

ment des pays qui avaient profité de la première guerre mondiale. Il n'est absolument pas prouvé que le respect intégral des traités de paix de 1919, fût toujours dans l'intérêt des petites nations, pas plus d'ailleurs que dans l'intérêt de certaines grandes puissances.

Or l'auteur soutient : a) que si la S.D.N. voulait défendre les intérêts des petites nations, il lui fallait défendre partout le statu quo; b) qu'Avenol était au service des grandes puissances, mais qu'il favorisait plus les Italiens et même les Allemands, à cause de ses sentiments hostiles aux Anglo-Saxons. Au sujet de cette dernière accusation, nous ne voyons vraiment pas pourquoi il aurait été bien d'être pro-anglais, mais mal d'être pro-italien, à partir du moment où l'on acceptait, comme Avenol, d'être un «great power agent» (p. 260).

L'auteur fait l'éloge du successeur, en 1940, d'Avenol, l'Irlandais Sean Lester, auquel il dédie même son ouvrage, en ces termes : «To Sean Lester...who...saved the dignity of the League of Nations» (p. V). Pourquoi? Avenol soutenait que l'Angleterre devait être exclue de la Méditerranée et que d'ailleurs il avait toujours été en faveur d'une nouvelle Europe, débarrassée des Anglo-Saxons comme des Russes. C'est un fait indéniable que l'idée d'Europe franco-allemande, sans Londres et sans la Russie, constituait depuis le XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, un important courant de la pensée politique française.

Lester jouait, quant à lui, sur un autre tableau : «As time went on and the United States entered the war, Lester perceived another reason for maintaining the League. If the United States decided after the war that it desired an international organization for keeping the peace, at least the foundations of one would be there» (p. 257). Du point de vue de la petite nation, Lester était donc un «great power agent» tout autant qu'Avenol. D'ailleurs, ce dernier n'était pas en d'aussi bons termes avec l'Axe qu'on pourrait le penser, puisque le 31 décembre 1943 il se réfugia en Suisse, pour éviter d'être déporté par les Allemands.

Enfin, c) l'auteur soutient que l'échec de la S.D.N. est en grande partie imputable à Avenol. C'est donner à un homme qu'il considère de plus médiocre, une importance sur le déroulement des événements mondiaux, tout à fait disproportionnée avec son pouvoir réel. Si Avenol était médiocre, alors il était à l'image de l'organisation dont il avait la charge. D'ailleurs les grandes puissances n'ont pas intérêt à nommer un secrétaire général qui soit trop brillant, de peur que l'envie lui vienne d'intervenir dans la prise de décision, réservée aux Grands.

Néanmoins, comme pour les autres ouvrages de James Barros, cette étude nous semble importante essentiellement à cause de la richesse de la documentation sur laquelle elle se fonde.

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DIMITRI KITSIKIS

Dimitri Kitsikis, *Le rôle des experts à la Conférence de la Paix de 1919. Gestation d'une technocratie en politique internationale*. (Ottawa, Canada: Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa. 1972. Pp. XII + 227.

Professor Kitsikis's new book is in a sense a continuation of his first book on the Peace Conference of 1919 (*Propagande et pressions en politique internationale. La Grèce et ses revendications à la Conférence de la Paix, 1919-1920*), but of course on the expanded theme of the role of the experts generally in the postwar negotiations.

As may be deduced from the slender size of this volume, one could not possibly expect a detailed study of the subject at hand; nonetheless, the author should perhaps have indicated in his Introduction how and why he intended to limit his study. This omission is com-

pensated for only somewhat by the table of contents which reveals, to a certain extent, how the author wishes to limit himself.

The very bulk of material available on the subject of the Peace Conference is indeed intimidating. It requires a vast amount of research and an intimate knowledge on the part of those historians and political scientists wishing to master the subject. For those who have mastered this material, this new book by Professor Kitsikis will be of relatively little value; however, it will prove useful to those who do not possess a specialist's knowledge of the subject.

In his new work Professor Kitsikis defines the role of the experts and broaches such questions as those involving territorial matters, roving commissions, economic questions, the League of Nations, and the role of the expert within his own delegation.

Of the four categories of delegates to the Conference — plenipotentiary delegates, delegates and technical advisers, technical experts, and members of the general secretariat— Professor Kitsikis concentrates on the first three, but also discusses others as well, e.g. unofficial delegates and advisers. The role of the adviser, or expert, was specifically recognized in an official text, the *Règlement de la Conférence*, issued by the Council of Ten at the beginning of the Conference (their role being defined generally in articles 3 and 13). The experts were to prepare the background material for each question, whereas the plenipotentiary delegates were to make the final decisions on the findings of the experts. The actual role of the expert, and what he did or did not do, is certainly an important subject, although it is somewhat disappointing to find that a mere sampling of the roles of the expert was taken in the work under review, and not a systematic and more detailed approach. Part of the decision to restrict this coverage was perhaps the result of publishers' policy generally today—whether commercial or university—to cut down production costs, which results in today's author often being warned from the outset that one must not produce a lengthy manuscript (even if the subject and method require a lengthy coverage), with the result that professors are discouraged from producing detailed and lengthy scholarly works.

