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THE EXPULSION OF CONSTANTINE VI:
THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE
AND GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS, 1924-1925*

The decisive victory of the Turkish nationalists over the Greeks in Anatolia in the autumn of 1922 placed the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as well as the large Greek community in Istanbul, in a singularly precarious position. Strongly resenting the Phanar's ill-conceived involvement in the antagonisms between Greece and Turkey during 1919-1922, the government of Ankara sought to banish the Patriarchate from the country. Thus, during the early stages of the peace negotiations at Lausanne (December 1922 and January 1923), the Turkish delegation made repeated and vehement efforts for the removal of the Patriarchate, together with all its organisations and constituent bodies, from Turkey¹.

Viewing the expulsion of the Patriarchate as yet another grave political reverse, the newly-established revolutionary government of Athens made an equally determined stance. Accordingly, the chief Greek delegate at Lausanne, Eleftherios Venizelos, impressed upon the conference that Greece would not sign a treaty providing for the removal of the Patriarchate. There is strong evidence suggesting that Greece was determined to renew hostilities rather than become party to the expulsion of the Patriarchate².

Further, the Turkish demand was vigorously opposed not only by the Greeks, but by the entire Orthodox world, as well as the powerful Anglican church. Finally, faced with a united Allied front and with the appearance of a Balkan bloc on so important an issue, the Turkish delegation yielded re-

* This essay relies heavily upon the unpublished documents housed at the Public Records Office in London (prefixed by FO) and at the Foreign Ministry in Athens (prefixed by YE). For place names the modern Turkish versions has been adopted. However, when reference is made to the Anatolian or Thracian dioceses or bishoprics the Anglicised Greek names have been preferred.

1. Harry J. Psomiades, "The Ecumenical Patriarchate Under the Turkish Republic: The First Ten Years", *Balkan Studies*, 11 (1961) 47-51.

2. This is clearly indicated in the despatches of Foreign Minister Apostolos Alexandris to Venizelos on 17 December, no. 14182, and 21 December 1922, no. 14337, YE/A/5. This question is discussed more fully in my Ph. D. thesis, *The Greek Minority in Turkey, 1918-1956: An Aspect of Gree-Turkish Relations*, London University, 1979 (now book in transcript), chapter I.

luctantly. On 10 January 1923, therefore, the chief Turkish delegate, İsmet İnönü, gave a verbal promise that his government would retain the Ecumenical Patriarchate provided it would confine itself within the limits of purely religious matters. The Turkish delegation, he declared,

taking note of the solemn declarations and assurances which have just been given concerning the future situation and attitude of the Patriarchate, and in order to give a supreme proof of its conciliatory dispositions, renounces the expulsion of the Patriarchate from Constantinople³.

As Arnold Toynbee pointed out, however, the Lausanne arrangement did not set "the Cross and Crescent in Constantinople on an entirely harmonious basis"⁴. The famous "pledge" of İsmet İnönü was of a general nature and it was not inserted in the Treaty of Lausanne or in any of its instruments. It was only recorded in the official minutes of the conference. Further, the uncertainty about the Phanar increased when the Turkish government, while appearing ready to honour its Lausanne commitment, systematically avoided renewing the organic connection existing between the state and the church. In order to determine their new status in secular Turkey, the patriarchal authorities brought about the abdication of the objectionable to Ankara Patriarch Meletios Metaxakis in November 1923. A month later, after an acrimonious controversy, the Phanar synod, elected a new patriarch, Gregory Zervoudakis, the archbishop of Chalcedon (Kadıköy). A distinguished ecclesiastic, Gregory showed little interest in political matters⁵.

During Gregory's short reign, lasting almost one year, the Turkish government embarked upon a vigorous anti-clerical program. On 3 March 1924, the Caliphate was abolished and Caliph Abdülmecid was expelled from Turkey⁶. This led to an outcry for meeting out similar treatment to the heads of the non-Muslim religious communities in Istanbul. For a short while there were some indications that Turkey would go ahead and banish the Patriarchate from Turkey. But despite its determination to transfer Turkey into a westernised nationalist and secular state, the government of Ankara, remaining loyal

3. Ibid. See also Harry J. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase*, Thessaloniki 1968, 87-91.

4. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs (SIA)*, 2 (1925) 268-69.

5. Dimitrios Mavropoulos, *Patriarchikes Selides*, Athens 1960, 199-206.

6. For the enactment of the law (431 sayılı *Hilâfetin ilgasına ve Hanedan-ı Osmaninin Türk Cumhuriyeti memaliki haricine çıkarılmasına dair kanun*) and for the final phase of the Ottoman Caliphate see Gotthard Jaschke, "Das osmanische Scheinkalifat von 1922", *Welt des Islam*, 1 (1951) 251, 388.

to its Lausanne undertaking, continued to tolerate the existence of the Patriarchate in the Phanar.

Concurrently, Greek and Turkish negotiators were engaged in protracted talks over the outstanding questions arising from the exchange of populations. Assisted by the neutral members of a mixed commission, Greek and Turkish experts tried to transfer not only some 1,500,000 exchangeable individuals but also to liquidate their properties. Not surprisingly, the complex financial issues created insurmountable difficulties⁷. Similarly, there was a major divergence of views over the correct interpretation of article 2 of the Convention for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations signed at Lausanne by Eleftherios Venizelos and İsmet İnönü in 30 January 1923. This article stipulated the exemption from the exchange of all the Greeks established in Istanbul prior to 30 October 1918. In return, it allowed the Muslim population of Western Thrace to remain *in situ*. But a major disagreement arose over the interpretation of the word “established” (*établis* in the original French text of the treaty) culminating with the Turkish government’s refusal to recognise a substantial number of Istanbul Greeks as being domiciled there and therefore exempted from the compulsory exchange of populations. In mid-October 1924, the Turkish authorities arrested unilaterally 4452 Greeks whom they considered exchangeable. In response, on 22 October 1924, the Greek government appealed directly to the League of Nations. As no solution was forthcoming the question of the *établis* was finally referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague on 11 November 1924⁸.

It was at this juncture that the exchangeability or non-exchangeability of the patriarchal prelates was raised before the mixed commission. As early as March 1924, the Turkish authorities registered all the employees, clerics and laymen, of the Patriarchate, while the Istanbul police prepared a detailed list of the members of the holy synod recording their places of birth and dates of arrival in the city⁹. Alarmed by these developments, on 6 June 1924, Patri-

7. Article 11 of the Convention for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, provided for the formation of a mixed commission for the supervision of the exchange of populations and the liquidation of movable and immovable properties of the exchanged. The commission consisted of four Turkish, four Greek and three neutral members appointed by the League of Nations. By far the best account of these intricate negotiations is given by Stephan Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, New York, 1932.

8. *Ibid.*, 399-414. See also the excellent article by Nihat Erim, “Milletlerarası Daimi Adalet Divanı ve Türkiye: Rum ve Türk ahalinin mübadelesi (Etabli meselesi)”, *Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2 : 1 (1944) 62-74.

9. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no 621, 7 March 1924; Tevfik Rüştü (Aras) to the Police Directorate, no. 610, 1 October 1924, both in YE/B/35.

arch Gregory addressed a letter to the Greek foreign minister, George Roussos expressing his concern about the Turkish intention to include the Phanar ecclesiastics in the exchange. Such expulsions, he remarked, would be tantamount to the abolition of the Phanar for only very few metropolitans could be regarded as established in Istanbul. Concluding his letter, the patriarch asked the Greek government to use all its influence with Ankara on the question¹⁰. The Greek delegate in the mixed commission, George Exindaris, too, believed that the issue of the exchangeability of the Phanar metropolitans should be settled by private Greek-Turkish negotiations¹¹. On his part, the Greek consul-general in Istanbul, Kimon Diamandopoulos warned his government that the expulsion of prelates would render the holy synod inoperative and as a result the institution of the Patriarchate would be so emasculated as to be practically put out of action¹².

By contrast, in a despatch to the Foreign Ministry, on 18 October, the Greek chargé d'affaires in Ankara, John Politis, urged his government to approach this, issue with great caution. He remarked that Greece did not really have a sound legal case on this particular question, for there was no specific reference to the non-exchangeability of ecclesiastics in the Turkish pledge given at Lausanne¹³. Expanding the same thesis, in a long memorandum dated on 9 November, Politis stressed that there were only between five and nine Phanar prelates who might be considered as exchangeable. Nor did he share the view expounded by the Phanar and the Greek consul-general in Istanbul that such expulsions would endanger the existence of the Patriarchate. Conversely, he reasoned, an increased interest on the part of the Greek government in the affairs of the Patriarchate would renew Turkish suspicions about the Phanar and would inevitably impair its chances of re-establish healthy relations with Ankara. The prelates, he proposed, anticipating the possible expulsions, should proceed immediately with the creation of new seats in Greek inhabited areas in Istanbul, such as Prinkipo (Büyükağa) Pera (Beyoğlu), Galata and Tatavla (Kurtuluş), as well as in the islands of Imbros and Tenedos (Bozcaada). Concluding his account Politis urged that pressure on Turkey should be applied only when "vital Greek interests" were at stake. In particular, he underlined, Athens should refrain from exacerbating Greek-

10. Gregory VII to George Roussos, no. 2208, 11 June 1924, YE/B/35.

11. He suggested that this issue should be included in a general package deal between Greece and Turkey, Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 2641, 18 November 1924, transmitting a telegram by Exindaris, YE/B/35.

12. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 2328, 16 October 1924, YE/B/35.

13. Politis to Foreign Ministry, no. 2700, 18 October 1924, YE/B/35.

Turkish relations by making representations on behalf of persons who had clearly arrived in Istanbul after October 1918¹⁴.

Notwithstanding these warnings of the able Greek diplomat in Ankara, Greece and Turkey were set in a collision course over this issue. On 15 November, Greek Foreign Minister George Roussos informed Politis that his government was opposed to the exchange of the Phanar prelates and that intended to raise the issue during the *établis* hearing at the Council of the League of Nations¹⁵. Meanwhile, important changes had taken place in Ankara. On 11 November, Premier İsmet İnönü was replaced by the liberal Fethi Okyar who headed a newly-formed opposition group, the Progressive Republican Party. Soon, however, Fethi Okyar showed signs of yielding to pressure by more radical elements among the Kemalists often seeking to strengthen his weak position in the assembly through anti-foreign action. Thus, on 31 December, the anglophone daily in Istanbul, *Orient News*, was suspended while strong attacks in the Turkish press and in the assembly against the Greek treatment of Muslims and their properties in Western Thrace resulted in reprisals against Greek properties in Istanbul¹⁶.

Pressure against the Phanar intensified in mid-December when the holy synod announced its intention to elect a successor to Patriarch Gregory VII who had died a month earlier. On 16 December, only a day before the patriarchal election, Constantine Araboglou, the archbishop of Dercos (Terkoz) and strongest contender to the patriarchal post, and two other metropolitans were taken by the police to the headquarters of the mixed subcommission. The escort of Constantine handed also a letter signed by the governor of Istanbul, Süleyman Sami. Stating that Constantine Araboglou was a native of Sigi, not far from Bursa in Anatolia, who had received his identity certificate (*nüfus tezkeresi*) in Trabzon and who had come to Istanbul in 1921, the governor requested the issue of a passport to enable the prelate to leave Turkey¹⁷.

While accepting that he arrived in Istanbul after October 1918, Constan-

14. Politis to Roussos, no. 2939, 9 November 1924, YE/B/35.

15. Roussos to the Greek Legation in Ankara, no. 9698, 15 November 1924, YE/B/35. Unable to solve the deadlock over the question of the *établis*, the mixed commission appealed directly to the Permanent Court of International Justice on 16 November and sought an interpretation of article 2 of the Exchange Convention, for details see Ladas, *op. cit.*, 405-408.

16. Turkey: Annual Report, 1925, Hoare to Chamberlain, 11 August 1926, FO/371/11556/E4798; *The Times*, 3 January 1925.

17. Copy of the letter by Süleyman Sami to the president of the mixed commission, no. 12214, 16 December 1924, YE/B/35.

tine protested vigorously against the attitude of the Turkish authorities, declaring that since 1902, when he was appointed archbishop, his legal domicile was the Phanar. The prelate went on to assert that the maintenance of the Patriarchate in Istanbul had been decided at Lausanne, and added that to submit its personnel to the conditions of the exchange would be tantamount to the complete dissolution of the Phanar administration. Declining to decide on such a delicate matter, the subcommission submitted the case of Constantine to the mixed (main) commission¹⁸. Meanwhile, on the insistence of the Greek delegate, Dr Antony Siotis, the Turkish authorities set the metropolitan at liberty.

The arrest of Constantine, coupled with warnings in the Turkish press that his election would be invalid on the grounds that he was an exchangeable, should have dissuaded the holy synod from going ahead with the election. Indeed, the Greek consul in Istanbul, Kimon Diamandopoulos, advised the Phanar to postpone the election¹⁹. Notwithstanding these warnings, on 17 December, the synod proceeded to elect Constantine to the patriarchal throne²⁰. In doing so the Phanar perhaps wished to settle the ambiguity arising out of the Convention for the Exchange of Populations which did not specify the position of the members of the holy synod.

This action infuriated Turkish public opinion. Headed by *Cumhuriyet* and *Tevhid-i Efkar*, the Turkish press charged that the holy synod, knowing the position of Constantine and being notified of his ineligible status, had deliberately elected him patriarch to hinder the normal resumption of Greek-Turkish relations. The whole election was considered as a political move contrary to the decisions which had affected the retention of the Patriarchate in Turkey²¹.

Aware that the mixed commission alone was competent to decide on the exchangeability of the patriarch, the Turks urged for a swift pronouncement on the issue²². But, thanks to the delaying tactics of the Greek delegate Mavridis, the matter was postponed until the beginning of 1925 General Manrique de Lara, the president of the mixed commission, returned from the Hague where he had put his views on the question of the *établis* before the Permanent

18. Minutes of the subcommission meeting of 16 December forwarded by its president, René de Gyllenram to K. M. Widding, no. 2360, 17 December 1924, YE/B/35.

19. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 2858, 17 December 1924, YE/B/35.

20. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 2859, 17 December 1924, YE/B/35.

21. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 2870, 18 December 1924; Politis to Foreign Ministry, no. 3456, 22 December 1924, both in YE/B/35.

22. Mavridis to Foreign Ministry, no 2942, 24 December 1924, YE/B/35.

Court of International Justice. During the ensuing protracted negotiations at the mixed commission, both sides expounded their respective positions on the issue of the exchangeability of the patriarch.

The Turkish delegation maintained that all the Phanar dignitaries, including Patriarch Constantine, who arrived in Istanbul after October 1918 were exchangeable Greeks under the provisions of the Exchange Convention. After reiterating its intention to respect the continued existence of the Patriarchate in Istanbul, the Turkish government reminded that the pledge concerning the Phanar did not figure in the text of the Lausanne Treaty or in any of its instruments. It was simply recorded in the *procès-verbaux* of the conference and therefore the issue of the Patriarchate remained a purely internal Turkish matter²³.

The Greek side objected to the exchangeability of the Phanar dignitaries on two grounds. They claimed that under the canon law all members of the clergy at the Patriarchate were also members of the monastery of St George at Phanar. The *berats* (*diplôme d'investiture*) granted by the Ottoman régime to the members of the holy synod acknowledged their legal domicile at Phanar and even subjected them to the jurisdiction of the courts in Istanbul irrespective of the locality from which they had originated. Further proof of their establishment at the building of the Phanar, according to the Greeks, was that the metropolitans who stayed in Istanbul were known as *endimoundes*—residing in the community—while the prelates who were sent periodically to administer the ecclesiastical sees outside Istanbul were called *apodimoundes*—absent from the community²⁴.

Equally significant, the Greeks stressed, was the inability of the Patriarchate to exist and function without its component parts, namely its ecclesiastical functionaries. Since only three metropolitans were “established” according to the Turkish interpretation of the term, the Greeks reasoned that, if this definition were to prevail, it would mean the immediate departure of the Patriarchate from Istanbul. But such an eventuality, it was underlined, would be

a fragrant breach of the solemn pledge given by the Turkish delegation

23. The Turkish position was also outlined in a communiqué issued by the Turkish Legation in Athens on 30 December 1924, see *The Times*, 31 December 1924.

24. The Greek view was articulated in some length by Michael Theotokas, a former Constantinopolitan Greek lawyer and a legal advisor of the Greek delegation at the Lausanne conference, see his articles “Le nouvelle persécution de Patriarcat” and “La question du Patriarcat”, in *Le Messager d'Athènes*, 29 and 30 December 1924 respectively. Alexander Pallis, too, elaborated the Greek thesis in *The Times*, 3 February 1925.

at the plenary sitting of the Conference of Lausanne, on 10 January 1923...²⁵.

It was, however, this particular Turkish obligation towards the Patriarchate that the neutral members of the mixed commission were reluctant to interpret. Stressing that they were only competent to take cognisance of the text of the Exchange of Populations Convention, where no reference to the Patriarchate was made, the neutral members felt that this question should be settled between the Great Powers and the Turkish government.

As a result, on 7 January, with the initiative of General de Lara, the legal subcommission drafted a formula which in substance affirmed the technical exchangeability of Constantine under the terms of the Convention. Yet it also ruled that it was outside its competence to decide whether this fact was overridden by the Turkish commitment regarding the retention of the Patriarchate in Istanbul²⁶.

The Greeks were not only apprehensive about the evasiveness of this formula but they also charged General de Lara with adopting an anti-Phanar stance throughout the negotiations on the issue. The general's unsympathetic attitude towards the Patriarchate was attributed to his closeties with the Vatican and to "his aversion to the Orthodoxy"²⁷. These apprehensions reinforced the Greek opposition to the draft formula of 7 January. Expressing these fears, Mavridis warned his government that the de Lara formula intended simply to give a "legal façade" to the ultimate expulsion of the patriarch. By its admission to the exchangeability of the patriarch, the Greek delegate explained, Turkish public opinion would be roused against the Patriarchate driving Ankara to expel the patriarch in spite of the mixed commission's refusal to visa his passport²⁸.

