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### THE ALLIED POWERS AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 1921-1923

DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1919-1939, First Series, Volume XVII: *Greece and Turkey*, January 1, 1921 - September 2, 1922; Volume XVIII: *Greece and Turkey*, September 3, 1922 - July 24, 1923. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M. E. Lambert, London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1970, 1972, pp. 948 and 1064.

The Volume XVII and XVIII of the First Series of the *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939* complete the documentation of Volume VIII, Chapter XIV, and Volume XIII, Chapter I, and deal with the attempts of the Allies to establish peace in the Near East over a period beginning April 18, 1920 and ending July 24, 1923 (the Lausanne Treaty).

In April 1920 the Allied Powers agreed on the Turkish peace terms and on August 10 the Sultan's government signed the Treaty of Sèvres. But the provisions of this Treaty were vitiated by the Turkish nationalist movement under Kemal Atatürk, which was especially opposed to the Greek occupation of the Vilayet of Smyrna. In this Kemal had the support of the French government who advocated an agreement with him on the basis to restore Smyrna to Turkish sovereignty<sup>1</sup>, and who declared that nothing would induce them to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres as it stood. For this shift of policy the French called the attention of the Allies to events in Greece. The unexpected defeat on 20 November of the Greek Prime Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, at the polls brought to the fore the question of the ex-King Constantine. The new government intended to bring back Constantine, whom the Allies had expelled from Greece in 1917 for alleged pro-German sympathies<sup>2</sup>. The French now demanded that in the event of Constantine's return the Allies should refuse to recognize him, break off diplomatic relations with Greece, cut

1. See Volume XIII, No 194, pp. 201-202.

2. See George B. Leon's most interesting article "King Constantine's Policy in Exile and the Central Powers, 1917-1918" *Essays in Memory of Basil Laourdas*, edited by Louisa B. Laourdas, Thessaloniki 1975, pp. 495-536.

off all financial aid, and deny to Greece possession of crucial strategic positions. The British, and particularly their Foreign Minister Lord Curzon, contended that the Allies had obligations towards Greece as a nation, no matter what government happened to be in power. Curzon proposed that the Allies should give Constantine every opportunity of maintaining the policy and international obligations of Venizelos and that, if the King complied, they should eventually recognize him. Curzon's proposals were rejected by the Supreme Council (Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Nitti) and it was decided that, should King Constantine return to Athens, then Greece should be deprived of Allied financial assistance. This meant that Greece under King Constantine was unable to persuade the Allies to compel the Turks to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres. When the year 1920 came to an end, the general outlook was very obscure and unsatisfactory <sup>1</sup>.

From January 1, 1921, to September 2, 1922, the diplomatic transactions were concerned with Curzon's endeavours to save as much as possible of the Treaty of Sèvres and to promote allied unity, by inducing the Greeks to accept a compromise on the status of Smyrna and by forcing the Turks to renounce the extravagances of their nationalist programme — endeavours which did not lead to any agreement. The details of the conversations and correspondence of this period are the contents of the Volume XVII under discussion.

The documents printed in Chapter I supply the background to the discussions on the Near East at the Second Conference of Paris, January 24-29, 1921, the Third Conference of London, February 18 - March 18, 1921, and the Paris conversations of June 18-19, 1921, between British, French and Italian representatives. In the three first weeks of January, Lord Curzon considered possible modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres, but the situation in Greece and Turkey did not afford the basis for such modifications. (Nos. 6, 12, 14, 15). Thus on 26 January at the Paris Conference the French government accepted the British proposal that the Eastern Question should be discussed by an Allied Conference at which Greeks and Turks should be represented. (No. 19). The French however stipulated that the Turkish delegation should include qualified representative of the Government of Angora (No. 20). Accepting the invitation Greece and Turkey hoped to impose their own views on the Con-

1. See Volume VIII, Chapter I, pp. 827-841, No. 97 and appendices, and Douglas Dakin's most informative article "Lord Curzon's Policy towards Greece", in *Essays in Memory of Basil Laourdas*, *op. cit.*, pp. 537-554.

ference. The Greek delegation arrived in London with the belief that the Conference would decide on the maintenance of the Treaty of Sèvres and that it would impose on Turkey penalties reserved by the signatories of the Treaty (No. 28). The Sultan's government, on the other hand, sent their representatives to the Conference with exaggerated pretensions concerning the frontiers of Turkey and the questions of Smyrna, Armenia, the Straits, the Turkish army, the financial clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres and spheres of influence. (No. 29). The Angora government which refused to merge their delegates in the Sultan's delegation, were determined to demand the withdrawal of Greece from Thrace and Smyrna, and although they sent a separate delegation, they led the Conference to believe that there was a close "subterranean" understanding between the two delegations (Nos. 40, 46). Under these circumstances the Third London Conference, 18 February to March 18, 1921, was a failure. Allied proposals for modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres were rejected by both the Greeks and the Turks <sup>1</sup>, and the Conference, before dispersing, made it clear to both sides that unless and until agreement was reached as to the modification of the Treaty of Sèvres, the principal Allied Powers could undertake no responsibility for restraining either of the two parties from movements considered necessary for the safety of their armies (No. 66).

The Turkish Nationalists however proceeded to make separate agreements with the French and Italians (Nos. 51, 56, 60, 63 and 69). In face of these developments, on March 23, the Greeks resumed the offensive, hoping for British support (No. 67), and despite lack of military news from the Asia Minor Front and fears of a Bulgarian and Serbian attack on Thrace and Macedonia, they contemplated the possibility of taking Constantinople (No. 78). The Greek offensive continued until April 2, when a stalemate followed up and lasted until June 15.

The separate agreements of the Turkish Nationalists with the French and Italians had affected Anglo-French relations which deteriorated from March 1921. The French agreement with the Turkish Nationalists which provided for an exchange of prisoners, for the ratification of the Syrian frontier and the evacuation of Cilicia (No. 56) conflicted with the Treaty of Sèvres and with the Tripartite Agreement (No. 60). The Italian understanding, reached by the Kemalists in London, provided for an Italo-Turkish economic agreement to be signed after the conclusion of

1. See Vol. XV, No. 53, Appendix 2, and No. 58, note 3.

peace (No.69). The British government informed the Italian that they regretted that an ally should pursue independent negotiations and that they declined to recognise any agreement thus made, because the Allied Governments ought first to have cognisance of the terms in case any were contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Council (Nos. 75, 81). They also protested against the conclusion of the secret Franco-Turkish pact pointing out that, if in analogous circumstances the British Government had made a separate treaty with a common enemy of the Allies and had refused to disclose the terms until it had been approved by the parliament, the French government would not have been slow to express their astonishment (Nos.63 and 76). Early in April, Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, denied the attempt to conceal the negotiations with the Turkish Nationalists and claimed that the agreement made in its present shape was not an international act as it had not been approved by the Italian Chamber. Berthelot, the French Foreign Minister, while expressing regret for the misunderstanding, stated that Briand had repeatedly explained to Lloyd George that he could not return to Paris after the London Conference empty-handed, and that the immediate publication of the agreement with the Kemalists was debarred by the French parliamentary procedure and the French Ambassador in London, claiming that Briand had kept Lloyd George informed of the lines on which he was proceeding, expressed the view that arrangements between Prime Ministers superseded the conventions of the old diplomacy (Nos. 81, 84 and 124).