Following his penchant to sample areas within the scope of each of the chapter headings, Kitsikis discusses in his second chapter, on territorial questions, the subject of the commission studying Greece, the composition and authority of this commission, but he also manages to squeeze in a few pages on the commission dealing with Belgian and Danish Affairs, which is not a balanced way of handling a subject.

Again in the third chapter, dealing with roving commissions, Kitsikis presents as his sample a commission dealing with Greece, this time, the Interallied Commission of Inquiry on the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and Adjacent Territories. Being an interallied commission, other countries are mentioned, but does such a slender volume warrant so much space just on Greece? Not that this subject is unworthy of a major study, but the author does not present a balanced sampling in his subjects. Surely there was more to World War I and its negotiations than the issues confronting any one country, in this case, Greece. In short, the contents of the book are not balanced and do not fully justify the sweeping title given this volume.

The next chapter is equally disappointing in its limited sampling. On the subject of «economic questions» the author discusses one subject: the commission studying ports, waterways and railways. The subject of reparations is not discussed here, and indeed only much later in a totally inappropriate chapter, on the British Delegation (pages 196-199), is this done, and then quite briefly.

The final chapters discuss the role of the experts within their own delegations, and again the author discusses only a couple of cases, i.e. concerning the American and British dele-

gations. Kitsikis does introduce interesting information here in general. He also indicates that the British had the largest number of advisers (their delegation comprising about two hundred members and an equal number at the lower echelon), the French delegation was the second largest and the American the third (with a little over one hundred members). A reflection of the newly acknowledged role of technical advisers by the end of World War I is clearly seen, as the author points out that during the Congress of Vienna, Lord Castlereagh brought only seventeen advisers with him.

Just how influential were the experts within their own delegations is a subject introduced on several occasions, especially concerning the extent to which their advice was taken by the head of their delegation. President Wilson, for instance, did listen to the advice of his experts quite often, whereas Lloyd George did not, although these advisory commissions were not always unanimous in their findings. For example, Kitsikis discusses the sharp division within the American commission to study Italian claims. This committee was strongly divided between those for Italian claims (backed by Col. House) including David Hunter Miller, George Louis Beer, James T. Shotwell, and S. E. Mezes, and those against Italian claims—W. E. Lunt, D. W. Johnson, Clive Day, Isaiah Bowman, and Charles Seymour. Here the author presents an interesting and useful case study of how a solution was finally achieved concerning a most sensitive subject.

Although Professor Kitsikis does not make any pretense at presenting a detailed study of the role of the experts at the Peace Conference, one is struck by certain obvious imbalances, such as the almost total omission of the subject of reparations and the inadequate discussion of the inner workings of the Italian and especially of the French delegations. This reviewer was disappointed, not with what was accomplished in this book, but rather with what was not attempted—to give a fuller, more balanced presentation of the subject. This would have required considerable archival research in unpublished papers (which was not attempted), and a much longer, and, consequently, a more complete study. Nevertheless, this book is useful and especially so for students, who will find in it a good introduction to the behind-the-scene events at the Peace Conference of 1919.

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ALAN SCHAM

*Admiral of the Fleet: Cunningham of Hyndhope, The Battle for the Mediterranean.* A Memoir by Oliver Warner. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1967. ix, 301 pp., Acknowledgments, Map. Chronology-Index, General Index.

This is a charming and thoroughly enjoyable book in which the author easily achieves his goal even if the promise of the title is not fulfilled. Slightly more than half of the pages deal with the war years and the scholar primarily interested in the Mediterranean campaign would be better served by the works of Kemp, Morison, or Roskill. The appropriate sections of Cunningham's own two volume *A Sailor's Odyssey* also provide much more information on the war and the man than does *Admiral of the Fleet* but Oliver Warner clearly had no intention of producing yet another survey of a given campaign nor of producing a full-fledged biography. Rather he sought, as indicated on the title page, to produce a «memoir» of one of the great British Admirals of this century and in this he has succeeded. Once the reader recognizes this as the author's intent it is quite easy to follow an almost unflawed Cunningham from success to seemingly inevitable further success in a British Navy almost totally lacking in poor leadership or less favored more jealous officers. Such a work is bound to reflect