At the same time, while stalling debate at the mixed commission²⁹, the

25. Speech of the Greek delegate at the subcommission, Souidas to Foreign Ministry, no. 3048, 9 January 1925, YE/B/35.

26. Mavridis to Foreign Ministry, no. 2994, 3 January 1925 and no. 3028, 7 January 1925, both in YE/B/35.

27. On his pro-Turkish stance on this issue, Mavridis to Foreign Ministry, no. 2947, 6 January 1925 and Politis to Roussos, no. 101, 13 January 1925, both in YE/B/35. Commenting on de Lara's incompetence, the British ambassador in Turkey stated: "the Spanish General's ... patent incapacity would delay the solution of the simplest problem", Turkey: Annual Report, 1927, Clerk to Chamberlain, 27 February 1928, FO/371/13096/E1149.

28. Mavridis to Foreign Ministry, no. 2929, 6 January 1925. Details on the work of the commission are given in Lindsay to Chamberlain, 13 January 1925, FO/371/10859/E291.

29. This tactic was based on the instructions given by Athens to the Greek negotiators

Greeks sought a bilateral arrangement with the Turkish government. Thus, on 26 December 1924, the Greek chargé d'affaires in Ankara, John Politis met with the Turkish foreign minister, Şükrü Kaya, with whom he discussed the patriarchal question for over two hours. Politis underlined that the Turkish insistence to expel most of the Phanar clerics, including the patriarch, would have "grave consequences" in the relations between the two countries. For such action, he explained, would be tantamount in fact, if not in theory, to the abolition of the Patriarchate³⁰. But, although the Turkish foreign minister promised to leave Constantine free to carry on with his duties until a legal decision had been reached by the mixed commission, the Turks continued to demand a swift end to the affair³¹. In yet another attempt on 27 January the head of the Greek delegation, George Exindaris, tried to persuade his Turkish colleague, Hamdi, to postpone debate on the patriarchal question at the mixed commission, offering new concessions on other outstanding issues such as Muslim properties in Western Thrace³². When, however, Hamdi refused such a postponement, the Greek representative in Ankara, Politis, could do little more than address a note to Foreign Minister Şükrü Kaya protesting against the uncompromising position adopted by the Turks at the mixed commission³³.

Greek despair became even greater, when the diplomatic effort to internationalise the issue of the Patriarchate bore no fruit. From as early as 30 April 1924, the Greek ambassador in London, Dimitri Kaklamanos, sounded the Foreign Office about the patriarchal question. Characterising the attitude of the Turkish authorities as "vexatious", Kaklamanos pointed out to Lancelot Oliphant, an influential member of the southern department, that the exchange of the members of the holy synod would constitute an infringement of the conditions upon which the maintenance of the Patriarchate in Turkey was decided at Lausanne³⁴. In their efforts to enlist British support, the Greeks were enthusiastically assisted the archbishop of Canterbury. Thus, on 6 January, the archbishop forwarded a letter to the Foreign Office requesting more

in Turkey, Roussos to the Greek Legation in Ankara, no. 11157, 22 December 1924 and Roussos to Greek Consulate in Istanbul, no. 11313, 27 December 1924, both in YE/B/35.

30. Politis to Foreign Ministry, no. 3494, 26 December 1924, YE/B/35.

31. Memorandum forwarded to the British Embassy by the Italian Embassy in Turkey, 22 January 1925, FO/371/10859/E412.

32. Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, no. 3202, 27 January 1925, YE/B/35.

33. Politis to Şükrü Kaya, unnumbered, 28 January 1925, YE/B/35.

34. Kaklamanos to Roussos, no. 1209, 30 April 1924, YE/B/35. Minutes of an interview with Kaklamanos, Southern Department, 29 December 1924, FO/371/10191/E11716.

energetic British support in favour of the Patriarchate³⁵.

But regarding that such an intervention would only antagonise the Turks, the British government was reluctant to make any representations³⁶. The British were equally averse to a request to the League of Nations to remind the mixed commission of the Turkish pledge at Lausanne in regard to the maintenance of the Patriarchate. Commenting on this Greek proposal, Osborne remarked³⁷:

It is difficult to treat the League of Nations as a court of appeal for the interpretation of the Lausanne settlement... The League of Nations has no *ex officio* interest in the dispute. Technically it has no *locus standi* to instruct or even to "remind" the neutral members of the mixed commission. Although the Allies could appeal officially to the League of Nations by invoking article 11 of the Covenant, this is undesirable since it would create a precedent. In any case it is doubtful whether the results of such an action would be effective.

Given these observations it is not surprising that Foreign Secretary Austin Chamberlain rebuffed a request by Kaklamanos for the intervention of the League in the patriarchal affair³⁸. Nor did the repeated efforts of Kimon Diamandopoulos to enlist the support of the Allied ambassadors in Istanbul produce any concrete results. On 11 January, the Greek consul informed his government that, though sympathetic to the plight of the Patriarchate, both the British and Italian ambassadors could offer nothing more than advice and a simple promise to draw, verbally, the attention of the Turks on the issue³⁹. The results of the Greek diplomatic effort in the Balkans was equally disappointing. The Greek ambassador in Bucharest, Kollias, found both the Romanian government and the church quite unsympathetic to the difficulties of the Patriarchate⁴⁰. Likewise, his counterpart in Belgrade, Tsama-

35. Copies of letters by the archbishop of Canterbury to Kaklamanos, no. 148, 6 January 1925 and no. 149, 7 January 1925, both in YE/B/35.

36. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, no. 170, 5 January 1925, YE/B/35.

37. Minute by Osborne, 21 January 1925, FO/371/10859/E415.

38. Kaklamanos to Chamberlain, no. 223, 21 January 1925, YE/B/35; "Minutes on the Greek request that the League of Nations be asked to remind the mixed commission of the Turkish pledge at Lausanne in regard to the maintenance of the Patriarchate", 21 January 1925, FO/371/10859/E415.

39. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 323 and no. 324, 11 January 1925. For the non-committal attitude adopted by the French government, Nicholas Politis to Foreign Ministry, Paris, no. 323, 10 January 1925, YE/B/35.

40. Kollias to Foreign Ministry, no. 1713, 27 December 1924 and no. 18, 2 January 1925, both in YE/B/35.

dos, was informed that although the Serbian government was genuinely interested in the fortunes of the Phanar, it was unable to make any official representations in Ankara because of the sensitive nature of Turkish-Serbian relations⁴¹.

After the failure to internationalise the question, the Greeks finally gave up their tactic of stalling the debate on the patriarchal question at the mixed commission. Thus, on 28 January, after two "very heated and protracted sittings", the mixed commission, with the abstention of its Greek members made the following statement:

"The Mixed Commission, while noting the facts contained in the report of the Sixth Sub-Commission, No. 2360, dated December 17, 1924, in regard to the question of the exchangeability of Monseigneur Constantine Araboglou, former Metropolitan of Dercos, according to which Monseigneur Constantine, having been born in Asia Minor and having gone to Constantinople after October 30, 1918, fulfilled in his person all the conditions necessary for the purpose of exchange, holds that it is beyond its competence to take a decision in regard to the case of this prelate in view of his status as a Metropolitan"⁴².

This resolution implied that the mixed commission or its agencies were to take no subsequent action on the actual transfer of the patriarch. Since the mixed commission alone was authorised to issue passports to exchanged persons, the neutral members hoped to prevent the actual expulsion of Constantine. But, in fact, the commission neither gave nor refuse to give an exit passport. For it also pronounced the technical exchangeability of the patriarch. Further, the verdict was not only evasive but also confused. While declining to refer to Constantine as patriarch, the resolution addressed him at first as the "former Metropolitan of Dercos" and then went on to describe his "status" as "Metropolitan". Not unlike their timidity over the *établis* question, the neutral members of the commission, by declining to take a firm stance, simply added fuel to the Greek-Turkish tensions⁴³.

41. Tsamados to Foreign Ministry, no. 2271, 21 January 1925, YE/B/35.

42. This resolution was based on the draft formula drawn by the legal subcommission on 7 January. Original French text and for details on the ensuing heated debate at the commission, Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, no. 3220, 29 January 1925, YE/B/35.

43. In a minute on 13 January Osborne wrote: "The neutral members are about to give another display of timidity, similar to that they showed in the early stages of the *établis* dispute... They do not appreciate how much they could do to relieve the tensions of Greco-Turkish relations by taking up a firm stance and a decisive attitude on issues which come before them", in FO/371/10859/E291.

Meanwhile, the Turkish government was under increasing pressure to take some drastic measure against the patriarch. Muslim religious sentiment was embittered by the expulsion of the Caliphate and this resentment only intensified by Ankara's refusal to mete out a similar treatment to the Patriarchate. Mindful of these sentiments, the Fethi Okyar government brought matters to a head by forcibly expelling Constantine from Turkey only two days after the resolution of 28 January. He was vouchsafed no explanation and the ten days' grace which the commission invariably accorded to the ordinary exchanged persons was refused by the Turks to the head of the Orthodox church. Nor was he issued by the commission the necessary travelling documents⁴⁴.

Consternation in Athens ran very deep, and was shared by the religious communities of the other Orthodox countries, as well as by the Anglican church. While the Patriarch was received at the railway station of Thessaloniki with full military honours, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Athens and Thessaloniki demanded vengeance upon the Turks. Moreover, on his arrival in Thessaloniki, Patriarch Constantine disclosed that he had been treated with great indignity and harshness by the Turks. He was apparently roused from bed at 6.00 a.m. by the Turkish police and was ordered to dress. He was given no time, the patriarch declared, to make any preparations or even to collect his clothes and luggage, instead he was driven to the Sirkeci railway station and put into a train heading for the Greek frontier⁴⁵.