These tensions in Anglo-French relations increased over the question of the supreme command at Constantinople. On January 17, 1921, Lord Curzon, on account of disquietening military factors in Turkey, considered it imperative that the authority at Constantinople should be centralized and demanded that M. Briand should recognize forthwith Lieutenant General Sir Charles Harington as Allied Commander-in-Chief. Already, during November and December 1920 the French and the British had agreed that General Harington should assume the functions of President of the Military Commission — an office which the French, Italian and British governments had decided to make inseparable from that of the Allied Commander-in-Chief — simultaneously with Monsieur des Closières assuming his functions as President of the Financial Commission (No.10). On January 21, the French government, instead of giving their immediate concurrence, brought forward a new condition—that of the allocation to a French officer of the post of President of the Sub-Commission on Organization. On February 7, the

French Ministry of War made objection to a British officer's holding both the post of the Commander-in-Chief and of the President of the Sub-Commission on Organization, and expressed the view that, since the decision to hold a Conference in London, the military situation was less critical (No.35). But on 24 March the British government insisted that the military situation in Constantinople was critical because of the launching of the Greek offensive. They therefore expected the French to think on broad lines and acquiesce in the immediate assumption of the Supreme Command by General Harington (Nos. 70, 85, 113, 115, 122); and on April 28 they expressed to the French Government their strongest objections to the new French condition. Although they were prepared to admit that changes of circumstances might alter their view, they could not surrender in advance their right to decide both cases when they arose in the manner which they thought best. If this declaration failed to afford satisfaction to the French government the British regretted that the present precarious situation in Constantinople must continue. Finally, on May 23 Lord Curzon informed M. Briand that, in return for the immediate recognition by France of the Supreme Command of General Harington, the British government would agree that the Sub-Commission on Organization should be replaced by two sub-commissions, one for Gendarmerie presided over by a French general for two years, the other for Special Elements presided over by Major-General Franks for the same period. On June 13 he drew the attention of the French to the need for unity of command at Constantinople and expressed the desirability of putting the *Entente* on a business footing, France supporting Great Britain in the East and Great Britain standing firmly by France on the Rhine (Nos. 138, 181 and 226).

There was, however, still another point in dispute between French and British: the alleged supply of arms to the Kemalists by the French and Italians, which contravened the neutrality of the Allies and was unfair to the Greeks (Nos.54, 122, 129). This question of the allied neutrality had become exceedingly complex as had also that of Greek belligerent rights. On 5 April the Turkish government complained that the Greeks were conducting belligerent operations in the Straits and in the Sea of Marmora by embarking and disembarking troops and war material. They pointed out that the Allied Powers had the duty, particularly in view of their announced neutrality, to prevent the Greeks from conducting belligerent operations in the Straits and the Sea of Marmora (No.88). The French and British agreed that no aid should be given by the Allied Powers to either Turkish Nationalist or Greek forces (No.

100). On April 16, 1921, the Allies agreed to remain strictly neutral and not to allow the export of war material to either Greece or Turkey. Lord Curzon pointed out that there was no analogy between the British attitude towards the Greco-Turkish hostilities and that of a neutral towards belligerents generally and particularly in the recent war. The relation of the principal Allies towards the Greeks and the Kemalists was peculiar. The Allies were recently seated at conference with both parties to each of whom they submitted proposals. While the terms were still under discussion one party had attacked the other. If Mustapha Kemal were in a position to negotiate for the supply of war material by British firms, the British government certainly would not allow such export to him. The British could not, therefore, adopt a different attitude towards Greece (No. 112). The French eventually agreed that no aid should be given by the Allied Powers to either of the belligerent parties, but the Italians did not commit themselves and continued to send aid to the Kemalists (Nos. 100 and 152). By mid-May the Italian government agreed that neither Constantinople nor any Turkish territory in effective occupation of the principal Allied Powers should be used by Greeks or Kemalists as military or naval base. The French considered that the Greeks should not be deprived of the use of Constantinople harbour which they enjoyed in virtue of the armistice and that the Allies should confine themselves to preventing active military operations in the waters of Constantinople and the Straits. The prospect of a reasonable reconciliation of the conflicting views of the Allies seemed difficult. (Nos. 164, 176).

On June 14 Lord Curzon proposed to M. Briand a fresh review of the political and military problems which could only be solved satisfactorily by close cooperation between the Allies. In return for an understanding to maintain allied rights under the Treaty of Sèvres in other respects, he suggested that the Greek Government should be asked to agree to the creation of an autonomous Turkish province of Smyrna under the protection of the Allied Powers. Should Greek agreement be forthcoming, the proposal should then be put to the Constantinople and Angora governments, with the intimation that, if it were refused, then the Allies would give assistance to the Greeks. He added furthermore that the assistance to be offered to the Greeks might, in the opinion of the British government, take several forms short of actual participation as belligerents. He offered to meet M. Briand in Paris. The French Prime Minister promptly agreed. The Tripartite conventions in Paris from 18 to 19 June 1921, restored harmony among the Allies. The French and

the Italian governments accepted General Harington's command at Constantinople. The Allies then approached jointly the Greek Government, offering their mediation and inviting the Greeks to place themselves in their hands. These proposals were rejected by the Greek Government with the explanation that it was only in the Near East that sanctions specified in the Treaty of Sèvres signed by the Allies and Turkey have been left pending. This delay had led Greece to undertake a fresh war against the Turks who had tried to prevent the application of the Treaty. Any postponement of the offensive would damage the Greek military situation and encourage the enemy to make stronger resistance to the behests of the Powers (Nos. 229, 245 and 260).

In Chapter II the documents show that none of the questions had finally been settled in Paris. Although France and Italy agreed in principle to General Harington's status, the question of his actual powers continued to be a matter of disagreement. The British Government contended that he was not responsible to the High Commissioners at Constantinople but to the Allied Powers, the Supreme Command having been expressly conferred on him to strengthen the Allied front. The French and Italians stated that he should be considered under direct authority of the High Commissioners, who constituted a *de facto* government, and that the military power in every constitutional country is subordinate to the civil power (Nos. 282, 329, 344, 353). Furthermore, there remained divergent views on Greek belligerent rights, conflicting interpretations of neutrality and British suspicions that the French were negotiating a separate agreement with the Kemalists. Briand's proposal at the end of June—with which the Italians concurred—was that, as Greece had refused mediation, the Allies should warn her of the dangers she was running and of the possible withdrawal of facilities given to Greek warships in the Straits area. On July 1, Lord Curzon expressed the view that the Greeks were likely to gain initial success and then accept mediation (Nos. 276, 281). He suggested that laws of neutrality should not be strained to an unnecessary degree. Greek operations in Anatolia however continued for longer than was expected, and, as time went on, the urgency of a settlement of the question of neutrality receded into the background. No action was taken, and the Greek Fleet continued to use Constantinople as an anchorage (Nos. 351, 322).

