Geopolitical expediencies and foreign policy implications in Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria following the signing of the Lausanne Treaty

Abstract

The Asia Minor Catastrophe has left a host of problems that needed
immediate resolution. At that point in time, two mistakes of grave political
significance, developed into severe blows weakening further the already
enfeebled Greek foreign policy. The first mistake was committed by the renowned international relations expert, Nikolaos Politis, who served as the
Greek representative in the League of Nations. Politis and his Bulgarian opposite number, Christo Kalfvf concluded a Protocol, the so-called Politis-Kalfvf
Protocol- which recognized the slavophone population of Macedonia as Bulgarians. The second mistake was committed by General Theodores Pangalos, a well-respected figure, who gained his reputation in the war of Asia Minor. The
second mistake was far more critical than the first one, as Pangalos tried to
satisfy his secret wish to reoccupy Eastern Thrace, through a military dictatorship. Immediately after his ascent to power, he concluded with Yugoslavia a number of agreements, creating a network of relations favourable to Yugoslavia and establishing a Serbian port in Thessaloniki. Because of the onesided and burdensome nature these agreements had for Greece, they were
termed the “Pangalos’ Agreements”. The ensuing rise of Eleftherios Venizelos
to power marked the beginning of a new era in Greek politics. He laid down
new foundations, obeying the spirit of the League of Nations on international
cooperation and public diplomacy, revising at the same time, the Greek
foreign policy.