Details of Constantine's humiliating expulsion heightened the Greek indignation. Writing in the *Politeia* of 31 January, General John Metaxas pointed out that "the famous Turkish promise at Lausanne" was a dead letter. He then wondered why such a crucial matter as the insertion of safeguards against the exchangeability of the Phanar metropolitans was neglected. Metaxas concluded his article by expressing the opinion that the patriarch's expulsion was largely due to the hostile attitude adopted by the president of the mixed commission, General de Lara, who had been opposed to the maintenance of the Patriarchate in Turkey. With equal indignation, Constantine Spanoudis, a prominent Constantinopolitan Greek journalist now living in Athens, maintained that the "abandonment of the Patriarchate in the hands of the Turks is a national catastrophe greater than even the Asia Minor dé-

44. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 1262, 30 January 1925; *The Times*, 3 February 1925; *SIA* 2 (1925) 270.

45. The British Consul at Thessaloniki, Crow, to Chamberlain, 1 February 1925, FO/371/10859/E798.

bâcle"⁴⁶. This view was shared by the archbishop of Athens, Chrysostom, who in a conversation with the notable journalist and academic William Miller, described the expulsion of Constantine as "much more serious than even the hanging of Patriarch Gregory V in 1821, because its object is not only to terrify the Greeks, but to accomplish a plan for the uprooting of the Patriarchate"⁴⁷. Even the Grecophone press of Istanbul joined this uproar and on 31 January, the *Imerisia Nea* depicted the Patriarchate as a "ruin" (*rimadi*) and vigorously criticised not only the neutral members of the commission but also the Greek delegate, George Exindaris, for "allowing the Turks a free hand in this question".

Meanwhile, the expulsion of Constantine raised once again the debate over the wisdom of letting the Patriarchate in Turkey, where it was viewed by the Turkish government with an incurable hostility. A large body of opinion, including such prestigious figures as the expelled patriarchs Meletios Metaxakis and Constantine Araboglou, propagated the transfer of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to Mt Athos, which since 1920 had been a theocratic republic under Greek sovereignty. Since the Patriarchate could not fulfil its ecumenical functions in Turkey, they proposed that the patriarch, after vindicating his right to remain in the Phanar, should withdraw *sponte sua* with his synod to Greece, appointing an archbishop of Constantinople to administer the 100,000 Greeks who remained in Turkey⁴⁸.

While agreeing with the transfer of the Patriarchate, a group of prominent Constantinopolitan Greeks took a far-sighted view stressing that the Patriarchate should be established in a neutral territory, such as Cyprus or Jerusalem. Only in this way, it was underlined, the Patriarchate, free alike from perpetual Turkish persecution and from the political pressures that it would be constantly exposed to were it to be transferred to Greece or to any other Balkan country, would be able to assume its ecumenical character⁴⁹.

This group deplored vehemently the continued use of the Patriarchate as a pawn in Greek-Turkish antagonisms. As the British ambassador in Turkey, Sir Ronald Lindsay observed⁵⁰:

46. *Eleftheron Vima*, 31 January 1925.

47. William Miller, *Greece*, London 1928, 89-90. Archbishop Chrysostom also addressed letters to all the heads of the Christian churches protesting against the Turkish action.

48. William Miller, "The Changing Rôle of the Orthodox Church", *Foreign Affairs*, 8 (1930) 278.

49. Lindsay to Chamberlain, 3 February 1925, FO/371/10859/E777. The possibility of a transfer to Jerusalem was supported by the influential French newspaper *Le Temps* on 29 January 1925.

50. Lindsay to Chamberlain, 11 March 1925, FO/371/10859/E1616.

Angora no longer wants to uproot the Patriarchate altogether. It has been realised that its continuance here may provide Turkish policy with certain levers which could be lost if the institution was completely suppressed. The present intention of Angora is, therefore, to keep the Patriarchate here, but in such a reduced state that it would be mockery of its former self and a ready tool in Turkish hands.

On the other hand, the British ambassador remarked, Greece, too, favoured the historical continuity of the Patriarchate in Istanbul, for it provided leadership to the much diminished Hellenic nucleus in that city. Significantly, Lindsay mentioned another party, the USSR, interested in maintaining the Patriarchate in Istanbul for political considerations. He concluded his account by intimating⁵¹:

Russia, as much as Greece, may have motives for the maintenance of the Patriarchate here. Russia, Turkey and Greece, for varying reasons, want the Patriarchate kept in Constantinople. Greece and Russia each hope that one day will be able to step thereby into Constantinople and, meanwhile, to keep the others out, Turkey tries to play the one against the other.

But despite pressure for the transfer of the Patriarchate the fragile government of the Michalakopoulos was not in a position to take such far-reaching and controversial decisions. Nor were the British empire willing to accommodate the Ecumenical Patriarchate in any of its colonies⁵². Similarly, a powerful group of Greek Orthodox religious conservatives argued that the removal of the Phanar was a "canonical impossibility", despite the precedent in the thirteenth century when the Patriarchate was temporarily moved to Nicaea (İznik) for some sixty years.

Under these circumstances, the Greek government tried to contain the patriarchal crisis as best as it could. Yet this episode, apart from causing a sharp deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations, threatened the fragile tranquility of Greece. As the Greek premier, Andreas Michalakopoulos, told Sir Milne Cheetham, the British ambassador in Athens, the popular excitement and anger might offer an opportunity to the more extreme military leaders, such a Theodore Pangalos, to proclaim a dictatorship⁵³. Indeed,

51. *Ibid.*

52. For the Cyprus alternative, Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 20 February 1925, FO/371/10859/E1059, and for Jerusalem, Melas to Foreign Minister, no. 517, 11 February 1925.

53. Greece: Annual Report, 1925, Cheetham to Chamberlain, 6 May 1926, FO/371/11357/C5755.

Pangalos not only made warlike statement but even went so far as to warn the government that it would suffer the same fate as the six royalist ministers in November 1922, if it compromised "vital Greek interests"⁵⁴.

Faced with such a bellicose attitude at home, the Greek government made a desperate effort to keep the situation under control. On 30 January, speaking before the Greek chamber, Premier Andreas Michalakopoulos expressed his indignation against the "arbitrary Turkish action", reiterating that Greece would not tolerate the suppression of the Patriarchate. Despite the patriotic tone of his speech, the premier declared his desire to exhaust all peaceful avenues before resorting to a rupture of relations with Turkey⁵⁵. Thus, Athens addressed *démarches* to all the co-signatories of the Lausanne Treaty requesting their intervention on behalf of the patriarch. But both the British and the French urged moderation. In an interview with Ambassador Kaklamanos on 31 January, Lancelot Oliphant of the Foreign Office stated that his government would support a Greek appeal to the League of Nations, though he expressed strong doubts as to whether such an action would bring any tangible results⁵⁶. But it appears that the Orthodox nations of the Balkans were disturbed by the humiliating manner in which the patriarch was expelled. In an interview to the press, the Serbian ambassador in Athens, Gabrilovitch, declared that the person of the patriarch was as sacred in the eyes of the Serbs as in those of the Greeks. His expulsion, Gabrilovitch added, produced the same impression in Serbia as the profanation of the relics of a saint. On being questioned as to the attitude which would be adopted by Serbia in the matter, the ambassador replied that, in his opinion, Serbia and Romania would inform Turkey that its action affected the whole of the Orthodox church. Similarly, the Serbian representative at Berne informed his Greek counterpart Basil Dendramis that both Belgrade and Bucharest were now ready to support Greece in its diplomatic effort on behalf of the Patriarchate⁵⁷.

Meanwhile, on 31 January, Michalakopoulos advised the holy synod to remain calm and continue its work regarding Patriarch Constantine as being on a leave of absence⁵⁸. A day earlier, on the instructions of his govern-

54. He referred to the members of the Gounaris government who were executed soon after the Asia Minor disaster, for details see Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision*, London 1973, 313 ff.

55. Cheetham to Foreign Office, 31 January 1925, FO/371/10859/E560. See also D. Gato-poulos, *Andreas Michalakopoulos, 1875-1938*, Athens, 1947, 183, 228.

56. Kaklamanos to Foreign Ministry, no. 361, 31 January 1925, YE/B/35.

57. Dendramis to Foreign Ministry, no. 1367, 30 January 1925, YE/B/35.

58. Michalakopoulos to Politis, no. 1361, 31 January 1925, YE/B/35.

ment, George Exindaris, the Greek member at the mixed commission, tendered his resignation⁵⁹. In a statement to the press, the Greek negotiator expressed his strong resentment against the Turkish government's treatment of the patriarch and intimated that Greece would bring the question of the Patriarchate before the international court at the Hague⁶⁰.

On 1 February, the Greek Legation in Ankara addressed a note to the Turkish government which recalled İsmet İnönü's declaration at Lausanne on 10 January 1923 and insisted that the mixed commission was alone competent to settle all questions, including procedure, concerning the exchangeable Greeks in Istanbul. Alluding to the decision of the League of Nations taken at Rome on 13 December 1924, by which the Turkish government was invited to avoid all action prejudicial to the rights of the Greek community in Istanbul, the note protested against the attack on the head of the Orthodox church and the liberties of the Constantinopolitan Greek minority. In conclusion, it proposed that in virtue of the article 44 of the Treaty of Lausanne to refer the question to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague⁶¹.