In March the French concluded with Angora an agreement providing for the economic and industrial development of Turkey and the organization of the Ottoman gendarmerie by French officers. This agreement was at variance with the Tripartite Agreement which had

stated that no decisions relative to Turkey should be made except in complete understanding among all the Allies. The French endeavoured to pacify the British by stating that the economic concessions to Turkey and organization of her gendarmerie would be limited to the French zones and that they had an obligation to prevent Turkish nationalist attacks on the frontier of Syria and Cilicia. The French government could not continue to maintain nearly 100,000 men and to spend hundreds of millions without a definite political object. In making a local agreement they had reserved the general question of peace between the allies and Turkey and also that of a common agreement to put an end to Greco-Turkish dispute. No general engagement had been or would be made without close agreement with the British government, and other Allies. Despite this statement however, the French government had gone further: to the agreement was attached a secret military clause by which the French undertook, on evacuating Cilicia, to leave to the Kemalists military stores, equipment and munitions sufficient for two divisions (Nos. 298, 309 and 388).

When the Allies met in August 1921 at Paris, they decided that a further offer of mediation to the Greeks and Turks would be premature, and they reaffirmed their strict neutrality. They stipulated however that private firms could thereafter sell arms to both belligerents, and upon British insistence, they left the Greek force to use their naval base at Constantinople. The result was that considerable military supplies reached the Kemalists from western Europe; while the Greek supply situation, owing to lack of funds, was precarious. At that moment Greek fortunes had suffered a reverse. In August the advancing Greek army had been defeated on the Sakharía River and had subsequently retreated to the line Eski Sehr-Afium-Karhissar. In this uncertain situation the Greek Prime Minister Gounaris and his Foreign Minister Baltatzis went to Paris (October) and stated to M. Briand that the Greek Government proposed to establish a Greek Civil administration in the occupied areas of Anatolia and that for the time being there was no question of mediation or of peace with Turkey. The French Prime Minister informed them that this would imply annexation which would not meet with the approval of the Powers and must inevitably become a source of weakness to the Greek Government and of exasperation to the Turks. If Greece was to have a future, she should consolidate her position and concentrate power nearer home, since it was not unlikely that as time went on the Yugo-Slavs might have aspirations in the direction of Thessaloniki and the Bulgarians towards Cavalla. She must modify her policy and come



to terms with Turkey either directly or through the mediation of the Powers, since it was essential, not merely for Greece but for the whole of Europe and the East, that peace should be restored in the nearest possible future.

Briand believed that the Greeks should make sacrifices in Thrace, because it was impossible to consider the Turkish Government free so long as the Greek Army was within a few miles and in striking distance of Constantinople. The British government however thought that it was impossible to ask the Greeks, their former Allies in the campaign against Turkey, to make further sacrifices in Thrace in addition to those in Asia Minor. Moreover, they believed that the Greek Government should not be asked to displace King Constantine in order to facilitate the conclusion of peace. Although Briand had indeed already conceded this point by receiving the King's Ministers, he nevertheless informed the Greek Government that they could not expect to enjoy all the advantages of the victory since, during an early and crucial period of the war, Greece had not only preserved an attitude of neutrality but had even been a source of anxiety and of difficulty to the Allies owing to the proceedings of King Constantine in the interests of his brother-in-law (Nos. 417 and 424).

The French Government had hopes that the British Government would impress on the Greek Ministers, who on leaving Paris proceeded to London, that Greece should come to terms with Turkey. Lord Curzon obliged by advising Gounaris to accept the Paris proposals with regard to Smyrna. Gounaris complained that Briand had been very vague as to what he meant by peace. The Greek Government was ready to accept concrete proposals, on condition that these were based on a recognition of the sacrifices made by Greece and on the safeguarding of her position. The Greek Government would prefer to place themselves in the hands of Great Britain. But when Lord Curzon explained that Great Britain could not act independently from the other two Powers (No. 425), the Greek Ministers then placed their case in the hands of the Powers without reserve. They pointed out, however, that, in order to maintain Greek positions in Asia Minor, Greece would need a loan (Nos. 449-50). Already, in December 1921, an attempt to raise a Greek loan in London had failed and unless the British Government took some positive action, such as to waive the *lieu* on Greek security which they hold under the 1918 agreement, any further attempt was unlikely to succeed. But the British Government was opposed to any positive action that ran counter to the Allied Agreement of December 4, 1920 (No. 478). When on January 3,

1922, the Treasury had agreed that Greece could negotiate for a loan up to £ 15,000,000, Lord Curzon had made it clear that this ruling in no way implied the raising of the financial blockade of Greece, nor did it imply that the British Government were themselves prepared to give the Greek Government financial assistance (No. 499). The Greek Government however failed, for purely commercial reasons, to raise a loan in London (March 1922) and Gounaris then informed the British that the Greek military position in Anatolia was lightly critical. Lord Curzon hastened to propose that a conference should meet in Paris on March 13 (No. 549).

This proposal came at a time when France and Great Britain were estranged over the Franco-Angora Agreement, which had been signed on October 20, 1921 and which conflicted with Article 3 of the Tripartite Agreement, with Article 6 of the Minorities Agreements and with Article 8 of the French Mandate for Syria. In the correspondence accompanying the draft of the Treaty it was implied that the Angora Government expected a large measure of support from the French Government in matters other than of local concern <sup>1</sup>. Curzon had sounded the Italians as to their reaction to the French-Angora Agreement. Italy could not relinquish her rights under the Agreement, and she would have to resist any encroachment upon them. She was however prepared, when the Turkish question was out of the way, to form close relations which had existed before the war with Great Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean. Curzon replied that it was for Italy, by a sustained policy of good faith—in which, up to that time, she had been decidedly lacking—to justify the creation of closer relations than those which already existed (No. 436). This reply brought from the Italians some response. They informed the Kemalists that they were unwilling to conclude a political or economic agreement and they offered to send an official to Angora to persuade the Nationalists to attend a conference (No. 441). Meanwhile there passed an acrimonious correspondence between the French and the British. Lord Curzon had demanded the publication of the correspondence concerning the Angora Agreement—a demand to which the French offered only to show him the dossier of the Agreement (Nos. 445, 468, 470, and 471 n. 2). On November 22, 1921, Curzon had proposed to the French and Italian Governments the calling of a conference at Constantinople

1. In a Foreign Office memorandum of January 6, 1922, Forbes Adam analysed the Angora Agreement, clause by clause, showing what must be totally rejected and what could be brought into harmony with any ultimate agreement between the Allies and the Turks (Nos. 432 and 436).

in January 1922, to which the Turks, including the Angora Turks, should be invited, and that before it met the Allies should arrive at an understanding to maintain the substance of the Tripartite Agreement (Nos. 456 and 462). He had asked the French, who had good relations with the Angora Turks, to take the lead in arranging the conference, and by implication the responsibility in the event of failure. On December 30 he outlined proposals for discussion (Memorandum of December 1921, attached to No. 496): a revised plan for Smyrna; the removal of the Greco-Turkish frontier to a distance of about eighty miles from the walls of Constantinople; the limitation of the Greek forces in Eastern Thrace; the predominance of the Moslem element in the executive council of the town of Adrianople; the complete evacuation (under conditions) of Constantinople by Allied troops; the placing of the Straits Commission under the supervision of the League of Nations; and arrangements for a reduced demilitarized zone. He proposed further a national home in Cilicia for the Armenians, the confiding of the direct supervision of the minority provisions to the League of Nations, and certain modifications in the military clauses of the Treaty. As for the revision of the financial clauses, he preferred to leave the initiative to the French.

