the sort of technique used for writing. *Strictu sensu* nationalism, he proposes, should be defined as ethnocentrism of the Gutenbergian age, as against proto-nationalism, which he defines as ethnocentrism in the age of manuscripts and scribes. Viewed from this standpoint, Albania’s ethnocentric affirmation is evidently of a nationalist character. Hence, Mr. Skendi would have done well if he had informed his readers about the date and place of publication of the first book ever printed in the Albanian language.

8. From the sociological and biological viewpoint, Mr. Skendi’s book serves to confirm the view that social conflict and consensus — or amity and enmity — are twin features of a single social process. For it shows that when the Albanians had to make a choice between intra-group dissensus or enmity on religious grounds and territorial unity or intragroup amity that was threatened by what they felt to be outsiders, they opted for the latter, with resultant groups consensus — and a forgetfulness of the historical fact that their national symbol, George Kastrioti Skenderbeg, had fought as a champion of Christendom against Islam.

In the process, a certain secularization occurred — secularization being a feature of nationalism the Roman Catholic American historian, Carlton J. H. Hayes, underlines in his studies of nationalism, where he notes that it becomes a substitute for religion. For supreme group loyalty was now directed to a secular, a political whole, to Caesar rather than to God, with some Albanian leaders referring to the “divine” warmth of patriotism or even going to the extreme of proposing the deification of Albania (pp. 178 and 189).

Hunter College
City University of New York

STEPHEN G. XYDIS

5. K. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1958), p. 71.