Ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα και δικαιοσύνη: προς μια γνωστικο-εξελικτική θεώρηση

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The concept of justice constitutes the core of Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of sociomoral reasoning. In his recent writings, Kohlberg (1986, Colby and Kohlberg, 1987) exemplifies through his longitudinal data the transformations of the justice concept from stage to stage. The present paper follows the structural changes in individual reasoning with respect to the justice concept and purports to examine whether the above transformations could correspond to changes in the modes the problem of human rights is conceived by the developing individual. During the first two stages of sociomoral development the conception of human rights is rudimentary, due to certain cognitive restrictions such as egocentrism and moral realism. The issue of human rights arises from the moment they are violated, usually by a superior power of some sort. Heteronomous respect for authority, which is the salient feature of preconventional reasoning, renders difficult the conception of human rights' violations as an issue of injustice, inherent in an imposed relationship. Substantial changes with respect to the attitudes adopted toward the basic human rights are expected to occur during the conventional (stages 3 and 4) level of sociomoral reasoning. At stage 3 the way reciprocity is understood manifests the existence of reversible logical operations; when such an understanding is applied to inter-group conflicts, it reduces the danger of infliction by the stronger partner and, be implication, the violation of the basic human rights. Still, the possibility of not generalizing the norm of reciprocity remains, at this stage, open. At stage 4 reasoning respect for human rights is an obvious pursuit of the legal system in every well-governed society. Although the relativity of the previous stage, in judging situations where human rights are at stake is now overcome, the fixation of stage 4 reasoning on whatever the social consensus considers as applicable, does not always warrants respect for human rights. The «prior-to-society» perspective of stage 5 sociomoral reasoning is the perspective of the rationally thinking individual who considers basic values and rights as the base of social Construction and functioning. From this respect, the validity of laws ate evaluated against the degree of protection they offer to basic social values and rights. For the stage 5 perspective basic human rights are not reversible, i.e. they cannot be congealed, not even with the consent of the majority. Such an attitude operates as a motive for the adoption of certain behavioral repertories which enhance respect for human rights. Two major factors, according to Kohlberg's model, operate as necessary prerequisites for the transition from one stage to the nest. The first known as "role-taking" is the capacity of the individual to put himself in somebody else's shoes. The second refers to the attainment of cognitive (Piagetian) operations which broaden sociomoral judgments. Finally, the cross-cultural validity of Kohlberg's theory is well-established, at least with respect to the preconventional and conventional stages.

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