Political changes in France and Italy in the early part of 1922 delayed the Conference until March. (No. 547). Meanwhile on a visit to Paris in the middle of January, on being informed of the reluctance of the Greeks to withdraw from Asia Minor, Lord Curzon warned the Greeks that peace was no longer possible unless they withdrew from Smyrna. Gounaris then agreed to put himself entirely in Lord Curzon's hands (Nos. 503 and 504). The Angora Government however were not willing to accept terms falling short of the National Pact. Nevertheless a settlement offering the removal of the Greeks from Smyrna and from part of Eastern Thrace might be accepted by the Sultan. (No. 506). In Paris Curzon discussed on January 16 the Near Eastern question with Poincaré (who was to succeed Briand on January 18). Poincaré explained that Curzon's proposals were unlikely to be acceptable to the Turks and he talked of necessary modifications in favour of the Turks, for there was no sympathy anywhere in France for Greece. The British proposals were in the interests of the Greeks. Anything done for the Greeks would be ill-received in France, where they were no longer regarded as Allies, but almost as enemies. King Constantine and Mr. Gounaris were very unpopular. He had already seen the Angoran representative. The Turks were convinced they would win all they wanted in the spring (No. 508). Curzon insisted that it was essential that some prior understanding should be reached

on the issue before conversations were held with the two belligerents. The French could come to an understanding with the Turks if Smyrna were restored to Turkish sovereignty and if the subject of an Armenian home in Cilicia were dropped. The British were not willing to demand the evacuation of Anatolia by the Greeks without material guarantees of the safety of the large Greek population. Curzon was much annoyed because Poincaré did not put forward any suggestions concerning the steps to be taken to force Turkey to accept any agreement arrived at between the Powers. Poincaré however insisted on his pro-Turkish policy and made it perfectly clear that France had no intention of employing military forces against the Turks (Nos. 515-519). Meanwhile the Italian Government had made their support for the British proposals conditional upon the payment of a war-indemnity by Turkey. Their insistence on this condition was based on their opinion that, while France and Great Britain had secured important benefits from the war, the Italians obtained little more than the Tripartite Agreement (Nos. 512, 522, 528, 532).

The documentation in Chapter IV deals with the conversations in Paris between British, French and Italian representatives from March 22 to 26, 1922 which resulted in a considerable measure of agreement with Curzon's proposals of December 30, 1921. Agreement was reached on the following: 1) a programme of the evacuation of Asia-Minor by the Greek forces and its reoccupation by the Turks; (2) a special guarantee for the protection of minorities in Asia and Europe; (3) the creation of a home for the Armenians in Turkey; (4) a frontier line between Greece and Turkey in Eastern Thrace; (5) a demilitarized zone in Europe and in Asia between Greece and Turkey; (6) the armed forces of Turkey; (7) the general control of the Ottoman finances and administration; and (8) the fiscal equality between foreign and Turkish subjects, as well as the judiciary system.

Chapter V shows that the Paris agreement of March 1922 was unsubstantial and that when it came to allied action disunity prevailed. Moreover the proposals pleased neither the Greeks nor the Turks. Gounaris stated that Greece could not make sacrifices for Thrace without obtaining adequate guarantees for the Christian minorities in Asia Minor, and without being informed of the details of armistice and of the allied proposals for evacuation. He added that the demilitarization of Thrace placed that province at the mercy of Bulgaria (Nos. 575-576). The Kemalists accepted the proposed armistice in principle, but stipulated that the evacuation of Asia Minor should begin as soon as armistice was concluded and should be completed within four months. If these conditions were

accepted the National Assembly would be ready to discuss the peace proposals of the Allied Powers at Ismid on date to be fixed (Nos. 583 and 603). Curzon insisted that the Allied proposals should be considered as a whole and suggested Therapia as the place for Conference, to which both Greeks and Turks would be invited. As he explained, he could not give any encouragement to tactics which obviously designed to wreck the whole scheme for a settlement (Nos. 609, 612, 617 and 619). The Turkish views were backed by Poincaré who maintained that the opening of «pour-parlers préparatoires» with the Kemalists afforded the best chance of an eventual settlement. He urged that the Allies should consent to a meeting at Ismid, which would probably ensure the presence of Mustapha Kemal himself. Prolongation of the negotiations, he added, would give the pretext for continuing the struggle — a responsibility which the French Government could not accept (No. 615). The Italians also supported the Kemalists. They protested against the British view that the signature of an agreement would render the Turkish authorities more unwilling to accept the terms offered by the Allies. When Lord Curzon accused them of negotiating behind his back and contended that the Italo-Turkish agreement had increased his difficulties, they greatly resented the accusation and stated categorically that, despite the agreement, they had the firm intention to cooperate with their Allies in the Near East — a statement which they asked to be published in the press (Nos. 611, 620-623).

Much distressed with all these obstructions on 10 May 1922, Lord Curzon invited the serious attention of the French Government to the delay in carrying out the Paris proposals and to the refusal of the Kemalists to accept them, and he warned Poincaré that, if the Paris plans were abandoned, the British Government would have to deal with the matter in a different and independent way, the first step being the publication of the correspondence between the Allied Governments and the Governments of Athens, Angora and Constantinople (No. 627). On May 15, Poincaré proposed, and to this proposal the Italians had agreed, that the three interested parties should be summoned immediately to meet the Allied representatives on a vessel of war near Ismid (No. 630). Curzon, astonished at Poincaré's readiness to break the Paris agreement by accepting the Angora proposal for conference at Ismid, on 7 June informed the French Government that the only alternatives would seem to be the reiteration of the Paris proposals or the liquidation of the Paris plan and the publication of the entire correspondence (No. 645). On June 16 the French Government replied in a diplomatic and friendly tone, proposing

a conference between the Allies and the representatives of Angora, Constantinople and Athens, at which the peace conditions should be discussed and explained. If, after the discussion, either of the parties should refuse to accept the peace conditions, then that party should be held by the Allies responsible before Europe and the world for the continuation of the war (No. 656). On June 19, Poincaré who had gone to London, agreed with Curzon that an inter-allied conference should be held in late July or early August and that it was essential to hold an impartial investigation into alleged atrocities. The Kemalists protested against the Greek bombardment of Samsoun and against the use of Constantinople by the Greeks as a naval base and complained of the failure of the Allied Powers to observe strict neutrality, although they themselves, who were principally to blame for the delays in the negotiations, had carried out wholesale deportations of the Christian populations (Nos. 659, 662, 664). On July 5 Curzon sent to the French a memorandum as a reply to the French note of June 16, stating that the British Government were prepared to withdraw their objection to a preliminary conference provided that the Allied Governments exchanged formal assurances that they would abide by the Paris resolutions; that the Conference should be held at a convenient spot near Constantinople; that the Allied Government recognized the Greek right of visit and search of ships; and that the Allied Governments agreed not to exclude the possibility of strengthening the provisions for the safeguarding of minorities (No. 676). Poincaré, citing the Angora complaints against the Greeks, stated that it would be difficult for the French and impossible for the Italians to accept the Greek right of visit and search, and that it was not logical to allow private firms to supply both belligerents and to facilitate the interception of the supplies in question. The Greek right of search, Poincaré added, was contrary to the rules governing naval warfare, and its application was prejudicial to the Turks and would therefore throw them into the arms of the Soviets (Nos. 680, 686, 689).