After receiving the Greek *démarche* the Turkish assembly held an extraordinary meeting while President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk interrupted a tour of the provinces and hurried back to the capital. On 4 February, responding to the Greek note, the Turkish prime minister, Fethi Okyar, delivered a long speech before the assembly. He admitted the Lausanne engagement, but this, he maintained, had been embodied in the proceedings and not in the actual treaty precisely because of the internal Turkish character of the patriarchal question. In no treaty, the premier declared, had Turkey taken any responsibility towards a foreign power over the Patriarchate and could not therefore allow any foreign intervention. Referring to the actual expulsion of Constantine, Fethi Okyar asserted that the mixed commission had decided on the exchangeability of the prelate before the holy synod elected him to the patriarchal throne. By expelling him, the Turkish government was simply carrying out a decision taken by the mixed commission. The whole question, he added, would not have arisen if the Phanar had elected a non-exchange-

59. Michalakopoulos to Exindaris, no. 1317, 30 January 1925, and Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, no. 3248, both in YE/B/35. Exindaris had already addressed an energetic letter to the president of the commission de Lara on 30 January protesting against the Turkish action, a copy of the letter, no. 3235, in YE/B/35.

60. *The Times*, 2 February 1925; Psomiades, *The Eastern Question* 98-101.

61. Copy of the *note verbale*, no. 293 and Politis to Foreign Ministry, no. 301, 1 February 1925, both in YE/B/35.

able individual. He condemned the attitude adopted by the Greek government and in particular those who represented the expulsion of Constantine as an insult to the whole Orthodoxy. He finally stressed that

“in the event of any foreign intervention, the Turkish government would have to recourse to all necessary measures for the defence of the honour and rights of the Republic”⁶².

The official Turkish reply to the Greek note was delivered on 5 February. Rejecting the Greek arguments, it asserted that in expelling Constantine Turkey had merely conformed to the decision of the mixed commission. Thus, the expulsion of an exchangeable individual had nothing to do with the Turkish engagement at Lausanne. But since the Treaty of Lausanne and its annexes did not mention the Patriarchate and since the affairs of that institution were of a purely domestic character, the note maintained, the Turkish government could not tolerate the intervention of a foreign power. The argument that the exchanged persons must be provided with travelling documents by the mixed commission was dismissed in that this arrangement was purely a matter of convenience, a consideration, it was dryly added, which did not apply in the case of Constantine. Further, even if an error of principle had been committed, the Turks reasoned, the only authority qualified to complain was the commission itself which had made no such complaint. Referring to article 44 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the note stressed that this could not be invoked because the clauses providing for the protection of the minorities did not apply to exchangeable persons, but to those who remained as Turkish subjects⁶³. Finally, the note expressed the Turkish government’s

“regrets de ce que les peuvres de bonne volonté qu’il a donné pour l’établissement des relations amicales avec la Grèce n’aient pas été appréciées à leur juste valeur par cette dernière Puissance”⁶⁴.

This view was repeated by numerous communiqués issued by Turkish embassies in foreign countries⁶⁵. After expressing its surprise at the Greek

62. Politis to Foreign Ministry, no. 328, 4 February 1925 and no. 439, 5 February 1925, both in YE/B/35; Lindsay to Chamberlain, 5 February 1925, FO/371/10859/E712; *The Times*, 6 February 1925.

63. *Note verbale* addressed by the Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Greek Legation in Ankara, no. 27521, 5 February 1925. Another copy of the text in Politis to Foreign Ministry, no. 350, 5 February 1925, YE/B/35.

64. *Ibid.*

65. Graham to Chamberlain, Rome, transmits a copy of a communiqué issued by the Turkish Embassy and published in the *Messaggero* of 3 February 1925, FO/371/10859/E714;

indignation over the expulsion of the patriarch, the Turkish press, too, declared that any foreign interference on this question would be considered by the Turks as an unfriendly act. Writing in the *Tevhid-i Efkar* of 1 February, Ebuzziya, declared his satisfaction with the government's decision to expel the patriarch and warned the Greeks in Istanbul to "give up the attempts to create problems". Modern Turkey, he stressed, would no longer tolerate their intrigues and political ambitions⁶⁶. Some newspapers hinted that an exchange of the Constantinopolitan Greek minority with the Muslims of Western Thrace might be the only reply to the Greeks attempts to bring back Patriarch Constantine. A prominent advocate of this view, Yunus Nadi Abalıoğlu, editor of the influential *Cumhuriyet*, pointed out that such an eventuality would *ipso facto* abolish the *raison d'être* of the Patriarchate. Meanwhile, the Turkish press unanimously supported the suppression of the Greek newspapers in Istanbul which they suspected to be intriguing against Turkey⁶⁷.

The pivotal rôle played by the Turkish mistrust of the Phanar in Ankara's decision to expel Constantine in such an abrupt manner is well-articulated by a Turkish intellectual, A. Rüstem, in an article at the *Foreign Affairs*.

The entire orientation of Greek foreign policy demonstrates that Greek imperialism has not disarmed, at least in relation to Constantinople and the narrow stretch of territory which still separates it from the Kingdom of Hellas. And that the maintenance of Constantinople as the seat of the Patriarchate, in unwilling response by Turkey to the passionate insistence of Greece supported by the Allies and the United States at Lausanne, was intended to serve the cause of Hellenic expansion, is irresistibly suggested by the circumstances. Manifestly, the underlying motive of the effort to ensure the survival of the Patriarchate in Constantinople was the intention to use that institution, in the future as in the past, as a bulwark of Hellenic influence in the heart of the covered place itself and as an agent of the policy pursued by the Greek Government at the expense of Turkey... The fact is that the only means of preventing the Patriarchate from being a source of trouble and danger to Turkey

Cheetham to Chamberlain, 4 February 1925, gives a copy of the statement issued by the Turkish Legation in Athens, FO/371/10859/E668. *The Times* of 3 February 1925 published the communiqué issued by the Turkish Embassy in London.

66. *Tevhid-i Efkar*, 1 February 1925 (press cuttings YE/C/68).

67. See also three consecutive articles in the *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* of 2, 4 and 5 February 1925 by the prominent journalist and deputy Mahmut Esat Bozkurt.

is for the latter to withdraw its hospitality⁶⁸.

Meanwhile, in its reply to the Turkish communication, the Greek government, in a note dated on 10 February, drew attention to the fact that the Turkish delegation was the first to have raised the question of the Patriarchate at the Lausanne conference. The long discussions which ensued, the note reminded, had only been terminated by İsmet İnönü's declaration on 10 January 1923 before the delegations of almost all the major powers. The Greek government was therefore surprised that Ankara did not regard the matter as essentially international in character. Considering the expulsion of the patriarch as a breach of the "treaties in force", the Greek government, the note concluded, intended to lay the question before the League of Nations under the second paragraph of article 11 of the Covenant⁶⁹.

Greek diplomatic efforts, however, only increased Turkish determination not to yield on the question of the Patriarchate. Speaking before the assembly on 19 February, the Turkish foreign minister, Şükrü Kaya, informed that the Greek government had delivered a second note-verbale but that Turkey had decided to ignore it. Nor would the Turkish government appear before the League of Nations, for that "venerable international institution was charged solely with the maintenance of peace between states". However, being a purely domestic Turkish institution, Şükrü Kaya opined, the Patriarchate could not be debated in any international forum. In this way the Turkish foreign minister not only refused to appear before the League but also delivered a "hands-off" warning. Finally, in a reference to the Phanar archbishop, he reiterated that the exchange of populations was "definite and absolute" and that a number of exchangeable metropolitans would soon be expelled⁷⁰. The firm stance of the foreign minister was approved wholeheartedly by the Turkish public opinion. Commenting on the news of a second Greek note, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın of the *Tanin* proposed that it should be returned like a "wrongly addressed letter", while the Greek decision to appeal to the League was described by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu in the *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* of 11 February as a "blunder" (*gaf*)⁷¹.

68. A. Rüstem Bey, "The Future of the Oecumenical Patriarchate", *Foreign Affairs*, 3 (1925) 607.

69. *Note Verbale* addressed by the Greek Legation to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ankara, 10 February 1925, YE/B/35.

70. Minutes of the debate during the session of 19 February 1925 at the Turkish assembly in YE/C/68. Also Politis to Foreign Ministry, no. 527, 20 February 1925, YE/B/35.

71. See article entitled "The Latest Action of the Greek Government", *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 11 February 1925, YE/C/68 (press cuttings).

