Balkan Studies

Report on the activities of the Institute in 2004

I. Mourelos — 2015-11-13

Docteur Georges Kiriazis : contribution à la prosopographie historique de l’Hellénisme de Roumanie au XIXe siècle

Evangelia N. Georgitsoyanni — 2015-11-13

In 19th century large numbers of Greeks emigrated to Romania, attracted
by the ample financial opportunities that had arisen, as a result of the Treaty
of Adrianople (1829). Most of them were engaged in commerce, in the merchant navy and in the leasing of large domains. They created vibrant communities and contributed a great deal to the financial and cultural life of the country. Among the most distinguished personalities of Hellenism in Romania is
the doctor, intellectual and benefactor George Kyriazis. Born in 1829 in the
village Platanos, near Naupactos, he studied medicine in Greece and France.
He immigrated to Romania, where he worked till his death in 1893 as director
of the Xenocratis Hospital in Bucharest, which was donation of his uncle Constantin Xenocratis (1800-1876), rich merchant and landowner. The hospital,
which was in operation till 1921, followed European models and offered free
treatment to the patients. Kyriazis was occupied also in the medical research.
Besides, he possessed one of the richest libraries in the Near East. He also
made many donations through his will. He sponsored the Xenocratis Hospital,
he created a scholarship for poor Romanian high school students, he founded a
Technical Professional School in Missolonghi and he contributed to the foundation of a Girls’ School in Missolonghi, after a donation of Xenocratis. He also
made many donations to Samacovo in Thrace, Xenocratis’ birthplace. In general, Kyriazis’ life and activity show a characteristic aspect of the intellectual
and scientific level of his time in the Balkans and are a testimony to the
beneficent activities which contributed to the liaison of the Balkan people.

Archaïsme et modernité des formes de violence politique dans les Balkans au tournant du XXe siècle

Bernard Lory — 2015-11-13

Political violence is a kind of language, whose “vocabulary” changes, according to time and place. In the Ottoman period, it usually follows the dividing lines between the millet(s). This we observe, for example, in the case of
the murder of the French and German consuls in Thessalonica in 1876; or at the abundant lists of murders, provided to the foreign consuls observing the
Macedonian question. This political violence can be qualified as “traditional”.
Murders of monarchs or ministers tend to become more numerous at the end
of the XIXth century, probably due to the impact of mass médias, and the
Balkans, as well as the rest of Europe, have their share of this kind of violence. At the beginning of the XXth century however, the revolutionary organizations in Macedonia experiment new forms of political violence, which we can
call “modem”, and which were imitated afterwards. Such innovations are the
kidnapping of Miss Stone in 1901 or the Thessalonica attempts of 1903, which
were magnified by worldwide mass médias. Simultaneously “archaic” violence
characterizes the Ilinden uprising.

(Trans)forming group identities among the Rhodopes’ Pomaks in the first decades of the 20th century : a historical perspective

Panagiotis G. Papadimitriou — 2015-11-13

In this study it is argued that the construction of the ethnic identity of the
Rhodopes’ Pomaks during the first three decades of the 20th century was a
reaction to the dominance of the three national states in the region: Bulgaria,
Greece and Post-Ottoman Turkey. Based on an interactive viewpoint of group
identities, the analysis focuses on three historical paradigms from the period
1912-1930, which exemplify the impact the state policies had on the construction of the identity of this non-dominant group. The first instance of the
state policies vis-à-vis the Rhodopes’ Pomaks is their forceful conversion to
Christianity during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) by the Bulgarians. The analysis proceeds with Greek ideological identity constructions and government
policies from the end of the First World War up to the 1930’s. It ends with a
comparative analysis of the Muslim minority rights postulated by the Bulgarian-Turkish Peace Treaty of Istanbul in 1913 and the Greek-Turkish Peace
Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. These historical cases provide examples of recurrent patterns of identity constructions throughout the 20th century through policies which reflect political agendas, external policy considerations and the
antagonisms among the three National States.

International Red Cross : a mission to nowhere

Stavros T. Stavridis — 2015-11-13

In 1922 the Entente —Great Britain, France and Italy— and the United
States received information from American relief workers that the Kemalists were deporting large numbers of Christian minorities (Greek Pontians and Armenians) from the coastal regions of the Black Sea into the Anatolian
interior. Many innocent people perished along the way from starvation and
disease. The European powers, in particular, wanted to maintain their policy
of strict neutrality in the Greek-Turkish conflict. Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary 1919-1924, suggested to his counterparts in Paris, Rome and Washington that allied officers be dispatched to investigate these claims. The French tried to delay the setting up and sending of an inter-allied mission to Asia Minor. Such delaying tactics worked to the advantage of the Turkish Nationalists. In order to maintain allied unity, Britain was able to win the support of the other powers, whereby the International Red Cross (IRC) as an impartial international organization was to be approached to conduct the investigation of the reported atrocities in Anatolia. The IRC wanted the Entente and US governments’ to provide it with funds so that it could discharge its duties. This article will address two issues: firstly that the Entente and the US
used the IRC as a convenient front in order to avoid responsibility towards
protecting the Christian minorities from Turkish reprisals. It should be further
stated that the Europeans and the Americans were interested in winning
economic concession from the Kemalists; and that the deportation of
Christians was an act of genocide committed by the Kemalists regime in order
to solve permanently the minority problem.