This exchange of correspondence brought about a further delay to the peace settlement and on July 23 and 27, the Greek Government informed Bentinck, the British representative at Athens, that they contemplated reassuming liberty of action in order to raise the Near Eastern Question in an acute form. In a note, of July 27, they stated that they would not be responsible for the prolongation of the conflict, that they were obliged to consider the best measures for putting an end to the conflict, and that they would always be ready to examine peace proposals in common with the Allied Governments. Two days later, they explained

in a note to the British that the occupation of Constantinople would bring about peace (Nos. 693, 697, 703). Bentinck warned the Greek Government that any Greek advance to Constantinople would be resisted by the Allied forces. The Greek Government decided to wait (Nos. 700, 709), for the outcome of the negotiations for a Conference. These, however, were delayed: the French Government had raised objections to the draft of the invitation, to the Governments of Athens, Angora and Constantinople on the ground that the Allies were still bound by promise to advance the date of the evacuation of Asia Minor (No. 743). Before there was time for a further exchange of correspondence between France and Great Britain, the military situation in Asia Minor had changed drastically. On August 26, the Turkish offensive began against the Greek position south of Afium-Kar-Hissar. The Greeks suffered a heavy defeat, (Nos. 745, 754). On September 2, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the British Foreign Office that in view of the Greek army's inability to defend Smyrna the Greek Government «would accept proposals for an armistice on the basis of immediate evacuation of Asia Minor» and begged «His Majesty's Government immediately to take such steps as they judge necessary in the circumstances» (No. 755).

## II

The collapse of the Greek army in Asia Minor, in September 1922, created an entirely new situation. Lord Curzon, who so patiently and persistently had endeavoured to bring about a moderate revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, had now to make a firm stand against the advancing Kemalists. For such a stand the cooperation of the French and Italian governments whose policies had been chiefly responsible for the Greek disaster was not forthcoming. France continued her policy of concessions and compromises towards the Kemalists, for she believed this to be the best means of safeguarding her financial interests in Turkey. Italy, whose interests in the East were largely commercial, adopted a similar policy. The crises that ensued and the negotiations for the convening of a Peace Conference which led to the signature on July 24, 1923 of the Treaty of Lausanne, are documented in *Volume XVIII*.

Chapter I deals with the Chanak crisis of September-October 1922, with the events leading to the Armistice of Mudania, October 11, 1922, and with the negotiations for the convening of a peace conference, which opened at Lausanne on November 20. On September 3, the Greek Government requested the British to arrange an armistice on the basis of the

evacuation of Asia Minor. Great Britain agreed provided it were understood she should work with her allies. The Kemalists, however, had decided to settle matters by force of arms. They feared that the issue would be settled in a way unfavourable to Turkey and they considered that the British Government were completely identified with the Greeks, (Nos. 1, 3, 6). The French and the Italians were prepared only to make efforts to persuade the belligerents to put an end to any further effusion of blood, (Nos. 9, 13). The Allied Commanders in Constantinople pointed out that the mere evacuation of Asia Minor would not prevent the Kemalists from attacking the neutral zones —Chanak and Ismid— and that armistice conditions would inevitably comprise a clause establishing a line behind which Greek troops in Thrace must retire (No. 16). On September 9, the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople informed the Turks that a request for armistice emanated officially from the Greek Government and that the object was the immediate evacuation of Anatolia (No. 19). But Kemal advanced to Smyrna and considered himself to be at war with Britain. In view of this situation the British Government invited Roumania and Yugoslavia to send reinforcements to Constantinople to protect the Straits, but these two powers refused to participate (Nos 29, 32, 39). This invitation had greatly annoyed the French, who ordered their troops to evacuate Chanak, as did also the Italians (No. 35). On September 20, Curzon rushed to Paris to protest against the French decision. Poincaré informed him that Kemal who could not prevent his troops from occupying all the territory covered by the National Pact, had requested that the Allies should allow him to occupy Constantinople and Thrace. He went on to suggest that a conference should be convened as soon as possible. Curzon replied that a conference would be futile if Allied firmness were lacking: if the French persisted in their views, the *Entente* had ceased to exist as far as Asia was concerned and Great Britain might be compelled to take independent action. In the end however it was agreed to hold a peace conference at which would be represented England, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Yugoslavia, Roumania and Turkey, the basis being the return of Eastern Thrace to Turkey (Nos. 41, 42, 48 and 51).

Turkish Nationalist troops, however, violated the neutral zones and advanced towards Chanak. The British Commissioner demanded that Kemal should withdraw his troops but Kemal denied that his troops had entered the neutral zone and accused the British of firing on Nationalist troops. The British then reinforced Chanak and this, along with the presence of Greek troops in Thrace, made it possible for them to warn



Kemal not to send troops either before or during the conference to a zone which had been provisionally declared neutral and not to cross the Straits or the Sea of Marmora. They impressed on Hamid Bey, the Kemal-ist Foreign Minister, the expediency of a speedy meeting at Mudania to sign an armistice and of prompt acceptance of the invitation to attend the conference (Nos. 58, 62 and 65). If the Kemalists did not comply with these demands, then Greek warships would be allowed to enter the Marmora and the Dardanelles. The Paris agreement of September 20-23 had not contemplated the Greek troops should retire before the Mudania meeting or before the Kemalists had accepted the invitation to the conference (Nos. 70, 73 and 76).

The meeting at which the British invited a Greek representative was arranged for October 3. Its first task was to draw a line behind which the Greek army in Thrace should withdraw and its second task was to prepare for the setting-up of some form of inter-Allied occupation in Eastern Thrace pending the peace conference. Venizelos, who had been called on by the new Government in Greece to take charge of negotiations, refused to consider the immediate withdrawal of the Greek army from Eastern Thrace (Nos. 80, 87, 89), and the Mudania negotiations broke down. On October 6, 1922, Curzon hastened to Paris. Here the Allies decided that Thrace should be evacuated within thirty days, and they agreed on the place, date, participants and status of Allied delegates of the peace conference. On October 7, the Mudania negotiations were resumed and four days later a Convention was signed by the Allies and the Turks. On October 13, the Greeks, who on 27 September had led Constantine to abdicate in favour of his son George II and had set up a Revolutionary Committee, reluctantly adhered to the Mudania Convention (Nos. 91, 96, 97, 106-108, 119 and 124).

