

councils would be able to dominate the new national and state governments and the remnants of the old army and bureaucracy, or whether the councils would be subordinated to the old institutions. On the local, state and national levels the councils competed with these old institutions for final authority. The Ebert government, especially after the Spartacist uprising in January, 1919, but even earlier on certain issues, such as demobilization, chose to rely on the Free Corps and old state bureaucracies to maintain order and consolidate power. The Social Democratic government in Berlin made these decisions even though the «large majority of the (workers' and soldiers' councils were dominated by the moderate Social Democrats». (60) .

In some ways the researches into the council movement in Austria are aimed at corroborating the interpretation that the outcome of the struggle between councils and government in Germany could indeed have been different. While taking full cognizance of the many differences in the Austrian situation (complete collapse of the Imperial army, more unified and radical Social Democratic Party, greater antagonism between Vienna and the provinces), Carsten cites the example of the organization of the Austrian *Volkswehr* units in arguing that Ebert's reliance on the old German High Command and Free Corps was not definitely necessary; the formation of a reliable Social Democratic oriented defense force was an alternative. In fact, a few such units were actually formed: in Baden, Württemberg, and elsewhere. (65-66).

Chapters 9, 10, and 11 have only a tenuous relationship to the earlier sections dealing with the council movements. Chapter 9, «The Extreme Right» (247-70), is a close look at some of the new anti-Semitic groups in Germany and Austria (but not Hungary) in 1919, and does not discuss the extreme right in general. Chapter 10, «The National Issue» (271-98), is a rather incongruous addition, touching upon the frontier problems of Germany and Austria in 1919, and is only indirectly related to the study of the council movement. Chapter 11, «Moving to the Right» (299-322), surprisingly focuses more on the end of the coalition government in Austria, than on the decline of the left in Germany, which was certainly the more important development.

An excellent concluding chapter, «A Revolution Defeated» (323-35), recapitulates Carsten's solid criticism of the tactics and judgment of the extreme left in Germany and attempts to argue the case once more for the unfulfilled possibilities of the council movement, that «genuine popular initiative from below» (49) during the revolution in Central Europe.

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William R. Kintner and Wolfgang Klaiber, *Eastern Europe and European Security. A Foreign Policy Research Institute Book. Foreword (by) William E. Griffith*. New York: Dunellen, 1971. xx, 393 pp.

The primary purpose of this rather loosely organized work is that of explaining the dynamics of change in Socialist Eastern Europe. A concluding chapter brings in security considerations. Kintner and Klaiber express the opinion—or is it a hope?—that the rate of transformation of Socialism may outpace the decline of NATO, and especially the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces, thus preserving the strategic balance between East and West by accident. Within this context, Western Germany's Ostpolitik is to be understood as an effort to reduce the danger of Soviet aggression against Western Europe even though this policy raises the possibility of Soviet domination of that crucial area by peaceful means.

The problem of dynamics is dealt with in the central 223 pages of the book, in two sections. The first of the two tests an hypothesis according to which the nature of economic reform, the role of the trade unions, and the part played by parliament vary directly with the level of economic development. The hypothesis is tested by the setting out of three case studies in economic reform and its possible spill-over effects, those of Bulgaria, Hungary and East Germany, in the years 1962-67. As perhaps might have been foreseen, Kintner and Klaiber found no direct covariance. The least change took place in the most advanced industrial country, the GDR, while the greatest change occurred in Hungary which, in terms of economic development stands in the middle of the three. Kintner and Klaiber attribute these differences to the style of leadership, the availability of competent Communist cadres and, in the case of the GDR, the lack of international recognition. If the two scholars preferred to work with a single explanatory factor they might, in my view, have better chosen the issue of political legitimacy rather than that of economic development.

In any case, the research base for this section is rather narrow, being limited almost entirely to the RFE papers. I have long been an advocate of the scholarly value of RFE research, but like any other body of source material it must be used in critical conjunction with others. Despite discussion of the cadre situation in East Germany, for example, there is no reference to Peter Ludz' *Parteielite im Wandel*, the standard work on the problem. The bulk of the research, furthermore, was done in 1965-67 and the reader is unfortunately left with the impression that economic reform has remained an integral part of Bulgarian and East German life, although both Sofia and Pankow have returned to highly centralized economic management, at least in some part as a consequence of the runaway events in Czechoslovakia.

The second of the two key sections attempts a statistical analysis of the factors which produce conformity to the Soviet model. Kintner and Klaiber first establish a series of indicators of conformity, such as membership in Comecon, the extent of public criticism of Soviet policy and the like and then, regime by regime establish an order of conformity for the years 1956-68. Conformity is greatest in the case of East Germany, least in the case of Albania, the others being strung in between. Against this rank order the two authors set rank orders of possible independent variables, or causes, such as trade dependence on the USSR, the ease with which Soviet armed forces might intervene in a given country, the extent of cultural interaction with the USSR, and the level of development. There follows an analysis of co-variance.

