

gone beyond this stage. Indeed, most of the papers in this book draw too much from earlier works by the same authors —some even draw heavily from these works (not to mention how much work is not acknowledged or ignored). In their introduction, Cowan and Brown link the effectiveness of their deconstructive move to a set of extremely important questions about power: Who, how, and why benefits “by making an ethnic logic appear natural and inevitable”? (p. 22). However, with the notable exception of Brown and Agelopoulos, such questions are hardly touched upon in this book, at least not outside the brilliant introduction. Perhaps it is time to consider them more seriously in the light of other disciplines as well, instead of recapitulating and rephrasing what we already know. Too much ink has been spilled to define ethnic groups and even more blood to define their boundaries. It is time to move on.

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*War over Kosovo. Politics and Strategy in a Global Age*, Andrew J. Bacevich & Eliot A. Cohen (eds) New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp. 223.

The Kosovo war, like the Gulf war that preceded it, was widely transmitted by television channels throughout the world. The optical part was more or less similar everywhere, but the narrative differed. The wide consensus that the narrative of the western media forged among western audiences has left regional (Southeast European) views unexamined. This first real war ever to have been waged by NATO, has long since ceased to concern the media but has gradually generated scholarly debate that often questions the initial consensus.

Most of the contributions to this collection of scholarly articles do not place Kosovo within a “broader context” (p. xiii) as the introduction promises, but deal mainly with the impact of the event on US strategy, war posture, civil-military relations and morality (which has a wider connotation). William Arkin embarks on a critical analysis of the air campaign, Eliot Cohen points out America’s new approach to war, James Kurth sees the conflict as a paradigm of a grand strategy encouraged by the end of the cold war, Alberto Coll discusses the moral questions raised by this war and Michael Vickers, unlike Cohen, believes that “Operation Allied Force” did not constitute a break with the cold war tradition of warfare. Only Anatol Lieven leaves

American considerations and places "NATO's neo-imperial disciplining of the Serbs within the larger tradition of Western imperialism" (p. xiv).

Of the authors, Kurth and Lieven mention some of the consequences of the war on Serbs, Albanians and Kosovo's neighbors. Most of the others have put together diligent and intelligent reports of military exercises and weapon testing that could have occurred in the desert or the ocean. The repercussion of the war on the environment of the territory involved, is conspicuously absent from this collection. It follows that references are mostly on American or NATO sources.

Cohen's contribution is the most elegant and is also playfully didactic. His discussion of the "Weinberger Doctrine" whose first and basic principle ("The US should not commit forces to combat overseas, unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest, or that of our allies") was not observed in Kosovo, President Clinton's misleading comparison of the 1999 Balkan crisis with the causes of WWI, the Secretary General's words to the Serbs that NATO was not waging a war against Yugoslavia, all lead to Cohen's compelling finale: "Perhaps Western leaders, including Americans, have concluded that waging war is a subject that no longer merits serious consideration. If so, they are making a grave mistake" (p. 60). A minor point is that he considers the American administration's concern for the "destabilization of Macedonia and its absorption by Greece, possibly triggering a conflict with Turkey" (p. 47), legitimate. Far from planning to absorb that state, the Greek government of the early nineties was fussing over the "copyright" of the name Macedonia, that since the interwar years involved claims on the northern part of Greece. As for President Clinton's admonition concerning a Turkish-Greek conflict over Macedonia, it was a statement that caused much amusement in the local media. Greece and Turkey may have had scores of opportunities to fight, but Macedonia was never among them.

In his "Kosovo and the Moral Burdens of Power" Coll failed to consult the OSCE report. (*OSCE, Kosovo/Kosova. As Seen As Told*, Warsaw 1999). This document provides a chronological account of all human rights violations committed in Kosovo and make it more possible now to decide whether such violations "were significant in their number and severity" (Coll, p. 131) to merit the bombardment of Serbia. The OSCE report, although damning to Serb violence, produces evidence that deaths before the campaign were much fewer than those that followed the campaign. Whereas 496 Albanians were killed before 24 March 1999, a total of 5,504 died after that date until the end of hostilities in June of that year. Needless to say that only a few were victims of the bombs. The report also makes it clear that the destabilization of the region

was certainly aggravated by the war. Its aftermath casts even greater doubt about the wisdom of the decision to bomb. A counter-terrorism still in progress against the dwindling Kosovar Serb minority, Serbia's crippled economy, the irredentist campaign of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA-UCK) and its shady networks in the neighboring states and Kosovo's reliance on western aid and administration, make the prospects of the region bleak.

Coll points out the inconsistencies in American behavior when addressing human rights violations, or in the US choice of ad hoc military courts to try war criminals (p. 148). His argument however that NATO had lawful authority in this undertaking (pp. 136-138) is less convincing. During the cold war era NATO had displayed little concern for human rights violations among its own members (Portugal, Greece, Turkey) and was therefore probably not the appropriate institution for waging a humanitarian war. Coll's contention that "NATO had lawful authority because it was sufficiently impartial" (p. 137), is seriously contested by Charles Boyd's (Deputy Commander in Chief of US European Command in Bosnia) "Making Peace With the Guilty" (*Foreign Affairs*, Sept./Oct. 1995, pp. 22-38).

Despite its lack of familiarity with regional sources, this collection constitutes an important addition to the multifaceted debate on the war in Kosovo. Of the many interesting views that appear in *War Over Kosovo*, this reviewer would like to end with that of James Kurth: "The Kosovo War was the first US war of the global era. But it will not be the last. It should however be the last US war fought to enlarge an international organization (NATO). It should be the last US war justified as being a purely humanitarian war" (p. 93).

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*Alexandre Ypsilanti, Correspondance inédite 1816-1928.* Publiée par Gregori Ars et Constantin Svolopoulos. Institute for Balkan Studies 268, Thessaloniki 1999.

In the framework of its collaboration with various scholarly institutions that share its own interests and objectives, in the last decade the Institute for Balkan Studies developed a wide programme of close collaboration with the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute for Slavonic and Balkan Studies. The ties between the two institutes were strengthened when Constantin Svolopoulos, now a professor of modern history in the University of Athens, was