The Allies, thereupon, began preparations for the Conference at Lausanne. The British demanded that any new proposals to be put forward at the conference should be agreed by the Allies before being made to the Turks and Poincaré agreed to inter-Allied negotiations in Paris on November 18. To the French and Italian Governments, Lord Curzon communicated, a list of points for discussion: A (essential) 1) Western Thrace, II) Frontier of Western Thrace, III) Freedom of the Straits, IV) Capitulations, V) Islands in the Aegean, VI) Frontiers of Syria and Irak, VII) Mandated Territories, VIII) War Graves, IX) Indemnities, X) Mudania Convention, XI) Constantinople; B) (most desirable) I) Minorities, II) Turkish Military Forces, III) Financial Clauses, IV) Eco-

conomic Clauses (Nos.133, 148, 169, 178 and 193). Kemal was by now less eager for an immediate conference, since he hoped that by the end of November, he would have taken over Eastern Thrace and perhaps would have paralyzed the Constantinople Government, in which case he would be in a stronger position to negotiate with the Allies. On November 13, in accepting the invitation to the conference, he hinted that Angora might not take part if the Constantinople Government were invited. The British Government observed that as the Allies had followed the procedure adopted at the 1921 London Conference<sup>1</sup>, the Angora and Constantinople Governments should arrange for the dispatch of a single delegation to Lausanne. On November 5 reports arrived in London of the resignation of the Constantinople Government and of the assumption of the administration by Refet Pacha, as representative of the Angora Government. Kemal then asked the Allies to evacuate Constantinople. A serious situation developed in Constantinople itself. On November 17, the Sultan, without having abdicated, left Constantinople for Malta on board a British war ship (Nos. 136, 141, 146, 155, 198 and 200). On November 18, the British, French and Italian representatives met in Paris and discussed the situation. They agreed to rule out the possibility of a voluntary evacuation of their troops from Turkey before the signature of the Treaty. They then discussed the points raised by Curzon (see No. 193) and they issued an official statement in which it was stated that the Allies were in full accord (No. 204).

The documentation in Chapter II relates to the first phase of the Conference of Lausanne, November 20, 1922 - February 5, 1923. At its first meeting the attitude of the Turkish delegation foreshadowed trouble. The first business session of the conference was devoted to the setting up of three commissions to deal with: (1) territorial and military questions; (2) the régime for foreigners and minorities in Turkey; (3) financial and economic questions (Nos. 209, 211). The first Commission began its sittings on November 23: under the presidency of Lord Curzon, it began with a discussion of the frontiers of Thrace. The Turks had demanded the pre-war frontier but the Allies were united in rejecting this demand. The Turks then accepted Lord Curzon's suggestion that the questions of demilitarized zones on the northern and western frontier of Eastern Thrace, of railway control in the area between the Maritsa and the sea, and of the creation of a port at Dedeagatch should be referred

1. See *British Documents on Foreign Policy*, First Series, Vol. XV, chapter II.

to a sub-committee of military and economic experts. On November 26, following agreement with the Allies, Curzon announced to the Turks a concession which the Allies were prepared to make to the Turkish Government: they would restore to them a small enclave between the right bank of the Maritza at Adrianople and the boundary line drawn by the Turkish Government when it ceded Karagatch and the surrounding district to Bulgaria in 1915, which concession would enable the construction of a separate station directly connected with Adrianople. It was not until February 5 that the Turks accepted the Allied decision on the Thracian frontiers (Nos. 215, 217, 222, 226, 234 and 370). Before, however, the question of the Thracian frontiers was definitely settled, on November 26 the Conference took up the question of the Aegean Islands. Here the Turks demanded: (1) recognition of Turkish sovereignty over the islands of Imbros and Tenedos and Samothrace commanding the entrance of the Dardanelles and the complete demilitarization of those islands; (2) demilitarization of the main group of islands in the hands of the Greeks lying between the above-mentioned group and the Dodecanese (i.e. Mityleni, Chios, Samos and Ikaria); and (3) the abrogation of Greek sovereignty over this second group and the institution of a form of autonomy which the Turks made no attempt to define. (This was a try-on which Curzon dismissed without difficulty and which was not heard of again). The Allies recommended a form of demilitarization for Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Ikaria, sufficient to save Turkey from their being used as a base for attack, while enabling Greece, in whose hands they would remain, to maintain order and ensure defence. This recommendation was adopted by the Turks; but the demilitarization of the islands guarding the Dardanelles, (the Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos and Samothrace) was reserved for the final decision of the sittings that would deal with the freedom of the Straits (Nos. 226 and 241).

The Straits question had already been referred to in a French Memorandum of November 18, 1922, which had recommended that the freedom of the Straits should be accepted on the understanding that they should be demilitarized. But, before the opening of the Straits debate, the form of Russian participation at the Conference had to be settled. The allied invitation to Moscow clearly had stated that the Soviet Union should take part only in the negotiations regarding the Straits. Although the Russians demanded full participation in the proceedings, the Allies were not prepared to change their original decision. On November 27, 1922, Curzon decided to embark on the Straits discussions immediately, his aim being to curtail opportunities for propaganda and intrigue. The

actual debate began on December 5. The Turkish delegation submitted no plan, but the Russian representative put forward an extreme case on their behalf. Curzon demonstrated the impracticable character and inner meaning of the Russian proposals, which infuriated the Russian representative, who alleged that the allied scheme was a system primarily aimed against Russia and the vital interests of Turkey. On December 8, the Turkish delegation delivered a carefully prepared reply to the allied proposals regarding the Straits, tacitly accepting the main principles but demanding guarantees for the protection of the Straits and Constantinople against sudden attack. Curzon thereupon adopted a very conciliatory attitude towards the Turkish demands, many of which were quite reasonable. On December 20, however, the Turks reiterated their views on points of special importance to them, the chief ones being the threat of a Greek population in the islands near the Dardanelles and the need for a garrison on the Gallipoli peninsula. The conference reached a stalemate. The Greeks announced their military preparations in Thrace. The French, most anxious to achieve peace at almost any price, suggested further concessions to the Turks. On February 2, 1923, a Straits Convention, (to be attached to the treaty) was presented to the Turks, whose agreement to accept it was made conditional upon further allied concessions. Curzon was prepared to make only one concession—the deletion from the main Treaty of the clause which placed restrictions on the numbers of the Turkish army in Thrace. On February 4, the Turks accepted the Straits Convention, which, in the main, satisfied the British, (Nos. 225, 228, 251, 255, 256, 260, 266, 283, 284, 286, 302, 360, 370).

During the Conference the Turks had raised other important issues, the Iraqi frontier (Mosul), the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, and the minorities problem. The negotiations for the settlement of the problem of Mosul was to be carried out separately between Great Britain and Turkey. The Turks offered to meet the British Government on every point, provided they got Mosul. The British however contended that the cession of the Kurdish areas to Turkey was not an acceptable solution. The Turks, though friendly remained unconciliatory, and the French representative Barrère warned Ismet Pacha that if the Turks persisted in making Mosul crux of the whole question of peace settlement, it would be necessary to decide whether their claim was to be accepted or rejected in toto. Finally, the British suggestion that the Mosul question should be settled by reference to League of Nations under Article II of Covenant, was agreed to (Nos. 228, 246, 257, 265, 273, 327, 334,

340, 342, 344, 345, 370) <sup>1</sup>.