The Fiume and the Corfu incidents

J. S. Papafloratos — 2015-11-13

The European stability was threatened by the Fiume and Corfu incidents
in 1923. Mussolini (Premier and Foreign Minister of the Italian government)
followed a common policy towards the two Balkan states (Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes and Greece). The “Fiume affair” firstly appeared at the
Paris Peace Conference, in which the Italian representatives claimed the
annexation of this city to their country. This claim was rejected by the Allied
powers. The Italian government did not give up and it tried to achieve its goal
in the following years. On August 27th, 1923, the Italian members of the
International Commission for the Delineation of the Greek-Albanian borders
were murdered. Mussolini took advantage of this murder and he sent a severe
ultimatum to Athens. The Greek government partially accepted it. But, Mussolini did not wait for the official reply and he ordered the occupation of Corfu. Unfortunately for him, the Italian commander ordered the bombardment of the demilitarized island, killing more than fifteen women and children. Mussolini’s diplomatic position was very weak. So, he followed a conciliatory policy towards Belgrade upon Fiume in order to prevent the Serbian government from combining its efforts with the Greek one. At the same time, he asked for the French assistance. The Serbian diplomats tried to form an alliance with their Greek colleagues unsuccessfully. This was a serious mistake of the almost paralyzed Greek government. After a few days, the French government pressed the Serbs to follow a moderate policy towards Mussolini, who remained firm in his demands. Athens, having only the discrete British assistance in the international fora, could not prevail over Mussolini. The latter was demanding compensation in order to liberate Corfu. Finally, the two isolated Balkan governments were forced to retreat in front of Mussolini’s claims.

US interests, British acquiescence and the invasion of Cyprus

William Mallinson — 2015-11-13

An extrapolation, analysis and evaluation of foreign policy documents
released (partially) by the British government for the year 1974 confirm
previously unproven suspicions about the dealings —and double-dealings—
surrounding the invasion of Cyprus. The following are revealed inter alia:
Kissinger’s express procrastination to help the Turkish government and military to gain time; British and US pressure on the Greek govemment(s) not to
resist the Turkish armed forces; high level French irritation at Britain’s attitude; Britain’s private anger at Turkish behaviour; and perhaps most significant in terms of today, Britain’s succumbing to American pressure and going
along with Kissinger’s wishes.

La Russie et le conflit yougoslave des années 1990

Jean-Christophe Romer — 2015-11-13

In Russia, but also in the West and in Yugoslavia itself, the yugoslav
crises have provoked much fantasy about Russia. Beyond those fantasies, facts have revealed the reality of Russia’s weakened situation in world affairs as
well as in its home political situation. But on the other hand, the yugoslav
crisis has been used as protecting counter-example against Russia’s own
centrifugal tendencies which had taken place then.

Turkey’s long path towards accession : a Greek viewpoint

Ersie Sideris — 2015-11-13

In spite of doubts and misgivings of the Greek public opinion the Greek
Government staunchly support Turkey’s full membership of the E.U. in the
hope that a Europeanized Turkey might cease to be a constant threat to
Greece’s territorial integrity and instead become a valuable economic and
political partner in South Eastern Europe. Over the passed years Turkey has raised a number of issues concerning the Aegean with a view to claiming Greek national territory or at least to exerting pressure and intimidation on Greece so that Ankara might achieve some kind of condominium in the Aegean. The Greek Government recognize the delimitation of the Continental Shelf of the Aegean as the only real contencieux between the two countries to be referred to the International Court of the Hague —an approach which runs contrary to Turkey’s preference for gunboat diplomacy. Moreover the problem of Cyprus stands as a major issue between Greece and Turkey and between Turkey and the EU. For Greece military occupation by Turkey of a large part of the Republic of Cyprus, a EU member constitutes the core of the problem. Non recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey, a candidate for accession, and refusal of the latter to extend the protocol to the Ankara Agreement to the Republic of Cyprus is currently becoming the main bone of contention in Ankara’s path towards accession. The majority of European citizens and a considerable number of European Governments are skeptical about the wisdom of accepting Turkey as a
full member of the EU, owing to religious and cultural differences and to the
democratic deficit which prevails in the policies and attitudes of that country in
the field of human rights and protection of ethnic and religious minorities.
Furthermore the cost of possible Turkey’s accession is expected to be enormous and the influx of Turkey’s labour will greatly aggravate the EU’s acute
problem of unemployment. Turkey’s current Islamic Government favours EU membership in the hope that they might thus curb the opposition of the Turkish Military to Islamic political power. However, in spite of differences of opinion on domestic issues Turkey’s Islamic Government and the Military, in their capacity as guardians of Kemal’s lay heritage, agree when it comes to foreign policy. They both seek EU membership à /а carte and both have difficulty to break with their Ottoman past when it comes to relations with their neighbours and with the world at large.

Abstracts

Various Authors — 2015-11-13