Given the deadlock in Greek-Turkish talks and the failure of the British and French attempts for mediation, tensions between Ankara and Athens increased dangerously. There was considerable talk of war and both sides accused each other of military preparations. Anxious to avoid any further escalation of Greek-Turkish tensions, the Greek government sought ways to internationalise the issue of the Patriarchate. Thus, the Greek ambassador in Paris, Nicholas Politis proposed that, since the Turks had already declared publicly their refusal to abide by an advisory opinion pronounced by the Hague court, Greece should apply directly to the Council of the League of Nations. The latter, Nicholas Politis reasoned, would be then obliged to impose its decision on Turkey for otherwise it would risk losing considerable prestige⁷². As this view prevailed in Athens, on 11 February, Greek Premier Andreas Michalakopoulos addressed a telegram to the secretary-general of the League of Nations raising the issue of the expulsion of Patriarch Constantine. He contented that:

The Greek Government, considering that this expulsion constitutes a serious infringement of the Lausanne Agreements regarding the constitution of the Patriarchate and its activities; considering that it constitutes an infringement of Article 12 of the Convention for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, an infringement of the Mixed Commission's decision of January 28th, 1925, and of the decision taken at Brussels on October 31st, 1924, in virtue of which Turkey undertook to carry out loyally all decision adopted by the majority of the Mixed Commission, and concerning that the situation thus created threatens to affect the relations between Greece and Turkey, Greece feels obliged to appeal to the League of Nations in virtue of Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Covenant and requests the Secretary-General to lay the dispute before the Council of the League of Nations as soon as it meets⁷³.

A week earlier, in a letter to Eleftherios Venizelos, who was then residing in London, Premier Michalakopoulos pointed out that the policy of moderation advocated by his government was gaining momentum. He intimated, however, that he faced a great deal of opposition at home. He was particularly bitter about the attitude of the Phanar. Sensing the Turkish reaction,

72. Politis (Paris) to Dendramis (Berne), no. 1628, 7 February 1925.

73. LN/Doc. C. 57.M.30.1925.VII given in *LNOJ* (League of Nations, Official Journal), April 1925, 579. Article 11 paragraph 2 of the Covenant provided: "It is also decided to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstances whatever affecting international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends".

the Greek government had, Michalakopoulos revealed, strongly urged the holy synod in December 1924 to elect a non-exchangeable patriarch. Despite these warnings, the patriarchal synod went ahead with the election of Constantine. Again, after his expulsion the patriarch was urged by the Greek authorities to withdraw to Mt Athos until the present crisis had subsided. Instead, Constantine not only established himself in Thessaloniki, but also held public meetings that inflamed Greek public opinion. Given these difficult circumstances, the premier asked Venizelos to use his influence in promoting the Greek viewpoint in the European capitals⁷⁴.

While ready to support the Greek thesis at informal meetings⁷⁵, Venizelos declined repeated appeals to represent Greece at the Council of the League of Nations on the question of the patriarch⁷⁶. Justifying his position, in a letter to the Greek government on 12 February, he explained that he could not assume such a responsibility because of what he characterised as the “reprehensible behaviour” of the Phanar prelates, who despite the warnings of both the Turkish and Greek governments went ahead with the election of an exchangeable metropolitan. While placing squarely the blame for the “present serious crisis” on the shoulders of the holy synod, Venizelos underlined his approval of the manner in which the Greek government attempted to internationalise the issue. Faced with a number of humiliating *fait accomplis* and forced to take into account the explosive domestic situation, Venizelos concluded, the Greek government had no alternative but to appeal to the League of Nations⁷⁷.

Finally, when the question of the Patriarchate came before the League of Nations on 14 March, Greece was represented by Dimitri Kaklamanos, Basil Dendramis, the ambassador in Berne, Rafail Rafail, director of the Turkish/Balkan section of the Greek Foreign Ministry, and George Exindaris, the Greek delegate at the mixed commission. After reiterating the Greek position, Dimitri Kaklamanos assured the League that Greece did not want

74. Michalakopoulos (Athens) to Venizelos (London), no. 1674, 6 February 1925.

75. On 3 February, he gave a speech at the Institute of International Affairs in London condemning the expulsion of the patriarch. A *resumé* of this lecture is given in a memorandum drawn by Rendel 3 February 1925, FO/371/10859/E638. Venizelos expounded the same views in an interview with Sir Harold Nicolson, memorandum by Nicolson, 3 February 1925, FO/371/10859/E637.

76. Letter by Venizelos transmitted to the Foreign Ministry by Nicholas Politis, Paris, 26 February 1925, no. 1092, YE/B/35.

77. Letter by Venizelos transmitted to the Foreign Ministry by George Melas, London, 12 February 1925, no. 821, YE/B/35.

to deny the internal character of the Patriarchate. The maintenance of the Patriarchate in Istanbul had, however, been subject of the provisions of international agreements. Any departure from what had been decreed, Kaklamanos asserted, was an international question and a matter of interest to Greece, one of the states signatory to the Treaty of Lausanne. Greece would have no longer any reason to concern itself with the affairs of the Patriarchate once the principles laid down at Lausanne were conformed⁷⁸.

Meanwhile, the Greek viewpoint was supported by an eminent professor of public law, Dr Karl Strupp, who in an authoritative article on 1 March 1925 acknowledged the international character of the Patriarchate. Dr Strupp argued that:

Les déclarations des deux parties sur la conservation du patriarcat à Constantinople formant, au point de vue juridique, une obligation contractuelle de la part du gouvernement ottoman, cette obligation doit, comme *lex (vel potius: conventio) specialis* l'emporter sur les autres dispositions générales, telle que la convention du 30 Janvier 1923, *sedes materiae* pour l'échange des populations gréco-turques, en tant que la dernière soit en opposition avec l'obligation du 10 Janvier⁷⁹.

After asserting that since Turkey had accepted the maintenance of the Patriarchate, it should also leave at its disposal the officials necessary to its existence, Dr Strupp concluded:

En chassant Mgr. Constantine Araboglou hors de ses frontières malgré la décision de la Commission mixte du 28 janvier 1925, la Turquie a violé l'obligation contractée le 10 janvier 1923, les articles 12 et 16 de la Convention du 30 janvier 1923, et les articles 37 et 40 du Traité de Paix de 24 juillet 1923. Elle a, de plus, violé les articles 37 et 44 de ce traité, en refusant de soumettre le litige à la Cour de la Haye. En agissant ainsi, elle a commis un délit international, à l'égard des co-signataires des documents internationaux que nous avons cité, elle a par conséquent ...l'obligation de révoquer l'expulsion du Patriarche⁸⁰.

This view was also upheld by a prominent professor of law at the University of Paris, Dr C. G. Ténékidès⁸¹. Earlier, on 23 February, the expelled patriarch

78. *LNOJ.*, April 1925, 482-84.

79. Karl Strupp, "Le différent gréco-turc sur l'éloignement du patriarche de Constantinople", *Revue de Droit International de Science Diplomatique, Politique et Social*, 3 (1925) 15.

80. *Ibid.*, 18.

81. C. G. Ténékidès, "L'expulsion du Patriarche œcuménique et le conflit gréco-turc", *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 32 (1925) 102-11.

had submitted his own memorandum to the League of Nations, expressing the canonical aspects of the question⁸².

Yet the Greek effort to internationalise the issue of the Patriarchate encountered considerable difficulties. The Turks, regarding the Greek action as an interference in their domestic affairs, intimated not only that they would expel the remaining exchangeable metropolitans, but that the question of the Greek population in Istanbul might be broached again should the present dispute not be settled to Turkey's satisfaction⁸³. At the same time, the Turkish government, in a letter dated on 1 March requested the League not to consider the Greek application. It denied having failed to respect the powers conferred upon the mixed commission by the Convention of Lausanne. Further, it maintained that it had not failed to conform to the declaration made at Lausanne by its representative, İsmet İnönü, when he withdrew his demand for the removal of the Patriarchate from Istanbul. It also argued that the Patriarchate was a Turkish domestic institution, its constitution and administration being subject to Turkish law and regulations, and there was no provision in any of the treaties in which a contrary view could be based. There was, moreover, no clause giving one or several foreign powers the right to intervene in the constitution and administration of this institution. The same letter accused the Greek government of trying to take advantage of this opportunity and to endeavour to turn the Patriarchate into an international institution and so interfere in Turkish domestic matters. Concerning the exchange of Constantine, it asserted, the mixed commission, the only competent body to take a decision on the matter, had declared the exchangeability of the prelate, permitting the Turkish government to expel him⁸⁴.

The Turkish government thereby raised the question of the competence of the League. The question was thus presented whether the Council of the League should abstain from considering the topic which, according to Turkey, was within the exclusive Turkish jurisdiction. Another aspect of this question was whether the Council should decide that, in virtue of the provisions of

82. Patriarch Constantine VI Araboglou to the League of Nations, 23 February 1925, LN/Doc. C.129.1925.VII.

83. *The Times*, 23 February 1925.

84. "The Expulsion of the Ecumenical Patriarch from Constantinople", letter addressed by Foreign Minister Şükrü Kaya to the Secretary-General of the League, 1 March 1925, Ankara, LN/Doc.C.160.1925.VII, in *LNOJ.*, April 1925, 579-81. In reply to this letter the Greek government sent a memorandum to the League on 14 March 1925, LN/Doc.C.211.M.70. 1925.VII, in *LNOJ.*, May 1925, 637-39.

the Lausanne Convention, it properly belonged to the exclusive jurisdiction of the mixed commission which had not submitted any request to the League of Nations regarding this matter⁸⁵. When the question came before the League at the meeting of the Council on 14 March, the Turkish government refused to send a representative to plead their case.

On 14 March, the Council, after taking note of the arguments advanced by Dimitri Kaklamanos, decided to request the Permanent Court of International Justice to give an advisory opinion on the following question⁸⁶:

Do the objections to the competence of the Council raised by the Turkish Government in its letter of March 1st, which is communicated to the Court, preclude the Council from being competent in the matter brought before it by the Greek Government by the telegram to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations dated February 11, 1925?