The problem of the exchange of populations had been created by the massive exodus of Greeks from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace. To the problem of refugees was related that of the prisoners of war. At the meeting of December 2, at which were present the representatives of of the Allies, Greece and Turkey, it was decided that a sub-committee should draw up a convention for the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. The question then arose whether exchange should be voluntary or compulsory and whether it should apply to all areas concerned. Ismet, in a long speech on December 13, contended that there was no minority question that could not be dealt with by ordinary Turkish law. Curzon replied that this situation would produce a lamentable impression throughout the world. As he was supported by the French, Italian, American, Greek and Serbian delegates, the Turks found themselves isolated and hopelessly in wrong. Throughout, the Turks intended to expel the Greek Patriarchate and its dependant institutions from Constantinople. In the discussions which ensued the Turks refused to budge an inch and on all points of importance, and a deadlock was reached on December 22 (Nos 247, 252, 269, 274, 286, 294).

The Turkish attitude towards the Patriarchate created a strong reaction in Greece. The Greeks made it clear that under no circumstances would they stand by and see an institution of such significance to them and to the Christian World be removed from its ancient site. They contemplated an attack on Constantinople and they made preparations in Thrace. They let it be known that if more Greeks were expelled from Turkey, public opinion might force the Greek Government to take action. Much perturbed, the Allies sounded a warning to the Greek Government, but it was not until at the end of January 1923, following repeated warnings, that the Greeks although they feared that the Conference might end without making a decision, promised not to attack the Turks without allied sanction (Nos. 299, 302, 307, 316, 317, 319, 350).

The end of the crisis over Constantinople coincided with an agree-

1. On June 13, the Mosul question was still pending and the Conference could not proceed with the signing of any treaty without containing a satisfactory provision on the lines of the Allies. On June 23, there was agreed on the Mosul question that the period for direct negotiation between the British and the Turkish Government should be nine months. This period was, however, prolonged to twelve months (Nos. 495, 606, 632, 635, 679).

ment, signed on January 30, 1923, along with an agreement for the exchange of hostages and prisoners of war, on the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. This exchange, which was adopted by both parties in the hope that it would remove deep-rooted causes of conflict and provide greater ethnic homogeneity, was to be carried out on a compulsory basis. On the minorities question however the Turks resisted strongly and finally dictated the terms. The Allies made two considerable concessions: (1) the restriction of the demand for protection to non-Muslim minorities and (2) the abandonment of the claim for the representation of the League of Nations at Constantinople. What is more, as they had no means of forcing the Turks to give way, the cause of the Armenians, Assyro-Chaldeans and Bulgarian refugees was not introduced to the Treaty (No. 315).

The Second Commission, under the presidency of the Italian delegate Marchese Garroni, dealt with a great number of different issues all related to the «régime of Foreigners» in Turkey, viz., the Capitulations (extraterritorial privileges) which had been granted by the Sultans from the sixteenth century onwards to western traders in Turkey and which, over the years, had developed into a régime of special protection and preferential treatment of foreign nationals and institutions. Ismet arrived at Lausanne with instructions to refuse to accept a capitulatory régime even if this refusal led to a rupture of the Conference. On November 27, he announced to Curzon his orders on the subject. Curzon argued that Turkey could not reasonably expect Europe to give all sorts of guarantees for her protection if she herself declined to afford any guarantees to Europeans who resided in her midst. On December 2, at the first meeting of the Second Commission, Garroni laid down the necessity of substituting for existing capitulations some arrangement which, while guaranteeing necessary protection for foreigners would be consistent with Turkish independent sovereignty. The Turks however declared their unwillingness to do anything beyond substituting the capitulations, for favourable provisions in commercial treaties. At the second meeting of December 10, the Turkish delegates were not only frankly obstructive but insolent, and on January 6, 1923, they again refused all concessions, beyond offering to negotiate separate treaties with individual Powers. To Ismet, Curzon pointed out the consequences of a failure to settle the matter: there would be a large exodus of the European commercial communities and constant friction between foreign governments and the Turkish authorities over the complaints of those who might remain. At length on January 27 the Second Commission

produced a formula for a new judicial regime in the place of fiscal capitulations enjoyed by foreigners in Turkey and to make provisions for the revival of Treaties to which Turkey had been a party before the war (Nos. 228, 250, 268, 311 and 346).

The Third Commission of the Conference dealt with economic and financial questions, of which the Ottoman debt and indemnities were the most important, the other problems being communications and transport, customs and the commercial regime, economic questions, and sanitary matters. The Commission came to an agreement in principle as regarded the sharing of the Ottoman debt annuities. But as regards the allied demand for indemnities, the Turks made final agreement contingent on the satisfaction of Turkish claims for war reparations from Greece—claims which they advocated with obstinacy and rudeness. The Turkish attitude was due to the reluctance of the French and Italian Delegates to press matters. On January 13, Lord Curzon, exasperated by this dilatory and humiliating procedure, asked for a final report of the Commission. On January 27, the Third Commission submitted to the Conference the text of articles to be inserted to the draft treaty on the sanitary, economic, commercial, and financial questions. As to other questions, the Turks pursued their usual tactics. Curzon who had become exasperated asked the allied delegates to put what they thought best in a draft text of the Treaty, which would be presented to the Turks for acceptance or refusal on January 31, 1923. Discussions, which were carried on outside the conference room, continued to be fruitless. On February 2, after a prolonged and heated interallied discussion, it was agreed to divide the capital of the Ottoman public debt without requiring the consent of the bond-holders and to reduce the allied claims for reparations from £ 15.000.000 to £ 12.000.000. Further, it was decided to find a formula which would exclude from the treaty the specific mention of the Turkish claims for Greek reparations estimated at the absurd figure of £ 16.000.000. When these decisions were presented to Ismet, he appealed in a memorandum to the Allies to sign a peace-Treaty on the issues that had been resolved and to postpone contentious questions for discussion later. This the Allies could not accept. On February 4, Curzon broke off the negotiations and left for London, the final rupture having occurred on the financial and judicial question over which Great Britain had not presided and in which she was not particularly interested (Nos. 268, 306, 312, 313, 326, 347, 363, 370).

Chapter III covers the negotiations from the break-down of the Conference on February 4, 1923, until its resumption on April 23, 1923,

during which the Allied draft Treaty of January 31, 1923 and the Turkish Counter-proposals were the subject of continuous haggling against a background of recurrent crises. While Curzon left for London, at Lausanne there remained the French and Italian delegates who made a further but vain attempt to induce Ismet to sign the Treaty. Ismet regarding the negotiations at Lausanne as adjourned, left for Constantinople in order to consult his government. On February 13 Curzon informed Henderson, the British High Commissioner at Constantinople, that the British Government saw no reason to offer Ismet Pasha any further concession at the moment on the economic clauses and when, on February 17, Henderson met him at Constantinople, he advised him to sign the treaty. But Ismet considered that he must first get the Grand National Assembly to approve of everything that he had done at Lausanne and to send him back with full powers to conclude the treaty. After having seen the other High Commissioners he left immediately to meet Mustapha Kemal at Eskishehir (Nos. 371, 380, 381, 394, 402 and 405).

