US interests, British acquiescence and the invasion of Cyprus
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Abstract
An extrapolation, analysis and evaluation of foreign policy documents
released (partially) by the British government for the year 1974 confirm
previously unproven suspicions about the dealings —and double-dealings—
surrounding the invasion of Cyprus. The following are revealed inter alia:
Kissinger’s express procrastination to help the Turkish government and military to gain time; British and US pressure on the Greek govemment(s) not to
resist the Turkish armed forces; high level French irritation at Britain’s attitude; Britain’s private anger at Turkish behaviour; and perhaps most significant in terms of today, Britain’s succumbing to American pressure and going
along with Kissinger’s wishes.
released (partially) by the British government for the year 1974 confirm
previously unproven suspicions about the dealings —and double-dealings—
surrounding the invasion of Cyprus. The following are revealed inter alia:
Kissinger’s express procrastination to help the Turkish government and military to gain time; British and US pressure on the Greek govemment(s) not to
resist the Turkish armed forces; high level French irritation at Britain’s attitude; Britain’s private anger at Turkish behaviour; and perhaps most significant in terms of today, Britain’s succumbing to American pressure and going
along with Kissinger’s wishes.
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