It also adopted a resolution directing Greece and Turkey to privately settle the dispute and suggested that they might use the good office of the neutral members of the mixed commission⁸⁷.

But private negotiations between Tevfik Rüştü (Aras) and George Exindaris had been deadlocked soon after the expulsion of the patriarch⁸⁸. Nonetheless, mindful of the importance of keeping alive some sort of a rapport between the two governments, the Rüştü-Exindaris meetings continued to take place throughout the early part of February⁸⁹. These negotiations, however, were entirely of an unofficial character and had no real chance of resulting in a *modus vivendi*⁹⁰. The Greek chargé d'affaires, John Politis, too, drew a grim picture arguing that, given the weak bargaining position of the Greek government, Turkey should not be expected to make unilateral concessions

85. Report by Secretary-General Viscount Ishii, adopted by the Council on 14 March 1925, see LN/Doc.C.183.1925.VII, in *LNOJ.*, April 1925, 578-79.

86. *Ibid.*, 482-88. At the discussion before the Court as to the meaning of the term *établis*, the Greek government sought a decision of the Court exempting high ecclesiastical dignitaries of the Phanar. In the opinion given on 21 February, the Court declined to consider the question, as its opinion on clerical matters had not been asked by the League, see *Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice*, Series B. No. 10, February 21, 1925, Collection of Advisory Opinions, "Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations" (Lausanne Convention, VI, January 30, 1923, Article 2), Leiden 1925, 28.

87. *LNOJ.*, April 1925, 488.

88. Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, no. 3314, 7 February 1925, YE/B/35.

89. Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, no. 3315, 8 February 1924 and no. 3344, 10 February 1925, both in YE/B/35.

90. Rüştü's statement to the press in *The Times* 12 February 1925.

on the question of the Patriarchate⁹¹. Politis' assessment was correct for in the course of his talks with Exindaris, Rüştü had hinted that Turkey may adopted a more accomodating attitude towards the Phanar if Greece were to make a gesture of goodwill by making some concessions on the issue of Muslim properties in Western Thrace. But, although Athens was disinclined to lump together the two issues⁹², Exindaris urged that a refusal to respond to Muslim grievances in Thrace would only make the Turks more intransigent on the question of the Patriarchate⁹³.

Meanwhile some decisive developments in preparing the groundwork for a compromise took place in Istanbul. Soon after the expulsion of the patriarch, the governor of Istanbul, Süleyman Sami, had applied to the mixed commission for the issue of passports to another three Phanar dinitaries. This left no doubt in the minds of the Greeks that Ankara's ultimate objective encompassed the expulsion of all the Phanar prelates considered to be exchangeable⁹⁴. But just before the formal appeal of the Greek government to the League of Nations, the Turks showed signs of a more accomodating spirit. Thus, on 10 February, the Governor Süleyman Sami approached the members of the holy synod and hinted that Turkey would not raise additional complications if the immediate question of the Patriarchate was solved by the abdication of Constantine⁹⁵. Few days later the Turkish chargé d'affaires in London, Zekai, informed Osborne of the Foreign Office that the present position of the Patriarchate was unsatisfactory because "the lack of a properly authorised and elected patriarch was compromising to the institution". A fresh election from among the non-exchangeable metropolitans, he intimated, would remove the issue from the "political sphere" and so "regularise and fortify" the position of the Patriarchate⁹⁶.

91. Politis to Foreign Ministry, no. 386, 9 February 1925, YE/B/35.

92. Michalakopoulos to Exindaris, no. 1848, 10 February 1925, YE/B/35.

93. Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, no. 3354, 11 February 1925, YE/B/35.

94. According to the information provided by the mixed commission the dates of arrivals of the members of the holy synod were as follows: Basil of Nicaea (1921), Kallinikos of Cyzicus (1921), Agathangelos of Prinkipo (1919), Cyril of Rodopolis (1923), Photios of Deros (1919), Joachim of Chalcedon (1913), Thomas of Aneon (1905), Eugenios of Silyvria (1916), Nikodimos of Brousa (1910), Nicholas of Caesarea (1916), Ambrosios of Neocaesarea (1914), Germanos of Sardis (1912). There were thus five exchangeables and seven non-exchangeables, Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, no. 3372, 15 February 1925, YE/B/35.

95. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 818, 10 February 1925, YE/B/35.

96. Minutes of Osborne's conversation with Turkish chargé d'affaires, 13 February 1925, FO/371/10859/E878.

Such a solution was unofficially put forward by Rüştü Aras during a meeting with Exindaris on 25 February. But this offer was made conditional to the withdrawal of the Greek appeal to the League of Nations⁹⁷. With the same objective in mind, Governor Süleyman Sami, on 24 February, offered a bargain to the members of the holy synod whereby he promised to arrange a non-exchangeable status for the Phanar ecclesiastics in return for the abdication of Constantine and his replacement by a non-exchangeable prelate⁹⁸.

The readiness to come to an understanding with the Ecumenical Patriarchate should be attributed to a number of factors, such as the Kurdish revolts in eastern Anatolia, the problem of internal reform and the general feeling that the Western world and the League were hostile to Turkish interests, especially in the questions of Mosul and Alexandretta⁹⁹. Further, with the expulsion of the patriarch, Ankara had accomplished its primary objective and by delivering a humiliating blow to the Ecumenical Patriarchate they had satisfied the anti-Phanar sentiments of Turkish public opinion. But since the Turkish government did not seek the immediate expulsion of the Patriarchate, the Turkish government strove to achieve a compromise formula and thus avoid bringing the weight of international opinion.

The Greeks treated the Turkish approaches with reserve. Premier Michalakopoulos stated that, before withdrawing the Greek application to the League, the Turkish government must "officially and unequivocally" declare the exemption of all the Phanar ecclesiastical dignitaries from the exchange. This declaration, in turn, should be endorsed by the president of the mixed commission. Nor was Greece prepared to give any guarantees concerning the abdication of the patriarch. Such a decision the Greeks asserted, was an internal matter of the Patriarchate and, as during the patriarchal election of 1924, Greece declined any involvement¹⁰⁰.

The holy synod, too, was not ready to accept a mere a verbal Turkish offer. In the course of the negotiations with Governor Süleyman Sami, they

97. Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, no. 3468, 25 February 1925, YE/B/35; *The Times*, 27 February 1925.

98. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 1148, 24 February 1925, YE/B/35; Lindsay to Foreign Office, 24 February 1925, FO/371/10859/E1189.

99. The Kurdish uprisings took place in February-March 1925 and was suppressed a month later with the capture of the Kurdish rebel Seyh Said was captured by government forces. For a document linking the Turkish change of attitude in the patriarchal question to the emergence of the Kurdish, as well as other internal and external problems, Lindsay to Foreign Office.

100. Michalakopoulos to Exindaris, no. 2765, 26 February 1925, YE/B/35.

exhibited a remarkable determination refusing to proceed with the abdication of the patriarch until they had obtained written guarantees as to their future position in Turkey¹⁰¹. Likewise, the prelates favoured the postponement of a decision until the issue was thoroughly examined by the League. Even if the above bargain was then accepted it would, they felt, receive added strength by a further international endorsement¹⁰².

Nor were the Turks ready to make any formal declaration or give written guarantees on the non-exchangeability of the Phanar ecclesiastics. As Rüştü Aras explained to Exindaris, such an act would give the impression that Turkey had compromised its sovereign rights and allowed a foreign power to interfere in an internal matter¹⁰³. Uncertainty about the future of the metropolitans grew once again when on 3 March five metropolitans (Nicaea, Silyria, Caesarea, Philippopolis and Aneon) and seven priests of the Patriarchate were summoned before the mixed commission¹⁰⁴.

Notwithstanding this setback, however, negotiations between Rüştü Aras and George Exindaris continued throughout March. So did the talks between Governor Süleyman Sami and the holy synod¹⁰⁵. Undoubtedly, the main obstacle appears to have been a mutual feeling of suspicion and mistrust. Thus while the Greeks feared that Ankara tried to achieve the abdication of the patriarch without giving any binding commitment as to the future status of the Phanar prelates, the Turks suspected that the Greeks sought to turn the Patriarchate into an international institution and so interfere in Turkish domestic affairs.

An agreement was further delayed by the refusal of Patriarch Constantine to abdicate, a refusal in which he had for some time the support of a large group of metropolitans who wished to sojourn at Mt Athos or Thessaloniki and to appoint a local representative in Istanbul. When, moreover, Constantine realised that the Phanar prelates were ready to accept a Turkish *quid pro quo* offer, he sent a strongly-worded telegram on 14 March reminding the holy synod that it formed only a fraction of the hierarchy of the patriarchal

101. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 1199 and Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, no. 3488, both 26 February 1925, YE/B/35.

102. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 1199, 26 February 1925, YE/B/35.

103. Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, no. 3501, 27 February 1925 and no. 3511, 28 February 1925, both in YE/B/35.

104. Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, no. 3562, 3 March 1925, YE/B/35; Lindsay to Foreign Office, 4 March 1925, FO/371/10859/E1392.

