

to a chauffeur-driven limousine for the rest of his life. This applies only if a Premier lasts more than three consecutive months, not just for "a few weeks." (p. 282)

All in all, despite its title, which is not original (Johannes Gaitanides, *Griechenland ohne Säulen*, Munich: List, 1955) Mr. Holden's columns are continually showing. In his view, not original, "there is hardly an aspect of modern Greek politics that does not have its antique parallel" (p. 24). One could say this about the politics of almost any country. In order to explain many features of modern Greek politics, Mr. Holden constantly refers to *hybris*, Plato, or Boeotia—which really shows how difficult he finds it to see things as they really are. This book, mainly because of its flogging the dead horse of utopian Philhellenism, which is derived from eighteenth and nineteenth-century neoclassicism, hardly warrants a review in a scholarly periodical. It contributes little, if anything to our understanding of modern Greece, the modern Greeks—except as these are seen through the eyes of other Englishmen, such as Osbert Lancaster or Patrick Leigh-Fermor. Its central thesis that Greek politics oscillate between the poles of anarchy and authoritarianism is a generalization derived from his four-year stay in Greece, during which he witnessed both. But, how about the fifty-year reign of George I (1863-1913), out of a total of 140 years in the history of modern Greece as an independent state?

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John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Pp. 346.

The analysis of revolution is coming more and more to be linked to the study of political development. To inquire why some societies undergo violent conflict while other similar societies do not is to make certain assumptions about the nature of historical change. This book is an important contribution to these concerns for students of comparative political development and for those interested in the eight societies that John Dunn discusses.

Professor Dunn's central theme is nation-building. He has chosen

eight twentieth-century revolutions, those in Russia, Mexico, China, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Algeria, Turkey and Cuba, all of which resulted in the establishment or consolidation of a nation-state. Mr. Dunn is much impressed by the strength of nationalism in the modern world, and he is concerned to examine in each of his eight societies the process through which localist peasant interests could be fused into a nationalist movement.

He is critical of the two main approaches to the study of revolutions, which he labels the ideological and the sociological. Ideologies of the Left he feels can misinterpret the genesis and the costs of a revolution by explaining the total process in terms of an all-justifying millenarian future. Conservative belief-systems err in the opposite direction by glorifying the pre-revolutionary past, missing any strains in its society, attributing the revolution to conspiracy, and discounting because of its violence any gains made as a result of the revolution. In addition, Communist revolutionary interpretation misses the vast differences in styles of revolutions that established Communist governments. It is blinded by its assumption of an international class structure and international revolutionary movement, and thus fails to see local and national uniqueness.

Sociological explanations escape these traps, but tend to consider revolutions as analogous to natural turbulent phenomena, thus missing the contributions of revolutionary leaders and followers as rational actors. Theoretical studies may also make the concept of revolution so specific that the explanations are expected to follow from description of events, or so abstract that *coups d'état* and rebellions cannot be distinguished from real revolutions.

But this book is not traditional narrative history. It belongs with other recent works of comparative history like Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, 1966); C. E. Black's *The Dynamics of Modernization* (Princeton, 1966); and Samuel P. Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, 1968)—all of which use a particular social tension to explain the modernization process. Professor Dunn organizes his accounts of eight revolutions around three topics, the program of the revolutionaries, the mobilization of mass support, and the breakdown of old institutions of authority and the establishment of new ones. Professor Dunn feels that analyses of revolutions often underplay the role of deliberate human acts. His cases consider how many revolutionaries there are, where they are placed in their country's social structure, and what they say they are attempting to do. He emphasizes

the role of particular leaders, the Lenins, the Castros, the Ataturks who have the nerve and the skill to seize opportunities which in other hands might have been forever lost.

The extensiveness and success of mobilization is said to rest on the relevance of the revolutionary program to the miseries of large numbers of people. The author contributes some clear thinking on the often muddied subject of the appeal of ideologies. Student intellectuals may be converted by philosophic abstractions; but peasants, urban workers or village artisans are seen realistically as neither philosophers nor mindless victims unable to determine their own interests, but as rational beings able to choose the best possible option in whatever circumstances they face. Revolutionaries can mobilize such people if they accurately determine their condition and offer the best ameliorative plans.

Revolutions have their innocent victims, and the book recognizes that effective mobilization may have its Stalinist component; successful revolutionaries have to establish control first over their followers and eventually over the whole society. Ultimately if the old regime falls it proves to have insufficient repressive power. Social structure is the key: revolutions succeed only if there are significant social tensions in the cities, villages and countryside. Since 1950 many modernizing societies have had revolutionaries and governments with weak social control, but there have been few revolutions because widespread mobilization of the masses has been so difficult. The author speculates that revolutions "work" only where the existing government has lost its legitimacy either by its harshness or by insufficient repression.

For readers of this journal three cases will be of special interest, the revolutions in Russia, Turkey and Yugoslavia. In Russia the vital element was Lenin's leadership, particularly his decision to reverse the program of the *Communist Manifesto* and call for the distribution of land to peasants and the nationalization of industry. Lenin's acceptance of the confiscatory treaty of Brest-Litovsk meant that the peasants did not accept the Bolsheviks as legitimate. It required Stalingrad in 1941 to unite the Communist government with Russian nationalism. All other Communist revolutions since 1917 have won their legitimacy as wars of national liberation; Yugoslavia is a case in point. Tito and the Communist party led a nationalist movement against the German occupation and thus forged a nation out of diverse ethnic and cultural groups. In Turkey between 1919 and 1923 the leaders of the national movement were not Communists but a managerial elite not implicated in rural class con-

flicts and able to lead the ethnic Turks against all foreign challengers. In all three of these cases the revolutionary leaders were talented organizers, their programs appealed to the peasantry, mobilization was soon or later in support of a nation-state, and the old regimes lost social control chiefly because of foreign intervention exacerbating class tensions.

*Modern Revolutions* suggests several interesting policy applications. First, all twentieth century revolutions have established either Communist economies or economies closely managed by the government. Professor Dunn feels this is because the world capitalist market makes economic development extremely difficult without government control. Second, all legitimate twentieth century revolutions have been home-grown; if new regimes are militarily imposed they carry the potential of stirring up mobilization against themselves. Finally, all twentieth century revolutions have brought extensive suffering, but revolution however costly may be the only recourse in a society where most people are wretched. Any future revolutions will not be in the United States or the Soviet Union; both these governments are at once too strong and insufficiently burdensome on enough people. This conclusion raises the intriguing question, which the author does not take up, that revolutions may be obsolete in post-industrial society.

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Ἀλέξη Α. Κύρου, *Ὀνειρά καὶ Πραγματικότητα: Χρόνια Διπλωματικῆς Ζωῆς 1923-53*. Ἀθήναι 1972. (Alexis A. Kyrou, *Dreams and Reality-Years of Diplomatic Activity 1923-53*). Athens 1972. Pp. 398.

The late ambassador Alexis A. Kyrou has been one of the outstanding Greek diplomats in the second and in the third quarters of the 20th century. His activity in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs lasted 45 years as after having been attained by the age limit he was asked by successive governments to stay on. During these 45 years the author felt his duty more than once, 1926, 1935, 1954-5 and 1961-3 to request to be relieved from active service as he did not agree with the policy applied in general or on a particular subject. The governments concerned acquiesced in the hope he would be later persuaded to resume his activity for the benefit of his country, as he did.