La France et les Balkans de 1944 à 1955
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Abstract
Since World War I France had a geopolitical vision for the Balkans: she
hoped that ethnic tensions would ease, and that as many Balkan countries as
possible would get together to resist foreign threats, coming from Germany
before 1945, from the USSR afterwards. After 1945, and even more after 1949 and the end of the civil war, FrancoGreek relations did not pose any major problem and Paris supported, cautiously but unmistakably, the Royal government. It was different with the communist countries in that region. With Rumania and Bulgaria as soon as 1946 there were no meaningful relations left. The case was different with Yugoslavia, because of the Tito-Stalin break. There France’s role was not unimportant, even if she hesitated between trying to regain her former traditional role in the Balkans, without taking into account the changed ideological landscape, or stressing Western unity against communism. Supporters of the former line were ready to go very far with Tito, those of the later did not forget that Tito remained after all a communist leader and they were quite cautious and contented themselves with Tito’s break with Moscow without sharing the illusion there could be a “national” kind of communism.
Generally speaking the French were anxious not to provoke the Soviets.
That is why, for instance, they were quite lukewarm towards Greece’s and
Turkey’s admission in NATO. By 1955 Paris witnessed with satisfaction the lessening of ethnic tensions. The Greek-Yugoslav thaw allowed Macedonia and Northern Epirus to become much calmer. As for Yugoslavia, one believed in the Titoist kind of federal system to solve the problem of relations among the different nationalities. But a new problem was seen in Cyprus with the Greek-Turkish tension, and one was conscious of the dwindling French influence because of France’s problems (the war in Algeria and an outmoded political system) and because the AngloSaxons and the Germans were developping their influence in that region much more efficiently.
hoped that ethnic tensions would ease, and that as many Balkan countries as
possible would get together to resist foreign threats, coming from Germany
before 1945, from the USSR afterwards. After 1945, and even more after 1949 and the end of the civil war, FrancoGreek relations did not pose any major problem and Paris supported, cautiously but unmistakably, the Royal government. It was different with the communist countries in that region. With Rumania and Bulgaria as soon as 1946 there were no meaningful relations left. The case was different with Yugoslavia, because of the Tito-Stalin break. There France’s role was not unimportant, even if she hesitated between trying to regain her former traditional role in the Balkans, without taking into account the changed ideological landscape, or stressing Western unity against communism. Supporters of the former line were ready to go very far with Tito, those of the later did not forget that Tito remained after all a communist leader and they were quite cautious and contented themselves with Tito’s break with Moscow without sharing the illusion there could be a “national” kind of communism.
Generally speaking the French were anxious not to provoke the Soviets.
That is why, for instance, they were quite lukewarm towards Greece’s and
Turkey’s admission in NATO. By 1955 Paris witnessed with satisfaction the lessening of ethnic tensions. The Greek-Yugoslav thaw allowed Macedonia and Northern Epirus to become much calmer. As for Yugoslavia, one believed in the Titoist kind of federal system to solve the problem of relations among the different nationalities. But a new problem was seen in Cyprus with the Greek-Turkish tension, and one was conscious of the dwindling French influence because of France’s problems (the war in Algeria and an outmoded political system) and because the AngloSaxons and the Germans were developping their influence in that region much more efficiently.
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