105. Mavridis to Foreign Ministry, no. 3759, 15 March 1925; Exindaris to Foreign Ministry, no. 3520, 31 March 1925, both in YE/B/35.

throne. He warned them that they were not authorised to conduct *pourparles* with the Turkish authorities about a new election¹⁰⁶. In a letter to Premier Andreas Michalakopoulos on 13 April, Constantine stressed that his resignation at this conjuncture would be tantamount to an admission of the principle that the Turkish government may compel any patriarch to resign if they so wished. He then explained that, according to the canonical law, his abdication could only be decided by the agreement of the Orthodox hierarchy. He concluded his letter by expressing his intention to convoke such a meeting of high ecclesiastical dignitaries¹⁰⁷. Concurrently, supporters of Constantine at the Phanar synod delayed the conclusion of an agreement with the Turkish authorities¹⁰⁸.

But by refusing to abdicate Constantine seriously impeded negotiations between the Greek and Turkish governments during April and May 1925. An agreement on the question of the Patriarchate would offer the Greek government with an opportunity to withdraw its appeal to the League of Nations and thus facilitate a prompt overall rapprochement. As a result the Greek government brought strong moral pressure to bear upon the patriarch to abdicate. The press rallied behind the government's positions. Thus, *Eleftheron Vima* went so far as to suggest that the whole affair was brought about by the "monkish pig-headedness" of the synod, which, despite warnings from the Turkish government as to the exchangeability of Constantine went ahead to elect him patriarch. Because of Constantine's avowed royalist sentiments, the editorial asserted, the republican government of Michalakopoulos had been reluctant to put pressure against his candidature during the patriarchal election of December 1924. Such action, it was explained, would have incurred the charge that Greek party feelings influenced the outcome of the election¹⁰⁹. Finally, faced with such a strong demand for his resignation, on 22 May, Constantine forwarded his abdication to the holy synod¹¹⁰. Four days later in an extraordinary session, the synod formally accepted the abdication and appointed Nicholas, metropolitan of Caesarea, *locum tenens* of the Patriarchate¹¹¹.

106. Keeling (Athens) to Chamberlain, 27 May 1925, FO/371/10860/E3299; *The Times*, 16 March 1925.

107. Constantine VI (Thessaloniki) to Michalakopoulos (Athens), 13 April 1925, YE/B/35.

108. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 2890, 14 May 1925, YE/B/35.

109. *Eleftheron Vima*, 8 February 1925.

110. Keeling (Athens) to Chamberlain, 22 May 1925, FO/371/10860/E3299; *The Times*, 21 May 1925.

111. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 7285, 30 May 1925, YE/B/35; Lindsay to

Meanwhile, in Ankara Prime Minister Fethi Okyar was replaced by İsmet İnönü on 4 March. This change of government had a positive influence on the Greek-Turkish dialogue. As Chargé d'Affaires John Politis disclosed to the British ambassador in Turkey, Sir Ronald Lindsay, İsmet İnönü, unlike his predecessor, manifested an inclination to discuss fully the issue of the Patriarchate¹¹². Thus, only three days after the patriarch's resignation, Exindaris reported that the Turkish government had assured him that the election of a new patriarch would be orderly and proper. In return the Greek government recognised that the new patriarch should be a *persona grata* to the Turks¹¹³. Earlier, the Turkish delegation in the mixed commission definitely withdrew the demand relating to the exchangeability of the members of the holy synod¹¹⁴. In effect, the Turkish government obtained the benefit of the *fait accompli* in connection with Constantine and admitted in turn that the Phanar ecclesiastical dignitaries were not to be exchanged.

The way was thus opened for the Greek government to withdraw its appeal to the League of Nations. On 1 June, therefore, in a letter to the secretary-general, the Greek government informed that the Greek-Turkish negotiations on the subject of the Ecumenical Patriarchate had been successfully concluded and that it withdrew its appeal to the League¹¹⁵. A week later, the latter, too, withdrew its request to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion regarding the international character of the Ecumenical Patriarchate¹¹⁶. The case of the Patriarchate was in fact the only one in which the Council's request had ever been withdrawn¹¹⁷.

Meanwhile, on 1 June, in a note to the Phanar, Governor Süleyman Sami stated the conditions under which the new patriarchal election was to take place. Accordingly, only those prelates who held Turkish nationality would be allowed to participate in the forthcoming election. Only non-exchangeable prelates would be eligible to contest the patriarchal throne while those considered to be objectionable to the Turkish government would be

Chamberlain, 29 May 1925, FO/371/10860/E3345.

112. Conversation with Politis, Lindsay to Chamberlain, 23 March 1925, FO/371/10860/E1927.

113. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question*, 103.

114. Soudas to Foreign Ministry, no. 3802 and no. 3811, both 11 April 1925, in YE/B/35.

115. Dendramis to the Secretary-General, 1 June 1925, LN/Doc. C. 306.1925.VII, in *LNOJ.*, July 1925, 895.

116. *Ibid.*, 854-55.

117. Basil S. Giannakakis, "International Status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate", *Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 3 (1957) 41.

immediately disqualified. Joachim of Chalcedon, the strongest contender to the throne, was declared unacceptable in advance¹¹⁸.

Some apprehension about these regulations was expressed by the Patriarchate. In particular, the barring from the electoral body all those prelates whose diocese areas were annexed by Greece after 1912 but which were still under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate caused concern. While the Turkish government stressed their ineligibility on the grounds that they were not Turkish nationals, the Phanar argued that such a restriction was uncanonical. In the ensuing negotiations between Süleyman Sami and *Locum Tenens* Nicholas an arrangement was worked out whereby only metropolitans with Turkish nationality voted directly in the patriarchal election while non-Turkish members of the holy synod approved automatically their decision¹¹⁹.

The position of the Patriarchate was further reinforced by the signing of a general Greek-Turkish agreement on 21 June by Rüşti Aras and George Exindaris. Quite prematurely, this rapprochement was hailed as the beginning of a new era of close political co-operation between the two countries¹²⁰. Few weeks later, the holy synod, freely and canonically, elected Basil Georgiadis, the metropolitan of Nicaea, to the patriarchal throne. A man of very old age, Basil III was a distinguished doctor of canon law and eminent liturgist caring more for scholarly pursuits than politics or temporal affairs. Further, a native of Istanbul, the new patriarch was regarded acceptable by the Turkish government¹²¹.

During the Constantine affair, Greece made an attempt to assert the international character of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. But in this it encountered the vigorous opposition of the Turkish government. The latter, moreover, succeeded in portraying the Patriarchate as a purely Turkish institution without being seriously contradicted by any of the Western nations. Unable to rally the support of even the rest of the Orthodox countries, Greece was compelled to come to a bilateral agreement with Turkey. This inevitably led to a withdrawal of the Greek appeal to the League of Nations. But by not awaiting a pronouncement from the international court on the question of the competence of the League to debate the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Greeks lost a

118. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 3331, 2 June 1925, YE/B/35.

119. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 3769, 22 June 1925, YE/B/35.

120. For an excellent treatment of the agreement as well as the ensuing negotiations see Ladas, *op. cit.*, 513 ff.

121. 13 July 1925. Diamandopoulos to Foreign Ministry, no. 4226, 13 July 1925, YE/B/35; Hoare to Chamberlain, 15 July 1925, FO/371/10860/E4233.

unique opportunity to settle in an international forum the exact status of the Phanar.

As a result, notwithstanding the arrangement of 1925, the Turkish government continued to challenge the ecumenical position of the Patriarchate, and considered the ecumenical patriarch as simply the *Baspapaz* (Archpriest) of the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey. Further, being greatly influenced by the political relations between Ankara and Athens, the Patriarchate felt strongly the repercussions of the deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations between 1925-1930. During this period the Patriarchate underwent a steady decline and an international isolation.

The Greek-Turkish arrangement of 1925 left also unanswered the fundamental question as to whether the declaration of İsmet İnönü on 10 January 1923 at Lausanne regarding the Patriarchate was an oral agreement and as such binding under international law. After nearly sixty years this remains a controversial question. A number of authors argued that the international position of the Patriarchate is supported by the Treaty of Paris, March 1836, article IX and the Treaty of Berlin, July 1878, article LXII, which it is claimed, retained their full value, even after the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne. Because the latter made no mention of the Patriarchate, it is asserted, the pre-existing situation is not in any way influenced by that settlement. It is also argued that articles 40 and 41 of the Lausanne Treaty provide for the non-Muslim minorities the right to establish their own religious social and educational institutions. Thus, the fate of the Patriarchate, in this particular instance, is directly connected with that of the Greek minority in Turkey¹²². Notwithstanding a number of noteworthy concessions particularly, during the reign of Patriarch Athenagoras I Spyrou (1948-1972), the Turkish government continues to belittle the significant international religious rôle reserved for the Ecumenical Patriarchate¹²³.

122. See Basil S. Giannakakis, "International Status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate", *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 2 (1956) 10-26 and 3 (1957) 26-46; Th. Agnides, *The Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Light of the Lausanne Treaty*, New York 1964, *passim*.

123. For the Turkish position see the text of a speech given by the then Ambassador Bülent Uşaklıgil at the International Academy of Paris on 26 April 1965, "La Turquie et le Patriarcat d'Istanbul", in *Cultura Turcica*, 1 : 2 (1964) 286-304. See also İsmet Giritlioğlu, "Patrikhane", in *Cumhuriyet* 22 April 1964, no. 14269; Fahir H. Armaoğlu, "Lozan ve Patrikhane", *Cumhuriyet*, 22 April 1965, no. 14626.