Russian diplomacy in the first Kosovo Crisis

Abstract

This article examines Russian Diplomacy in The First Kosovo Crisis, of
June-October 1998. Historically NATO and the Warsaw Pact as regional collective security organizations gave stability to Europe, reducing the possibility
of conventional war, out of nuclear apocalyptic fear. It was a peace oppressive
of ethnicity, nationalism and self-determination in the Balkans. The end of the
Cold War and the end of oppressive forces, both global and local, gave rise to
renewed ethnic and nationalistic conflict once again in the Balkans. The attempts to establish some form of regional security and peace, in the Balkans,
without oppressive regimes, became embroiled in the processes of arms
control and disarmament negotiations for START п/ш, NATO enlargement and
an emerging European Union foreign affairs, defence and security identity.
The First Kosovo Crisis (1998) thus became the nexus of the diplomatic
interchange focussing on the trade-offs between the security umbrella that
NATO could provided to foster peaceful economic development in Europe and
the jeopardy that enlargement would do to Russian threat perception thereby
endangering the disarmament process of START II/III. In this the Russian
Duma emerged as a new and powerful democratic voice in the European
Disarmament process, making observers question who was the real controller
of foreign affairs and ultimately the arms control of nuclear weapons in
Moscow. This paper will analyse this issue considering the debate that started
with the Kosovo conflict in deliberating what would achieve greater security
and peace in Europe: NATO enlargement or arms control.