In the meantime, following the breakup of the Lausanne negotiations, the Turks demanded that all foreign warships of more than a thousand tons should leave Smyrna before February 7. The Allies reply was that the Three Powers could not recognize any restrictions on the free movement of their warships until peace was signed. Adnan Bey, the Angora Representative at Constantinople, begged the Allies, and especially England, to take some action in order to liquidate the Smyrna difficulty which was complicating the whole situation. The Allies reply was that the Mudros and Mudania armistices were still valid. Finally, taking up Henderson's suggestion of supporting the pro-British Turkish party, on February 24, Curzon instructed the withdrawal from Smyrna of warships as a sign of conciliation and friendliness, but not as an indication of the abandonment of principle (Nos. 372, 376, 383, 385, 390, 393, 395 and 413). On March 7, the Angora Government transmitted to the Allies the official communiqué of the Grand National Assembly stating that the draft treaty was unacceptable, but that the Turkish Government had authority to continue peace negotiations <sup>1</sup>. On March 8 the Turks submitted counter-proposals and these Lord Curzon invited the French and Italian governments to send experts to discuss in London. The outcome of these discussions, which lasted from March 21 to 27, were proposals for fresh concessions which were embodied in a new draft of the treaty, and an invitation to the Turks to renew peace

1. See text in Appendix III.



negotiations. The Turks considered that the new draft did not contain any substantial modification, but they readily accepted the invitation for renewed negotiations (Nos. 427, 433, 435, 451, 455-458, 460 and 466).

The documentation in Chapter IV consists of correspondence and memoranda referring to the second phase of the Conference of Lausanne, April 23 to July 24, 1923. During these negotiations the delegates were chiefly concerned with economic and judicial questions. The French and the Italians were inclined to yield on almost every issue, and, during the second phase of the Conference the British representative (Sir. H. Rumbold had replaced Lord Curzon who remained in London) and the British Foreign Secretary found themselves defending the French bondholders with a greater tenacity than the French Government displayed on their behalf. Only at the last moment, when almost every conceivable concession had been made, did the French stand on what were really trivialities, and, in so doing, they seriously jeopardized the armistice, fondly hoping that if hostilities broke out the British and the Greeks would fight their battles for them. Not until Curzon let it be known that the British Government would not stand for this, did the French make the final concessions which enabled the Peace Settlement to be signed. Until the final stages, the Conference worked as three Committees: the first dealt with outstanding territorial issues and the judicial declaration, the second with financial problems, and the third with economic questions.

On April 26, the Conference reviewed the whole of the territorial clauses and agreed on all points except two, namely the Maritza frontier and Castellorizo. The Turks who wanted to have something to show on credit side on their return to Angora, demanded Castellorizo and the thalweg of the Maritsa. The Italians proposed to bargain the thalweg of Maritza and the Merkeb Islands for Castellorizo. To this proposal the British were not prepared to agree as it would have meant a loss for Greece. The discussions dragged on and Greece became impatient, especially her military authorities, who considered that, with the demand for an indemnity hanging over their heads, the time had come to have it out with Turkey. On May 14, Venizelos proposed to give the Turks Karagatch with a few kilometres to south plus a small triangle of territory to the north between the rivers Maritza and Arda, on the condition that the Turks dropped once and for all their demand for an indemnity from Greece. Ismet then tried to commit the Allies to restrain the Greeks and to allow the Turks a free hand in Eastern Thrace. The Allies were wil-

ling to restrain the Greeks and warned them against the resumption of hostilities. But although the Greek Government gave a formal assurance that they would not resume hostilities without giving notice to the Allies, they stipulated that the question of Greco-Turkish reparations must be settled «within a reasonable time» and, when Ismet asked for a «practical proposal» on behalf of Greece, they threatened to withdraw their delegate from Lausanne if the Powers yielded to the Turkish demand for indemnity, expressing the hope that if Turkey provoked war the Allies would not stand in the way. The only concession Greece could make was a slight rectification of frontier. On May 24, the Greek representatives stated that they would leave if the indemnity question was not settled immediately and they complained that 7.000 Turkish troops had crossed to Eastern Thrace. The Allies renewed their warning to Greece against war with Turkey and they hastened to induce the Turks to agree to the Greek request. Finally, on May 26, at a meeting between the heads of the Allied delegations, Ismet Pacha and Venizelos, it was agreed that in return for the renunciation of an indemnity from Greece, the Turks should gain Karagatch and the Arda-Maritza triangle (Nos. 480, 501, 505, 508, 513, 516-18, 521-22, 524, 530, 539, 546, 548-552, 554, 556-58, 563-564).

As for Castellorizo the Allied delegations and Greece supported the Italian claim. Ismet however refused to drop his demand for that island. Montagna, the Italian delegate, still wanted to bargain, at the expense of Greece, the thalweg of the Maritza and also the Merked Islands, near Tenedos, which with Imbros had been handed over to Turkey. At length it was decided that the thalweg of the Maritza should be conceded in return for the renunciation of an indemnity from Greece and, on May 29, Ismet agreed to drop his demands for Ada Kale (in the Danube) and Castellorizo in return for the Merkeb Islands (Nos. 479, 480, 494, 501, 534 and 569). Already, on April 26, Ismet had raised the questions of the evacuation of Constantinople and the Straits zones, but the Allies had given an evasive answer. A month later, on May 27, Ismet proposed that the Allied evacuation of Constantinople and the Straits should begin as soon as Angora ratified the treaty. The Allies, although ready to leave Constantinople, wanted to maintain the occupation of the Straits. On July 10, the British attempted to arrange with the Turks unlimited right of passage, pending the coming into force of the Straits Convention. But the Turks insisted that the presence of large allied naval forces in Turkish territorial waters was a part of the Allied occupation. On this issue the French and Italians gave to the British but lukewarm support and

it was finally agreed that the evacuation of the Straits zones should take place at the same time, like the evacuation of Constantinople, upon the ratification of the Treaty by the Angora National Assembly (Nos. 481, 567, 585, 587-8, 654, 664, 666, and 674). On July 24, 1923, the Peace Treaty and seventeen other instruments were signed.

The Appendices attached to the documentation, namely, the Memorandum of November 15, 1922, by H.G. Nicolson respecting the Freedom of the Straits, the Memorandum of October 19, 1922, of the General Staff of the proposed New Treaty between the Allies and Turkey and the Allied Draft Treaty of January 31, 1923, and the Turkish Counter-Proposals of March 8, 1923, are of great importance as they complete and explain the documents. The Minutes of the Lausanne Conference are published in the *Command Papers (Accounts and Papers, 1919-1926)*, London.

The documentation and memoranda printed in this volume like those printed in its predecessors provide a wealth of material for the study of British policy in the Near East during the years 1919 to 1923. For the Greek historian of this last phase of the policy of the *Megali Idea* it is an essential source of information as the Greek diplomatic sources, owing to the damage are piecemeal. The British sources here published contain records of conversations and diplomatic exchanges which are not to be found in the Greek Archives. For example, there exists in Greece no complete record of Venizelos's conversations with British diplomats and it would seem that certain Greek records of conferences have not fully survived. On the other hand, for the impact on Greece of this period of crises one must turn to the abundant Greek sources, for the British documents can be expected only to give a picture of Greece as seen through the eyes of the British representative in Athens. For the overall picture of Greek policy these British documents are very adequate but they cannot be expected to convey satisfactorily the means by which the Greek policy was formulated.

*Athens*