Several positive correlations emerge, not altogether unexpectedly: between conformity on the one hand and, on the other, cultural exchange with the Soviet Union, tourism to the USSR, and trade with the Eastern giant. Unexpectedly, it seems, the correlation between conformity and development is negative. Kintner and Klaiber had expected the industrially more advanced states to manifest greater independence—a corollary of their earlier expectation concerning the level of economic development and propensity for structural change—whereas in fact it is the backward countries (Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania) which have demonstrated such independence. The authors explain this negative correlation by reference to the lesser degree of economic vulnerability (e.g. to a trade embargo) which characterizes the less sophisticated economies. A more effective explanation, in my view, is that forced industrialization makes greater sense in the less developed countries, so that their regimes tend to develop a broader base of local support, which in turn makes it possible for the regime to pursue more closely the national interest. Rather Kintner and Klaiber find solace in demonstrating that there exists a positive correlation between variations from the Soviet level of economic development in either direction and non-conformity. This leaves them with the

argument that East Germany and the Soviet Union are at the same point in development. This appears to me doubtful, in view of the preponderance of machinery and equipment in East German exports to the USSR, and the weight of fuels and raw materials in Soviet deliveries to the GDR.

Unfortunately the tables used as the core of this second section are somewhat difficult to follow. They are printed in the same type as the text and with the same spacing (no doubt to save money) and since they contain much data usually end up several pages away from their explanatory text. The tables are always organized alphabetically, by country, rather than by the size of the key variable, which is the usual practice, and the Kendall coefficient of concordance is always buried somewhere in the text, rather than indicated on the table itself.

I cannot agree with Professor Griffith when he asserts in his preface that this is «an important contribution to the study of the contemporary political scene in Eastern Europe» but I would argue that Kintner and Klaiber have made a serious effort to understand the complex process of change in that area and that others with comparable ambition would be well advised to look first at their work before plunging in.

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James Barros, *Betrayal from Within. Joseph Avenol, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, 1933-1940* - New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969, pp. XIV-289.

Le secrétaire général de l'organisation mondiale (de la Société des Nations, puis de l'Organisation des Nations unies) n'est qu'un fonctionnaire, le premier des fonctionnaires internationaux. Pourtant, sur la scène internationale, il prend des allures de chef d'un gouvernement mondial. Ce phénomène est lié à la montée, au XX^e siècle, d'une technocratie internationale, dont l'auteur de ce compte rendu a étudié dans un livre (*Le rôle des experts à la Conférence de la Paix de 1919*, Ottawa, 1972) les premières manifestations.

La personnalité des différents secrétaires généraux qui se sont succédés à la tête de l'organisation mondiale depuis 1919, a inspiré dernièrement plusieurs ouvrages, dont ceux d'A. W. Rovine (*The First Fifty Years, The Secretary-General in World Politics, 1920-1970*, Leyden, 1970), M. C. Smouts (*Le secrétaire général des Nations unies*, Paris, 1971), M. W. Zacher (*Dag Hammarskjöld's United Nations*, New York, 1970). L'originalité, si l'on peut dire, de l'ouvrage de James Barros consiste dans la violence de son attaque contre le deuxième en date des secrétaires généraux, le Français Joseph Avenol. Le titre du livre est à la mesure de cette exécution morale. Pour ce faire, l'auteur se fonde largement sur les témoignages d'anciens collaborateurs de la «victime» et notamment sur celui du diplomate grec Athanase Aghnidès, sous-secrétaire général de la S.D.N.

Ce que le livre reproche essentiellement à Avenol, c'est de n'avoir pas dressé la Société des Nations contre les ambitions des puissances révisionnistes et de n'avoir pas ainsi défendu la paix mondiale. Pourtant, ce réquisitoire incessant, de la première à la dernière page, semble se fonder sur un postulat qui laisse perplexe l'historien: la S.D.N. avait forcément raison et ses adversaires forcément tort. Or cette organisation mondiale (en fait surtout européenne) avait été dominée par les Anglais et les Français et avait été orientée au départ dans une direction contestable: défendre les acquis des vainqueurs et empêcher les vaincus de crier à l'injustice. On assimilait volontairement le maintien du statu quo des vainqueurs, au maintien de la paix. Par la suite, Londres et Paris durent faire une série de concessions, devant la pression des puissances contestataires, tout en essayant de conserver l'institution comme instru-